ARMY OPERATIONS. 



151 



been ordered to the rear in consequence of the 

 difficulty of obtaining forage in the mountain- 

 ous region. On the hills and in the defiles 

 between Mt. Vernon and the State line, ten 

 thousand men would be as effective as forty 

 thousand in resisting an army. The pursuit of 

 the Confederate forces now lost all of its impor- 

 tance. 



The result of the invasion of Kentucky was 

 undoubtedly regarded by the Confederate lead- 

 ers as successful in obtaining supplies, but they 

 were greatly chagrined at the tardiness of the 

 Kentuckians to rally around the Confederate 

 standard. The desertions from their force ex- 

 ceeded the number of recruits obtained. The 

 Confederate forces now retired into east Ten- 

 nessee, and Gen. Buell fell back to the line be- 

 tween Louisville and Nashville, where he was 

 superseded in the command by Major-Gen. 

 Kosecrans, under the orders of President Lin- 

 coln. Col. Morgan, with a small guerilla force, 

 still remained in the State. The invasion of 

 eastern Kentucky, by the Confederate forces, 

 cut off the line of communication between the 

 Federal forces at Cumberland Gap in east Ten- 

 nessee and the north. It was followed by the 

 evacuation of that strong position by the Union 

 General, G. W. Morgan. 



Cumberland Gap is south and a little east of 

 Lexington, Ky., and about one hundred and 

 fifty miles distant. It is a natural gap in a 

 mountain nearly eighty miles in length. There 

 are other places in this long mountain which 

 are called gaps, but this name is given more from 

 the fact that the summit at those places is of 

 more easy access than because of any natural 

 depression of the mountain. At the place called 

 Roger's Gap, next to Cumberland, and eighteen 

 miles west, there is actually no gap ; but the 

 road, taking advantage of a succession of ridges 

 on the northern side and running diagonally on 

 the southern side, is rendered passable by man 

 and beast, and may, by great exertions, be 

 passed over by wagons and cannon. The dis- 

 tance from the beginning of the ascent on the 

 one side to the ending of the descent on the 

 other is a little more than five miles. Sixteen 

 miles further west is Big Creek Gap, the cross- 

 ing at which is a little more difficult. 



The mountain on each side of Cumberland 

 Gap ia about twelve hundred feet high. In 

 the gap it is only four hundred feet. The road 

 through the notch is a good one. On the 

 southern side the mountain is abrupt in some 

 places and almost perpendicular, and the sum- 

 mit is inaccessible without the greatest danger, 

 except by entering the gap and ascending on 

 either the right or left. The northern side is 

 more irregular, breaking off in a succession of 

 smaller mountains and hills, to the valley lying 

 between the gap and Cumberland Ford. But 

 the main mountain towers far above its neigh- 

 bors. Two roads from Lexington. Ky., lead 

 to the gap. One passes through Nicholasville, 

 Crab Orchard, and Mt. Vernon, by the way 

 of Wild Cat. The other passes through Rich- 



mond, by way of Big Hill. From London, 

 Ky., there is but one road. It is flanked on 

 each side by a succession of hills and moun- 

 tains, and passes through Barboursville, and 

 crosses the Cumberland Ford. Wagons or 

 cannon could scarcely pass by any other route. 

 This position was important to the Confed- 

 erate Government, as by its occupation in 

 force they could hold possession of east Tennes- 

 see, and prevent any approach from the north 

 to cut their northern railroad line of connec- 

 tion between Richmond and northern Alabama, 

 Mississippi, Nashville, Memphis, and other 

 towns on the Mississippi. Its occupation was 

 also necessary to sustain their advance into 

 eastern Kentucky. A small Confederate force, 

 therefore, took possession of the gap soon after 

 the commencement of hostilities. On the 

 other hand, its possession was important to the 

 Federal Government, as thereby it prevented 

 the invasion of Kentucky from the southeast. 

 It was also the stronghold of east Tennessee, 

 a section in which there existed among the 

 people a stronger and more invincible attach- 

 ment to the Union than in any other portion 

 of the seceded States. After the defeat of the 

 Confederate forces in southeastern Kentucky, 

 under Gen. Zollicoffer, a body of Federal 

 troops advanced in the direction of Cumberland 

 Gap. On the loth of February, they were en- 

 camped near Cumberland Ford, about ten miles 

 from the gap, which was then occupied by 

 about two thousand Confederate soldiers. 

 Scouting parties were sent out from the camp 

 near the ford, one of which penetrated the gap 

 and captured a few prisoners. On the 13th 

 of March, another expedition consisting of 

 about 12 companies of infantry and 86 cav- 

 alry, started from camp near Barboursville, 

 Ky., and crossing the mountain near Big Creek 

 Gap. after four days reached Powell's Valley, 

 five miles from Jacksborough, where a body of 

 about four hundred Confederate cavalry was 

 surprised and routed, and their camp taken 

 possession of. Another body at Jacksborough, 

 about two' hundred in number, was next driven 

 out. After remaining four days, the Federal 

 force retired. On the 21st, a strong expedi- 

 tion moved upon the gap and made an attack, 

 and cannonading ensued without any impor- 

 tant result except developing the Confederate 

 strength. The Confederate occupation of the 

 gap continued without any serious interference 

 until Chattanooga was occupied by the forces 

 of Gen. Mitchell, as has been stated. This led 

 to its evacuation about the 10th of June. Pre- 

 vious to that date. Gen. Geo. ~W. Morgan, with 

 a division of Union troops, advanced from 

 Cumberland Ford, and crossing at Roger's 

 Gap, prepared to cut off the supplies for the 

 small force then at Cumberland Gap. Their 

 stock at the time was small ; the Confederate 

 forces under Gen. E. K. Smith had moved 

 south from east Tennessee, and the Union 

 forces at hand being large, and threatening in 

 front and rear, no alternative remained to the 



