ARMY OPERATIONS. 



125 



the extreme to our canse. I fear it will be a fatal blow. 

 Several days are necessary to complete the prepara- 

 tions for so important a movement as this, and while 

 they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration 

 may be given to my statement. This army is now in 

 excellent discipline and condition. We hold a de- 

 bouche on both banks of the James river, so that we 

 are free to act in any direction, and, with the assist- 

 ance of the gunboats, I consider our communications 

 as secure. 



We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are 

 not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight 

 a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, 

 which brings us practically within ten miles of Rich- 

 mond. Our longest line of land transportation would 

 be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid 

 of the gunboats we can supply the army by water, dur- 

 ing its advance, certainly to "within twelve miles of 

 Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five 

 miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the 

 way. From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of 

 about seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable 

 to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. 

 The result of the movement would thus be to march 

 one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now 

 only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves 

 entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water 

 transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization 

 of this army, which would ensue; the terrible depress- 

 ing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong 

 probability that it would influence foreign Powers to 

 recognize our adversaries; 'and these appear to me 

 sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to 

 urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language, 

 that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from re- 

 calling this army, it may be promptly reenforced to 

 enable it to resume the offensive. 



It may be said that there are no reinforcements 

 available. I point to Gen. Burnside's force, to that of 

 Gen. Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence 

 in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those 

 portions of the Army of the West not required for a 

 strict defence there. Here, directly in front of this 

 army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all 

 our resources should be collected to strike the blow 

 which will determine the fate of this nation. All points 

 of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandon- 

 ed, and every available man brought here. A decided 

 victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion 

 is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we 

 may meet with elsewhere, here is the true defence of 

 Washington ; it is here, on the bank of the James river, 

 that the fate of the Union should be decided. 



Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the con- 

 sciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated 

 solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambi- 

 tious or selfish motives have influenced me from the 

 commencement of this war; I do now what I never 

 did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be 

 rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with 

 a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of mv pow- 

 er, devoting to the movement, which I clearly foresee 

 will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, what- 

 ever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be, 

 and may God grant that I am mistaken in mv fore- 

 bodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction 

 that I have written and spoken frankly, and have 

 sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster 

 from my country. 



GE'O. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. 



Gey. HALLECK TO GEX. MCCLELLAX. 



WASHINGTON, Aug 6, ISM. 

 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McCUllan, Commanding, &c., 



Berk-eley, Va. : 



GENERAL Your telegram of yesterday was re- 

 ceived this morning, ana I immediately telegraphed a 

 brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. 

 You, General, certainly could not have been more 

 pained at receiving my "order than I was at the neces- 

 sity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in 



whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the 

 order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined 

 not to do so until'l could learn your wishes from a per- 

 sonal interview ; and even after that interview I tried 

 every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your 

 army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared~to de- 

 lay it. I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and 

 inconsiderate act,"but one that caused me more anxious 

 thought than any other of my life. But after full and 

 mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was re- 

 luctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be 

 issued. There was to my mind no other alternative. 



Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. 

 You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the 

 enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 

 men. Since then you and others report that they have 

 received and are receiving large reinforcements from 

 the south. General Pope s army, now covering Wash- 

 ington, is only 40,000. Your effective force is only 

 about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, 

 and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety. With the enemy 

 directly between you, ready to fall with his superior 

 numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect, 

 neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack. 



If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, 

 Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be 

 left uncovered and exposed. If vour force be reduced 

 to strengthen Pope, you would "be too weak to even 

 hold the position you occupy should the enemy turn 

 round and attack von in full force. In other words, the 

 old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with 

 the entire force of the enemy directly between them. 

 They cannot be united by land without exposing both 

 to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send 

 Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under pres- 

 ent circumstances, a military impossibility. The only 

 alternative is to send the forces on the "peninsula to 

 some point by water sav Fredericksburg where the 

 two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some 

 of the objections which you have urged. 



You say that to withdraw from the present position 

 will cause the certain demoralization of the army, 

 which is now in excellent condition and discipline. I 

 cannot understand why a simple change of position to 

 a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an 

 army in excellent discipline, unless the officers them- 

 selves assist in the demoralization, which I am satisfied 

 they will not. Your change of front from your extreme 

 right at Hanover Court House to your present position 

 was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it 

 demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe 

 losses they sustained in effecting it. 



A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericks- 

 burg, brings you within about sixty miles of Rich- 

 mond, and secures a reinforcement of forty or fifty 

 thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change, 

 with such advantages, will, I think, if properly repre- 

 sented to your army, encourage rather than demor- 

 alize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested 

 that a junction might be effected" at Yorktown, but 

 that a flank march across the peninsula would be more 

 hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will 

 remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further 

 from Richmond than Fredericksburg is. Besides the 

 latter is between Richmond and Washington, and 

 covers Washington from any attack by the enemy. 



The political effect of the withdrawal may at first 

 look unfavorable, but I think the public are beginning 

 to understand its necessity ; and that they wm have 

 much more confidence in a united army "than in its 

 separate fragments. But you will reply," Why not re- 

 enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from 

 my present position ? To do this, you said at our 

 interview that you required 50,000 additional troops. 

 I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. 

 You finally thought you would have " some chance " 

 of success with 20,000 ; but you afterward telegraphed 

 to me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was 

 being largely reenforced. 



If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, 

 your requisition was perfectly reasonable ; but it was 



