ARMY OPERATIONS. 



167 



ment have been effected on the hanks of the 

 North Anna. Nearly thirty days elapsed be- 

 fore the pontoons arrived and the bridges were 

 completed. The ensuing military operations 

 were investigated by a committee of Congress, 

 before whom Gen. Burnside testified as follows : 



Gen. Halleck came down to see me on the llth of 

 November. On the 9th I made out a plan of opera- 

 tions, in accordance with the order of Gen. Halleck, 

 which directed me not only to take the command, but 

 also to state what I proposed to do with it. That plan 

 I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November, and 

 sent it by special messenger to Washington. I can 

 furnish the committee a copy of that plan if they de- 

 sire it I do not have it here now. 



Question. State the substance of it, if you please. 

 That may do as well. 



Answer. I stated, in substance, that I thought it 

 advisable to concentrate the army in the neighborhood 

 of Warrenton, to make a small movement across the 

 Eappahannock as a feint, with a view to divert the at- 

 tention of the enemy, and lead them to believe we 

 were going to march in the direction of Gordonsville, 

 and then to make a rapid movement of the whole 

 army to Fredericksburg, on this side of the Rappa- 

 hannock. 



As my reasons for that, I stated that the farther we 

 got into the interior of Virginia, the longer would be 

 our lines of communication and the greater would be 

 the difficulty we would have in keeping them open, as 

 the enemy had upon our right flank a corps that al- 

 most at any time could, by a rapid movement, serious- 

 ly embarrass us. If we were caught by the elements 

 so far from our base of supplies, and at the same time 

 in the enemy's country, where they had means of get- 

 ting information that" we had not, it might, I thought, 

 prove disastrous to the army, as we had but one line 

 of railway by which to supply it. 



In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the 

 time be as ngar Washington as would the enemy, and 

 after arriving at Fredericksburg, we would be at a 

 point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if 

 we should take Gordonsville. On the Gordonsville 

 line, the enemy, in our opinion, would not give us a 

 decisive battle" at anv place this side of Richmond. 

 They would defend Gordonsville until such time as 

 they felt they had given us a check, and then with so 

 many lines of railroad open to them, they would move 

 upon Richmond or upon Lynchburg, and in either 

 case the difficulty of following them would be very 

 great. 



In connection with this movement I requested that 

 barges filled with provisions and forage should be 

 floated to Aquia Creek, where they could easily be 

 landed; that materials be collected for the reconstruc- 

 tion of the wharves there, and that all the wagons in 

 Washington that could possibly be spared should be 

 filled with hard bread and small commissary stores, 

 and, with a large number of beef cattle, started down 

 to Fredericksburg on the road by way of Dumfries ; 

 and that this wagon train and load of cattle should be 

 preceded by a pontoon train large enough to span the 

 Rappahannock twice. I stated that this wagon train 

 could move in perfect safety, because it would be all 

 the time between our army and the Potomac ; or in 

 other words our army would be all the time between 

 the enemy and that" train. But at the same time I 

 said that if a cavalry escort could not be furnished 

 from Washington, I would send some of my cavalry 

 to guard the train. 



On the morning of the 14th of November, feeling 

 uneasy with reference to the pontoons, as I had not 

 heard of their starting, I directed my chief engineer to 

 telegraph again in reference to them. 



He telegraphed to Gen. Woodbury or to Major 

 Spaulding. It subsequently appeared that that was 

 the first they ever had heard of any wish to have the 

 pontoon train started down to Fredericksburg, although 

 the authorities in Washington had had my plans sent 



to them on the 9th of November; and it had also been 

 discovered by Gen. Halleck and Gen. Meigs, at my 

 headquarters, on the night of the llth and 1-Jth of No- 

 vember; and after discovering it fully there, they sat 

 down and sent telegrams to Washington, which, as I 

 supposed, fully covered the case, and would secure the 

 starting of the pontoon trains at once. I supposed, 

 of course, that those portions of the plan which re- 

 quired to be attended to in Washington would be car- 

 ried out there at once. I could have sent officers of 

 my own there to attend to those matters, and perhaps 

 I made a mistake in not doing so, as Gen. Halleck af- 

 terward told me that I ought not to have trusted to 

 them in Washington for the details. 



In reply to the telegram I had ordered to be sent, 

 Gen. TN oodbury telegraphed back that the pontoon 

 train would sta'rt on Sunday morning probably, and 

 certainly on Monday morning, which would have been 

 on the 16th and 17th of November, and would have 

 been in time. They did not, however, start until the 

 20th, and on that day it commenced raining, which 

 delayed them so much and the roads became so bad 

 that when they got to Dumfries they floated the pon- 

 toons off the wagons. We then sent to Washington 

 for a steamer, and carried them down to Aquia Creek 

 by water, sending the wagons around by land. The 

 pontoons did not get here until the 22d or 23d of No- 

 vember. 



On the loth of November I started the column down 

 the road to Fredericksburg, not knowing anything 

 about the delay in the starting of the pontoons, because 

 the telegram announcing the delay did not reach War- 

 renton Junction until I had left to come down here 

 with the troops, and that telegram did not reach me 

 until I arrived here on the morning of the 19th, when 

 it was handed to me by an orderly who had brought it 

 down to Warrenton Junction. 



After reaching here I saw at once that there was no 

 chance for crossing the Rappahannock with the army 

 at that time. It commenced raining and the river be- 



fan to rise not to any great extent, but I did not 

 now how much it might rise. There were no means 

 of crossing except by going up to the fords, and it 

 would be impossible to do that because of the inability 

 to supplv the troops after they should cross. 



Gen. Sumner, with his command, arrived here in 

 advance. He sent to me, asking if he should cross the 

 river. He was very much tempted to take his own 

 men across to Fredericksburg by a ford near Falmouth, 

 as there was no enemy there except a very small force. 

 I did not think it advisable that he should cross at 

 that time. 



The plan I had in contemplation was, if the stores 

 and these bridges had come here as I expected, to 

 throw Sumner's whole corps across the Rappahan- 

 nock, fill the wagons with as many small stores as we 

 could, and having beef cattle along for meat, then to 

 make a rapid movement down in the direction of Rich- 

 mond and try to meet the enemy and fight a battle be- 

 fore Jackson could make a junction there. We knew 

 that Jackson was in the valley, and felt confident that 

 there was force enough on the upper Rappahannock to 

 take care of him. We felt certain that as soon as the 

 enemy knew of our crossing down here, the force of 

 Jackson would be recalled, and we wanted to meet this 

 force and beat it before Jackson could come down on 

 our flank and perhaps cripple us. 



I had recommended that some supplies should be 

 sent to the mouth of the Rappahannock with a view 

 of establishing a department at Port Royal. After 

 we had advanced to Fredericksburg, and after the 

 first delay in starting the pontoons, I think they were 

 sent as quickly as they could have been, and the sup- 

 plies and quartermasters' stores have been always in 

 as great abundance as we could have expected, for 

 after the 19th of November the roads were particular- 

 ly bad. Horses and mules were sent down to us, so 

 that our cavalry and teams were in very good condi- 

 tion. 



After it was ascertained that there must be a delay, 

 and that the enemy had concentrated such a force 



