106 



ARMY OPERATIONS. 



thus get in the rear of Gen. Banks. The guard 

 at Front Eoyal consisted of the 1st Maryland 

 regiment, Col. Kerily, with three companies of 

 the 29th Pennsylvania, two rifled guns of 

 Knapp's battery, and two companies of the 

 5th New York cavalry. To their bravery is due 

 the partial defeat of the Confederate plan. On 

 Friday noon, May 23, the enemy were reported 

 to be approaching, and Col. Kenly formed in a 

 position about one mile east of the Shenandoah 

 river. The fight commenced by a strong dash 

 of cavalry under Col. Ashby upon this position. 

 After a contest of two hours the enemy were 

 repulsed with considerable loss. Finding that 

 a large force of infantry was approaching to 

 the aid of the cavalry, Col. Kenly ordered his 

 men to fall back to the west side of the Shenan- 

 doah and to destroy the bridges after them. 

 This was done in good order and the smaller 

 bridge destroyed ; but a Hanking force of the 

 enemy fording above came upon them before the 

 larger one was destroyed. Col. Kenly imme- 

 diately got his guns in position and formed his 

 men, and another struggle ensued, whicli check- 

 ed the enemy a couple of hours longer. Finding 

 the force of the enemy increasing, he placed his 

 artillery in the rear and commenced falling 

 back. This was continued for three miles, 

 when the force was overwhelmed by a charge 

 of the enemy, their lines broken, and no further 

 resistance could be made. Col. Kenly was 

 severely wounded, but afterward recovered. 

 This check retarded the Confederate advance. 



The news of this affair reached Gen. Banks 

 that evening, with such details as convinced him 

 that the enemy were afc hand with a force from 

 fifteen to twenty thousand strong. It was evi- 

 dent to him from the large Confederate force, 

 composed as it must be of all their troops in the 

 valley concentrated, that they were close upon 

 him for some purpose not yet developed. That 

 purpose must be nothing less than the defeat of 

 his own command, or its possible capture by 

 occupying "Winchester, and thus intercepting 

 supplies or reinforcements and cutting otf all 

 opportunity for retreat. Under this interpreta- 

 tion of the enemy's plans, one of three courses 

 was open for him to pursue : first, a retreat 

 across the little North Mountain to the Potomac 

 river on the west; second, an attack on the 

 enemy's flank on the Front Royal road ; third, 

 a rapid movement direct upon Winchester with 

 a view to anticipate the occupation of the town 

 by the enemy, and thus place his own command 

 in communication with its original base of oper- 

 ations in the line of reinforcements by Harper's 

 Ferry, and secure a safe retreat in case of disaster. 



To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded ; 

 to move over the mountains was to abandon his 

 train at the outset, and to subject his com- 

 mand to flank attacks, without possibility of 

 succor ; and to attack the enemy in such over- 

 whelming force could only result in certain de- 

 struction. It was, therefore, determined by Gen. 

 Banks that to enter the lists with the enemy in 

 a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the 



possession of Winchester, the key of the val- 

 ley, was, for him and his force, the path to 

 safety. 



Accordingly, the advance guard was called in, 

 and at three o'clock on the next morning several 

 hundred disabled men, left in charge by Gen. 

 Shields's division, were put upon the march to 

 Winchester, followed by the wagon train under 

 escort of cavalry and infantry. The rear was 

 protected by nearly the whole force of cavalry 

 and six pieces of artillery. The attack of the 

 enemy was expected in the rear. When all the 

 column except the rear guard had passed Cedar 

 Creek, three miles from Strasburg, informa- 

 tion was received from the front that the enemy 

 had attacked the train and was in full possession 

 of the road at Middletown. The danger being 

 now in front, the troops were ordered to the 

 head of the column and the train to the rear. 

 After this change the head of the column en- 

 countered the enemy in force, fifteen miles from 

 Winchester, who were attacked with artillery 

 and infantry and driven back some two miles. 

 The neglect of the enemy to attack the train 

 and throw it into confusion when at the head 

 of the column secured a successful continuation 

 of the march. On the remainder of the route 

 to Winchester, the enemy pressed the main 

 column with the utmost vigor, and defeated at 

 every point all efforts of detachments to effect 

 a junction with it. At five o'clock in the after- 

 noon the advance guard arrived at Winchester, 

 and Gen. Banks became satisfied that the force 

 of the enemy was not less than twenty-five 

 thousand men. His command consisted of two 

 brigades of less than four thousand men, with 

 nine hundred cavalry, ten Parrott guns, and one 

 battery of smooth six pounders. To this should 

 be added the 10th Maine regiment of infantry 

 and five companies of Maryland cavalry, station- 

 ed at Winchester. During the night Gen. 

 Banks determined to test the strength of the 

 enemy by actual collision, and measures were 

 promptly taken to prepare the troops. The 

 rolling of musketry was heard during the latter 

 part of the night, and before the break of day 

 a sharp engagement occurred at the outposts. 

 Soon after four o'clock the artillery opened its 

 fire, which continued without cessation until 

 the close of the engagement. 



The main body of the Confederates was hid- 

 den during the early part of the action by the 

 crest of a hill and the woods in the rear. 



Their force was massed apparently upon the 

 Federal right, and their manoeuvres indicated 

 a purpose to turn them upon the Berryville 

 road, where, it appeared subsequently, they had 

 placed a considerable force with a view of pre- 

 venting reinforcements from Harper's Ferry. 

 But the steady fire of the Federal lines held them 

 in check until a small portion of the troops, on 

 the right of the Federal line, made a movement 

 to the rear. This was done under the erroneous 

 impression that an order to withdraw had been 

 given. No sooner was this observed by the 

 enemy than its regiments swarmed upon the 



