UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (TiiE SUPRKMK COURT.) 



663 



troversies between the States, and held that the 

 demurrer could not be sustained, and the same 

 was overruled and leave was given to the de- 

 fendants to file answer to the bill. The Chief Jus- 

 tice and Justices Harlan and White dissented. 



Divorces. April 15, 1901, the court decided 3 

 cases involving the validity in one State of di- 

 vorce decrees granted in other States. In Ather- 

 ton vs. Atherton, the husband and wife had been 

 domiciled in Kentucky. The wife left the hus- 

 band and returned to her mother's home in New 

 York. The husband obtained a divorce in a Ken- 

 tucky court, on the ground of abandonment. No- 

 tice was served upon the wife in accordance with 

 the laws of Kentucky, by mailing to her address 

 a copy of the petition. Subsequently the wife, 

 in the New York court, applied for a divorce, and 

 the New York Court of Appeals held that the 

 Kentucky decree was no bar to the suit. This 

 was reversed by the Supreme Court, Chief-Justice 

 Fuller and Justice Peckham dissenting. In this 

 case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court 

 of the State which had always been the undoubted 

 domicil of the husband, and which was the only 

 matrimonial domicil of the husband and wife. 

 The question was as to the validity of that di- 

 vorce, granted after notice had been given as re- 

 quired by the statutes of Kentucky. As the pro- 

 ceeding was regular, the decree \vas entitled to as 

 great credit by the courts of New York as it 

 receives in Kentucky. 



The other two cases also came from New York. 

 In Bell vs. Bell, the question of the validity of a 

 decree granted to the husband in Pennsylvania 

 was raised, and in Streilwolf vs. Streilwolf the 

 same question concerning a decree granted to the 

 husband in North Dakota. In both cases the 

 decrees were held to be invalid because neither 

 the husband nor the wife had domicil in the State 

 in which the divorce was granted. 



The Insular Cases. The court, May 27, 1901, 

 handed down its decisions in five of the so-called 

 " insular cases " which had been argued before it 

 some time previously, and concerned the relations 

 of the United States to its newly acquired terri- 

 torial possessions. 



The first case decided was that of De Lima et al. 

 vs. Bidwell, collector, the case coming to the Su- 

 preme Court from the circuit court of the United 

 States for the southern district of New York. 

 The question at issue was the legality of customs 

 duties upon goods imported from Porto Rico after 

 the ratification of the treaty with Spain of April 

 11, 1899, ceding Porto Rico to the United States, 

 and before the passage of the act of Congress to 

 provide revenues and a civil government for Porto 

 Rico, approved April 12, 1900, known as "the 

 Foraker act." The constitutionality of the col- 

 lection of the duties in this case had been affirmed 

 by the United States circuit court, but the Su- 

 preme Court reversed the decision and held that, 

 between the date of the ratification of a treaty 

 ceding territory to the United States and the date 

 upon which Congress legislated respecting the 

 revenue and customs laws to be enforced over 

 that territory, the territory was not foreign with- 

 in the meaning of the tariff laws, and no duties 

 on commerce between ports of the new territory 

 and any port of the United States could legally 

 be assessed and collected. Justice Brown deliv- 

 ered the opinion of the court. Justices Gray, 

 Shiras, McKenna, and White dissented. 



The case of Goetze vs. United States involved 

 the validity of duties collected on tobacco im- 

 ported from Porto Rico into the United States 

 after the ratification of the treaty with Spain, 

 but before the passage of the " Foraker act," and 



the case of Grossman >.s. 1'nited States involved 

 the validity of duties rolkrtrd OM liquors im- 

 ported from Hawaii in April, 11)00. after the pas- 

 sage of the resolution foi si.rmexa.Uon, but before 

 the taking effect of the act of April :>,(>, 11)00, 

 providing a government for Hawaii. The only 

 question in these cases was, whether J'orto Rico 

 and Hawaii, at the period mentioned, wen; do- 

 mestic or foreign territory, and in aerc,ida.riee with 

 the decision in the De Lima case the roust held 

 they were then a part of the United Stales mid 

 the importation not dutiable, reversing the action 

 of the Board of General Appraisers and the judg- 

 ment of the circuit court. 



The Dooley case involved the validity of duties 

 paid at the port of San Juan on goods imported 

 into Porto Rico from New York between July 20, 

 1898, and May 1, 1900. The court held that the 

 duties, which were levied under military orders 

 and prescribed by the President as Commander- 

 in-Chief and collected prior to the ratification of 

 the treaty ceding Porto Rico to the United States, 

 were legally collected, being justified by the laws 

 of war. Those collected after the ratification of 

 the treaty, however, were not legal, for the reason 

 that on that date Porto Rico ceased to be a for- 

 eign country and the tariff ceased to apply. Jus- 

 tices Shiras, McKenna, Gray, and White dissented. 



The Armstrong case was very much like the 

 Dooley case, and the decision in that case applied. 



The Downes case involved the question whether 

 goods from Porto Rico which entered the port of 

 New York after the passage of the " Foraker act " 

 were exempt from duty or subject to duty under 

 that act, which required the payment of " 15 per 

 cent, of the duties which are required to be levied, 

 collected, and paid upon like articles of mer- 

 chandise imported from foreign countries." The 

 decision sustained the constitutionality of the 

 Foraker act and the validity of the duties col- 

 lected thereunder. Justice Brown delivered the 

 opinion announcing the conclusion and judgment 

 of the court. He said : " A false step at this time 

 might be fatal to the development of what Chief- 

 Justice Marshall called the American empire. 

 Choice in some cases, the natural gravitation of 

 small bodies toward large ones in others, the 

 result of a successful war in still others, may 

 bring about conditions which would render the 

 annexation of distant possessions desirable. If 

 those possessions are inhabited by alien races, 

 differing from us in religion, customs, laws, meth- 

 ods of taxation, and modes of thought, the ad- 

 ministration of government and justice accord- 

 ing to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be 

 impossible, and the question at once arises whether 

 large concessions ought not to be made for a 

 time, that ultimately our own theories may be 

 carried out, and the blessings of a free govern- 

 ment under the Constitution extended to them. 

 We decline to hold that there is anything in the 

 Constitution to forbid such action." 



Justice White delivered a concurring opinion, 

 which was also concurred in by Justice Shiras 

 and Justice McKenna. Justice Gray also deliv- 

 ered a concurring opinion. The Chief Justice and 

 Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham dissented. 



The Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion, 

 said: "The logical result is, that Congress may 

 prohibit commerce altogether between the States 

 and Territories, and may prescribe one rule of 

 taxation in one Territory and a different rule in 

 another. That theory assumes that the Consti- 

 tution created a government empowered to ac- 

 quire countries throughout the world, to be gov- 

 erned by different rules than those obtaining in 

 the original States and Territories, and substitutes 



