SOUTH AFRICA. 



625 



refugee camps in order to till pieces of ground 

 allotted to them with the right of retaining the 

 first and a share of subsequent crops. The block- 

 houses were of a pattern invented by Major Smith 

 tor the better defense of Ladysmith, consisting of 

 hexagonal erections having bullet-proof walls 

 made of two sheets of corrugated iron filled in 

 between with gravel, with loopholes for 10 or 15 

 men. The Boers avoided these blockhouses for a 

 time; then they devised a plan for attacking them 

 and captured one after another by stealing up to 

 the walls and using the loopholes against the 

 defenders inside. The military authorities were 

 on the point of abandoning the system when a 

 method of preventing such attacks was found in 

 entanglements of barbed wire in a broad lacework 

 so interwoven that they could not be cut. For the 

 protection of bridges masonry fortifications were 

 built. The first line of blockhouses away from 

 the main lines of transportation was the defensive 

 line from Bloemfontein through Thabanchu to 

 Ladybrand, intended to divide the northeastern 

 part of the Orange Free State from the southeast- 

 ern districts. When De Wet and his commando 

 broke through at Springhaans Nek the number 

 of posts was increased. Gen. Clements surrounded 

 Pretoria with a ring of blockhouses to protect the 

 town from Boer raids. A chain of blockhouses 

 was afterward carried west from Bloemfontein to 

 be manned by constabulary, and gradually ex- 

 tended along the Modder river to Jacobsdal, with 

 a ramification stretching through Petrusburg to 

 Fauresmith. Blockhouses were employed later in 

 clearing and holding difficult parts of the Trans- 

 vaal, such as the Schurveberg and the Zwart 

 kopjes northwest of Johannesburg, Commando 

 Nek in the Magaliesberg, which was connected 

 with Krugersdorp by a chain of blockhouses, and 

 the line of the Mooi river. In the autumn a line 

 of posts was built between the Wilge river on 

 the railroad to Komatipoort and Greylingstad on 

 the railroad to Standerton. It was decided also 

 to extend the line from Krugersdorp through the 

 Losberg. Besides the infantry garrisons in the 

 blockhouses mounted troops patrolled day and 

 night between them. In October the Bethel dis- 

 trict in the eastern Transvaal where the repub- 

 lican Government had long held sway was made 

 the field of blockhouse extensions, the railroad 

 from Pretoria to Pietersburg was protected by 

 these erections, and they were placed along ail 

 the exposed branches of the Cape railroad net- 

 work. Still the enclosed areas were not sufficient- 

 ly cleared or sufficiently protected in any part of 

 the republics or in the disaffected districts of the 

 old colonies to allow the resumption of farming 

 and other business. 



Lord Kitchener's proclamation had not the 

 slightest effect in leading the active Boer com- 

 manders to surrender, some of whom had already 

 lost their families, others -their property, and 

 none of them cared to come under British rule. 

 It made the conflict more bitter and desperate. 

 The Boer deputies in Europe made the proclama- 

 tion the pretext on which a fresh appeal for arbi- 

 tration was made, which was addressed to The 

 Hague Tribunal. That body took no notice of 

 the application, because it had no power of initi- 

 ative and can only act on the application of 

 both interested parties. Lord Kitchener in a sub- 

 sequent proclamation ordered the sale of the prop- 

 erties of burghers still in the field to provide for 

 the maintenance of their families. Whenever a 

 Boer officer was captured after Sept. 15 a sen- 

 tence of perpetual banishment was promulgated. 

 Martial law in Cape Colony caused many who 

 had secretly aided the commandoes or who had 



been suspected of doing KO to join thorn. Others- 

 who were wavering or inclined to UK- peace party 

 became rebels when friends, relatives, or neigh- 

 bors were hanged. Many were ;ilien;ii.ed bv the 

 hardships which the application <>\ the mifitary 

 laws brought upon themselves. Kven the loyalist 

 colonists smarted under a regime that, st-ipped all 

 business and subjected them to the tyrannical 

 caprices of the local commandants. A written 

 permit was required for every act. At an early 

 hour in the evening everybody had to be indoors 

 with all lights out. Foreign newspapers and. 

 periodicals were interdicted and English papers 

 were kept back for weeks by the censor. The 

 farmers had all their horses and most of their 

 cattle requisitioned at prices mostly far below 

 their worth, though some favorites got more than 

 the value of their stock. Those who still had 

 beasts to till the land could not take their prod- 

 uce to market without first making a trip to get 

 a pass. All firearms and ammunition were taken 

 away from the whites, and under the circum- 

 stances British and Dutch colonists alike saw 

 with alarm the arming of large numbers of Kaf- 

 firs and Bastaards. In August the country stores- 

 in certain districts were closed and all goods re- 

 moved to large towns to prevent their falling 

 into the hands of the Boers. Country residents- 

 were not allowed to have more than enough pro- 

 visions to last a week. Later whole districts in 

 Cape Colony and Natal were cleared and denuded 

 as in the Boer states. In October martial law- 

 was extended to East London, Grahamstown,. 

 Port Elizabeth, and the Cape peninsula. No one 

 was permitted to enter or leave by sea or land 

 without a permit, and letters and telegrams were 

 subject to censorship, as well as all newspapers- 

 and pamphlets. East Griqualand and Tembuland 

 were placed under martial law because the Boers 

 drew supplies from the natives. 



The object of Gen. Sir J. French's operations 

 in Cape Colony, begun in July, was to drive the 

 commandoes northward to the line of blockhouses 

 stretching from De Aar east, or, if they broke- 

 through or passed round the end of this line, to- 

 chase them over the Orange river. Against 

 Scheepers in his mountain fastness near Graaf 

 Reinet four columns operated. Scheepers had 

 burned the public buildings in Murraysburg. 

 Other columns were chasing Kritzinger, whose 

 force was already broken up. The pursuit of 

 Van Reenen, Fouche, and other leaders was begun 

 at the same time. On July 13 Scheepers's laager 

 in the Camdeboo mountains was captured and 

 25 prisoners were taken. Five-sixths of this com- 

 mando and of most of the others were Cape rebels. 

 Scheepers and most of his men escaped, and in 

 the following week at Beaufort West they cap- 

 tured a train from Cape Town loaded with stores 

 and carrying recruits for the British army. Of 

 113 soldiers on board 21 were killed or wounded. 

 The principal commandoes were scattered over the 

 country between Beaufort West and Queenstown 

 south of De Aar and Stormberg. The British 

 sent into this region the pick of their army, and 

 the extraordinary strength and activity of 

 French's columns kept the Boers on the move. 

 The Herschel district in the north was troubled 

 by parties of Kritzinger's commando, who were 

 left alone, as also were the invaders in the west 

 who received support from the inhabitants. To 

 facilitate his great drive Gen. French had some 

 districts in the center cleared of inhabitants and 

 food supplies. The difficulty of the Boers in the 

 Cape rebellion at this time was not to get recruits, 

 but to provide them with arms. They had an 

 abundance of Mauser rifles buried, but no Mauser 



