SOUTH AFRICA. 



611 



ration of the offices of High Commissioner and 

 Governor of Cape Colony, but hoped that it would 

 be only temporary, and that Cape Colony would 

 retain its former preeminent position justified by 

 its size, population, extensive seaboard, and ma- 

 terial interests, and that in the future federal 

 union of all British South Africa the supreme 

 head of the commonwealth would be located in 

 Cape Town. 



When Lord Kitchener assumed command of the 

 British forces in South Africa on Nov. 29, 1900, 

 Gen. Christian de Wet, who had sustained a de- 

 feat at Bothaville, rallied his forces on the Dorn- 

 berg, east of Winburg, and Commandant Hertzog 

 assembled a force at the same time in the south- 

 west corner of the Orange River Colony. It was 

 known to the British that they contemplated an 

 invasion of Cape Colony, where they expected to 

 be joined by large numbers of Dutch colonials. 

 Commandant-Gen. Botha at the same time col- 

 lected a force of 5,000 men in the eastern Trans- 

 vaal with the probable intention of invading 

 Natal and advancing upon Durban. De Wet with 

 the main invading column planned to advance 

 south by way of De Aar, Hertzog to pro- 

 ceed to Lambarts Bay, where, according to the 

 English account, a ship from Europe was ex- 

 pected to land volunteers, guns, and ammunition; 

 both forces were then to join in an attack on 

 Cape Town. If the Cape and Natal Afrikanders 

 rose with spirit and unanimity against the British 

 the republican generals expected to wrest from 

 them, if not their sea base, their lines of com- 

 munication with the base, which would place the 

 great British army in South Africa at their 

 mercy. Helpless for offensive operations the 

 British were already, because Lord Roberts, in 

 the belief that the war was ended and the mass 

 of the Boer population ready to accept British 

 sovereignty and settle down to the pursuits of 

 peace if they could only be protected from the 

 solicitation and coercion of the irreconcilable fire- 

 brands whose forces were reduced to roving guer- 

 rilla bands, had in fulfilment of his promise of 

 protection given to the burghers who surrendered 

 after the fall of Bloemfontein and Pretoria placed 

 garrisons, in the richest districts of both republics 

 as well as on the railroads, and all the effective 

 troops that were not so employed were needed 

 to convoy supplies to these scattered garrisons. 

 Some of the convoys and even garrisoned posts 

 were successfully attacked by the Boers, and the 

 British troops, worn out by a severe campaign, 

 lacking horses, and often deprived of food sup- 

 plies by the active commandoes, had all they 

 could do to hold their positions. The total 

 strength of the Boer forces was never known to 

 the British. The population of the republics was 

 probably underestimated -from the beginning. 

 Their fighting strength was perhaps 50 per cent, 

 greater than was reported by the British intelli- 

 gence department, which had no useful military 

 map of the seat of war until at an advanced 

 stage of the campaign the Transvaal Government 

 map that was in the custody of a SAviss printer 

 was obtained by bribery. The number of foreign 

 volunteers, the adherence of the majority of the 

 Uitlander population to the republican cause, the 

 almost unanimous sympathy of the colonial 

 Dutch and of a considerable proportion of the 

 British colonials for the Boers, all came as sur- 

 prises to the British generals and statesmen. The 

 assemblage of considerable Boer forces in the 

 field with guns, horses, and ample supplies about 

 the time that President Kruger reached Europe 

 was a new surprise. Lord Kitchener, however, 

 on taking command abandoned the policy of pro- 



tecting the surrendered burghers, evacuated all 

 posts away from the railroad.-! excepting the Tha- 

 banchu line protecting Cape Colony, Imiit fortifi- 

 cations along the railroads to permit, the with- 

 drawal of a large part of the troops guarding 

 communications, and by these measure- .-,(.- 1 free 

 troops for field operations, which \vcn; supple- 

 mented by numerous irregular mounted corps 

 that were enlisted to fight guerrillas with their 

 own tactics. In evacuating the country Lord 

 Kitchener established central refuge camps alon^ 

 the railroad lines where surrendered burgher.s 

 could live under effective military protection. 

 He also instituted the policy of devastating the 

 adjacent districts and bringing into the camps 

 the families of burghers still under arms, the 

 members of which were for a time purposely 

 starved as a means of compelling the fathers to 

 surrender, until the Minister of War placed his 

 interdict on this barbarous expedient. 



The earliest peace negotiations took place be- 

 fore the occupation of Pretoria. Gen. Chris Botha 

 asked Sir Redvers Buller in Natal what terms 

 Lord Roberts would offer. Gen. Buller suggested 

 to the commander-in-chief definite terms which 

 made no distinction between officers and men. 

 Lord Roberts replied from Johannesburg on June 

 3, 1900, that his terms were unconditional surren- 

 der, but that troops that surrendered arms and 

 horses and signed a pledge not to fight again 

 would be allowed to return to their homes with 

 the exception of those who had commanded por- 

 tions of the republican forces, or who had taken 

 an active part in the policy that brought about 

 the war, or who had been guilty of, or parties to, 

 wanton destruction of property, or had committed 

 acts contrary to the usages of war, the principal 

 officers to be detained until decision was made as 

 to their disposal. 



After the capture of Pretoria and the flight of 

 Paul Kruger to Europe Field-Marshal Lord Rob- 

 erts, the British commander-in-chief, called upon 

 Commandant-Gen. Louis Botha in the cause of 

 humanity to refrain from further resistance, as 

 the war could only be prolonged for a few weeks 

 in the face of the overwhelming British force, and 

 there would therefore be no loss of honor for the 

 Boers in laying down their arms after their gal- 

 lant struggle. Botha asked for a week's armis- 

 tice to enable him to telegraph to President Kru- 

 ger and to call the commanders of his scattered 

 forces to a council of war. Lord Roberts would 

 not agree to a cessation of operations, but offered 

 to make no farther advance northward or east- 

 ward for five days if the Boers would refrain 

 from attacking. The acting commandant-general 

 replied on June 15, 1900, that it was impossible 

 to accept an armistice which permitted movements 

 of British troops in all directions in the South 

 African Republic except east of Elands River Sta- 

 tion and north of the Volksrust and Johannesburg 

 Railroad. Lord Roberts, in answer to a complaint 

 of Commandant De Wet against the destruction 

 of farmhouses and the eviction of their occupants, 

 wrote on Aug. 3, 1900, that soldiers had been shot 

 from farmhouses flying the white flag and rail- 

 road and telegraph lines had been cut; therefore 

 he had found it necessary to burn down farm- 

 houses at or near which such deeds had been per- 

 petrated, and should continue to do so, the mis- 

 deeds of burghers being thus the cause of women 

 and children being rendered homeless. Sir Redvers 

 Buller, when opening the railroad to Delagoa Bay, 

 promised protection to burghers who remained 

 neutral, but burned or destroyed homesteads 

 whenever patrols were attacked or telegraph-lines 

 cut, and Lord Roberts in a communication to 



