56 



AEMY OPERATIONS. 



Illinois, and an Iowa battery. The 2d brigade, 

 commanded by Col. Vandever, consisted of the 

 9th Iowa, 25th Missouri, 3d Illinois cavalry, and 

 a battery. There were also two battalions of 

 the Iowa 3d cavalry and a mountain howitzer 

 battery of four guns. A considerable number of 

 sick soldiers belonging to many of these regi- 

 ments had been left at Rolla and Lebanon. 



On the 5th of March, a cold, blustering day, 

 snow having fallen so as to cover the ground, 

 as Gen. Curtis was engaged in writing, not ap- 

 prehending an immediate attack, he was in- 

 formed by scouts and fugitive citizens that the 

 enemy were rapidly approaching to give battle. 

 His cavalry would be at Elm Springs, twelve 

 miles distant, that night, and his infantry had 

 then passed Fayetteville. Couriers were im- 

 mediately sent to Gen. Sigel and Col. Carr to 

 move with their divisions to Sugar Creek. 



The Confederate forces were under the com- 

 mand of Gen. Van Dorn, who had arrived at 

 their camp on the 2d of March. They were stat- 

 ed to be composed of between twenty-five and 

 thirty thousand men, as follows: Missouri troops 

 under Brig.-Gen. Price ; Arkansas, Louisiana, 

 and Texan troops under Brig.-Gen. McCulloch ; 

 Choctaw, Cherokee, and Chickasaw Indians un- 

 der Brig.-Geu. Pike. 



Gen. Sigel, upon receiving the orders of 

 Gen. Curtis to march to Sugar Creek, and be- 

 coming aware of the dangerous position of his 

 command, immediately ordered Col. Sch;efer 

 to break up his camp, and send the cavalry 

 company to Osage Springs to cover his right 

 flank and to march with his regiment to Ben- 

 tonville. All the other troops he ordered to 

 be prepared to march at two o'clock on the 

 next morning. Commencing his march in the 

 morning, he reached Bentonville, and, retaining 

 a small force to set as a rear guard, he sent his 

 train forward. At ten o'clock it was reported 

 that large masses of troops, consisting of in- 

 fantry and cavalry, were moving from all sides 

 toward the front and both flanks of the rear 

 guard at Bentonville. By a mistake a part of 

 this force designed to act as rear guard had 

 gone forward, leaving about six hundred men 

 with five pieces of the light battery. These 

 troops were ordered by Gen. Sigel to march 

 in the following order : two companies of the 

 12th Missouri regiment at the head of the 

 column deployed on the right and left as 

 skirmishers, followed by the light battery ; one 

 company of the same regiment on the right 

 and one on the left of the pieces, marching by 

 the flank, and prepared to fire by ranks to 

 the right and left, the remainder of the regi- 

 ment being behind the pieces ; two companies 

 of cavalry to support the infantry on the right 

 and left, and the rest of the cavalry with one 

 piece of artillery following in the rear. Thus 

 the troops advanced slowly in this formation, 

 modified from time to time according to cir- 

 cumstances, fighting and repelling the enemy in 

 front, on the flanks, and rear, whenever he stood 

 or attacked, for five hours and a half, when re- 



enforcements from Gen. Curtis arrived. What 

 made this march a more difficult achievement, 

 was the condition of the roads, which were in 

 many places very narrow and badly cut up. 

 This movement brought Gen. Sigel's division 

 to the west end of Pea Ridge, where he formed 

 a junction with Gen. Davis and Col. Carr. 



On this day Gen. Curtis had been engaged 

 in diligently preparing earthwork defences 

 and cutting timber to check the progress 

 of the enemy along the Fayetteville road, 

 where they were confidently expected by him. 

 But during the day and the ensuing night Gen. 

 Van Dorn moved his entire army around the 

 west side of Gen. Curtis's army, so that Gen. 

 Price occupied the Fayetteville road north of 

 Gen. Curtis's camp, while Gens. McCulloch and 

 Mclntosh lay north of Gen. Sigel. Thus the 

 Confederate forces fronted south, and the divi- 

 sion under Gen. Price formed their left wing. 

 The distance apart of the main bodies of the 

 two wings of each army was nearly three miles, 

 thus forming in fact four distinct armies. 

 Gens. Van Dorn and Price were opposed to 

 Gen. Curtis, who had with him Gen. Davis and 

 Cols. Carr and Asboth, leaving one division 

 to Gen. Sigel opposed to Gens. McCulloch 

 and Mclntosh. Gen. Curtis was thus com- 

 pelled to make a change of front, and formed 

 it almost two miles further north and resting 

 on the brow of a range of hills fronting 

 north, called Pea Ridge. In this position the 

 enemy occupied the line of retreat for Gen. 

 Curtis, if defeated. The battle commenced on 

 the 7th on the right of Gen. Curtis's column, 

 and raged furiously during the entire day. The 

 brunt of it was borne by Col. Carr's division. 

 The Confederate forces, owing to their superior 

 numbers, the numerous and deep ravines and 

 the thick brush which covered the hills, suc- 

 ceeded in driving the Union right from the 

 ground occupied in the morning, with a severe 

 loss on both sides. They encamped on the 

 battle ground during the night, and the right 

 wing of Gen. Curtis fell back nearly a mile. 

 The field occupied by this portion of both 

 armies during the day did not exceed three 

 fourths of a mile in diameter. 



On the left wing Gen. McCulloch commenced 

 in the morning by moving his force to the south 

 and east, evidently intending to form a junc- 

 tion with Gens. Van Dorn and Price. Gen. 

 Sigel, perceiving this movement and the effect 

 it would have toward surrounding the Federal 

 force, sent forward three pieces of light artil- 

 lery, with a supporting force of cavalry, to take 

 a commanding position and delay the move- 

 ment of the enemy until the infantry could be 

 brought into proper position for an attack. 

 Hardly had the artillery obtained their position 

 and opened fire, when an overwhelming force 

 of the enemy's cavalry came down upon them, 

 scattering the cavalry and capturing the ar- 

 tillery. This terrible onslaught of the enemy 

 allowed their infantry to reach unmolested the 

 cover of a dense wood. On the west of this 



