86 



ARMY OPERATIONS. 



erals of division who had his personal confi- 

 dence. It is easy to see that here was matter 

 enough to cast a cloud upon the firmest mind. 

 But the general's resolution was promptly taken. 



" To follow the Confederates by land to Rich- 

 mond at this season of the year was a material 

 impossibility. An incident had just proved this 

 to be so. Gen. Stoneman, with a flying colnmn, 

 had been sent in pursuit of the enemy. This 

 column came up with the enemy on the Rappa- 

 hannock, along the railway to Gordonsville, and 

 had two engagements with him of no great im- 

 portance. Then came the rain. The fords 

 were swollen, the bridges carried away, the 

 watercourses could no longer be passed by 

 swimming; they were torrents. Stoneman's 

 column began to suffer for want of provisions, 

 and its situation was perilous. In order to com- 

 municate with the army, Stoneman had to send 

 two of McClellan's aides-de-camp, who had ac- 

 companied him, across a river on a raft of logs 

 tied together with ropes. 



" Such was the country before the army. 

 Furthermore, the enemy was burning and break- 

 ing up all the bridges. Now. with the wants of 

 the American soldier and the usual extravagance 

 of his rations, and with the necessity of trans- 

 porting everything through a country where 

 nothing is to be found, and where the least storm 

 makes the roads impassable, no army can live 

 unless it supports its inarch upon a navigable 

 watercourse or a railway. In Europe our mil- 

 itary administration assumes that the transpor- 

 tation service of an army of one hundred thou- 

 sand men can only provision that army for a 

 three days' march from its base of operations. 

 In America this limit must be reduced to a single 

 day. I need only add that upon the roads to 

 Richmond there were viaducts which it would 

 have required six weeks to reconstruct. 



"The land march was therefore abandoned, 

 and we came back to the movement by water. 

 But this operation also was no longer what it 

 had been when McClellan had conceived it. 

 The revelation of his plans to the enemy had 

 allowed the latter to take his precautions. The 

 evacuation of Manassas had preceded instead 

 of following the opening of the Federal cam- 

 paign. The movement by water could no 

 longer be a surprise. Unfortunately it was also 

 to lose the advantages of a rapid execution." 



The movement of troops had been as follows : 

 The last detachment of the Confederate army 

 left Manassas on the 9th of March. On the 

 morning of the 10th Gen. McClellan moved the 

 Army of the Potomac toward the deserted posi- 

 tion. The object of moving to Manassas waa 

 to verify its evacuation, to take the chance of 

 cutting off the enemy's rear guard, to deceive 

 the enemy, if possible, as to the real intentions 

 of Gen. McClellan, and to gain the opportunity 

 of cutting loose from all useless baggage, and 

 to give the troops a few days' experience in 

 bivouac and on the march. After reaching 

 Manassas, Gen. McClellan returned to "Washing- 

 ton on the 13th, and the army at once counter- 



marched, and on Sunday the 16th it was massed 

 in new positions near Alexandria, ready to em- 

 bark with the least possible delay. During the 

 ensuing week it began to embark on transports 

 at Alexandria for Fortress Monroe. The num- 

 ber of transports promised was to be sufficient 

 to convey fifty thousand men, but the number 

 collected was found to be hardly enough for 

 the conveyance of half that number. Instead 

 of moving the whole army with its equipage 

 at once, as it had been intended, a number of 

 trips were required. The embarkation com- 

 menced on the IVth of March. 



By reference to the order of the President 

 issued on the 8th of March (see p. 84), it will 

 be seen that the army was divided into five 

 corps. Of these, the corps of Gens. Banks and 

 McDowell did not embark. Of the second 

 corps, under Gen. Sumner, one division, that 

 of Gen. Blenker, was withdrawn and sent to 

 Gen. Fremont in the Mountain Department. 

 There remained therefore to be embarked, 

 two divisions under Gen. Sumner, three under 

 Gen. Heintzelman, and three under Gen. Keyes 

 being in all eight divisions. The Prince de 

 Joinville, in his statement of the numbers of 

 the entire army, says it consisted of "11 di- 

 visions of infantry, 8,000 to 10,000 strong; 1 

 division of regulars (infantry and cavalry), 

 6,000 strong ; 350 pieces of artillery. The total 

 effective force may have been 120,000 men." 

 From this number are to be deducted the corps 

 of Gen. McDowell and the division of Gen. 

 Blenker. This will make the effective force of 

 Gen. McClellan embarked for Fortress Monroe 

 about eighty-five thousand men. Two weeks 

 were occupied in transporting this force to 

 Fortress Monroe. 



It has been stated that Gen. Blenker's divi- 

 sion was withdrawn from Gen. Sumner's corps, 

 and sent to Gen. Fremont in the Mountain De- 

 partment. This was done one or two days be- 

 fore Gen. McClellan sailed. The reason given 

 was "political pressure" exercised to get a 

 command for Gen. Fremont. No military 

 reason was stated for this withdrawal. The 

 following letter from President Lincoln to Gen. 

 McClellan, produced at a court martial in Wash- 

 ington, thus explains it : 



"WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862. 

 Maj.-Gm. McClellan : 



Mr DEAR SIR : Your despatches complaining that 

 you are not properly sustained, while they do not of- 

 fend me, do pain me very much. 



Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before 

 you left here, and you know the pressure under which 

 I did it ; and, as I thought, acquiesced in it certainly 

 not without reluctance. 



After you left I ascertained that less than twenty 

 thousand unorganized men, without a single field bat- 

 ter; , were all you designed to be left for the defence 

 of Washington and Manassas Junction ; and part of 

 of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. 



Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas 

 Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Win- 

 chester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without 



be goue) a great 



