SOUTH AFRICA. 



621 



-with impending destruction of the nation all hope 

 of preserving national sentiment would be lost. 

 Mr. Steyn was not discouraged. He hoped for 

 European complications, and relied on the grow- 

 ing uneasiness of the public mind in England. 

 The Transvaal leaders proposed to send an agent 

 to President Kruger to report the desperate con- 

 dition of affairs, or if they could not do this to 

 ask for an armistice in order to obtain the opinion 

 of the inhabitants of the two Boer states as to 

 making peace. Since the Free State Government 

 did not favor a peace policy they determined to 

 get the opinion of President Kruger and the depu- 

 tation of the republics in Europe. Accordingly 

 Gen. Botha asked Lord Kitchener to allow mes- 

 sengers to go to State-President Kruger in Eu- 

 rope to report to him the military situation with 

 .a view of terminating the war. Lord Kitchener 

 was willing to forward a cipher despatch, which 

 was accordingly sent. President Kruger and the 

 Boer deputies, Dr. W. J. Leyds, A. Fischer, A. D. 

 W. Wolmarans, and C. H. Wessels, replied that 

 they still had hopes of a satisfactory ending of 

 the long struggle, which the burghers should con- 

 tinue, while they on their part would see that the 

 captive women and children and the prisoners of 

 war would be provided for. On receiving this 

 reply Schalk Burger, President Steyn, Louis 

 Botha, and J. H. Delarey had a conference at 

 which they resolved that, taking into considera- 

 tion the material and personal sacrifices made by 

 the Afrikanders of Cape Colony and Natal and 

 the unbending persistence shown by the great 

 majority of the men and women of the republics, 

 they would accept no peace conditions by which 

 the national independence and existence of the 

 republics and the interests of their colonial 

 brothers should be the price paid. They believed 

 that after the destruction already done and the 

 losses suffered the surrender of independence 

 would result in the extinction of the Afrikander 

 nationality. Their determination to prosecute 

 the war vigorously for the maintenance of inde- 

 pendence was proclaimed on June 20. Steyn, De 

 "Wet, and Botha sent letters to Lord Kitchener 

 stating that they intended to go on fighting. 

 Peace delegates from the Afrikander Bond of Cape 

 Colony, ex-Ministers Sauer and Merriman, were 

 sent to England, and they pleaded to be heard 

 at the bar of the House of Commons, but they 

 received little attention. 



On Aug. 7 Lord Kitchener issued a proclama- 

 tion on instructions from the Colonial Secretary 

 declaring that, whereas the Orange Free State 

 and South African Republic had been annexed 

 and British forces Were in possession of their seats 

 of government, machinery of administration, 

 principal towns, and railroad lines, and whereas 

 35,000 burghers were prisoners or had submitted 

 and those still in arms were few in numbers and 

 without guns or regular military organization, 

 and therefore unable to carry on regular warfare, 

 but continued to make isolated attacks on posts 

 and detachments, to plunder and destroy prop- 

 erty, and to damage railroad and telegraph-lines, 

 therefore all field-cornets and leaders of armed 

 bands still resisting the British forces and all 

 members of the governments of the Orange Free 

 State and the South African Republic, unless 

 they surrendered before Sept. 15, would be per- 

 manently banished from South Africa and the 

 cost of 'the maintenance of the families of all 

 burghers in the field who failed to surrender be- 

 fore that date would be a charge on the property 

 of such burghers. 



The Boers, though courageous, were not ag- 

 gressive at any time, and their natural caution 



helped their present tactics, directed to prolonging 

 the war so as to wear out. t lie patience of the 

 British people and benefit by the political reac- 

 tion which the cost of the \vur in Mood and treas- 

 ure would produce in time.. They \\eie disap- 

 pointed in the expectation of seeing any party in 

 England come forward in favor ot their' independ- 

 ence. Only the Irish party took th;n -.-round. 

 Even the Radicals declared annexation to !,< irrev- 

 ocable, though they held out a prospect oi -elf- 

 government which Mr. Chamberlain shut oil' 

 when he altered Lord Kitchener's pledge oi elect- 

 ive colonial government at the earliest practica- 

 ble moment into a promise to introduce an elective 

 element after an indefinite period of Crown colony 

 government. The Boer commanders were the 

 political leaders, being elected to their position 

 by political methods. The lack of discipline and 

 cohesion in the Boer armies and the degree of 

 initiative assumed by the inferior officers were 

 favorable to the guerrilla operations. Although 

 fine shots, the Boers were not such excellent 

 marksmen as of old. Their shooting qualities 

 were those of still hunters, not of soldiers, and 

 they would not hold a position to the last. When 

 offensive operations were undertaken it was al- 

 ways the foreigners who bore the brunt of the 

 fighting. The religious sentiment predominated 

 in the Boer camps and they grieved at the slaugh- 

 ter they inflicted on the enemy no less than at 

 their own defeats. On the halt and in camp they 

 read the Bible or sang psalms. They tended 

 the British wounded with as much care as they 

 did their own and treated their prisoners kindly. 

 When a movement was proposed which was not 

 agreeable to the men no officer would make a 

 move; consequently many well-planned affairs 

 were ruined. Their lack of capacity for the offen- 

 sive prevented them as a rule from enjoying the 

 fruits of a tactical victory. From the beginning 

 Boers occasionally violated the rules of war, and 

 so did the British. When Lord Roberts, and 

 afterward Lord Kitchener, repudiated the accept- 

 ed customs of war on the ground that the Boers 

 had adopted guerrilla tactics, treating them as 

 rebels, and later as bandits, a designation against 

 which they feelingly protested, Botha and Delarey 

 still observed the rules of battle, but Kritzinger and 

 other guerrilla leaders adopted barbarous methods 

 in retaliation. When the hangings of Cape rebels 

 began the Boer delegation in Europe unanimously 

 advised the shooting of an English officer for 

 every Afrikander that was hanged. President 

 Kruger, however, would not eiive his consent to 

 the killing of prisoners. The Boer families in the 

 concentration camps were invaluable to the Brit- 

 ish as hostages. In spite of the blockhouses dot- 

 ting the railroads and the armored trains con- 

 stantly within call patrolling every section of the 

 line, the Boers could destroy trains and cut the 

 line almost where and when they pleased. Their 

 knowledge of the movements of the British was 

 perfect, and the feeling that every inhabitant of 

 the country, white or black, was a probable spy 

 was exasperating to the British commanders. In 

 the refuge camps the Boer women knew about 

 battles before the official report was issued, and 

 every movement of British troops found the Boer 

 commandoes prepared. The train-wreckers always 

 let supply-trains destined for the concentration 

 camps go through and blew up and plundered 

 only those carrying supplies for the troops. In 

 certain sections of the railroads, by an arrange- 

 ment with the trainmen, who deposited flour, 

 coffee, and sugar for them beside the track, they 

 refrained from destroying trains altogether. The 

 blockhouses and armored trains could not prevent 



