168 



AEMY OPERATIONS. 



as to make it very difficult to cross, except by a num- 

 ber of bridges, we commenced bringing up from 

 Aquia Creek all the pontoons we could. Alter enough 

 of them had been brought up to build the bridges, I 

 called several councils of war to decide about crossing 

 the Rappahannock. It was at first decided to cross 

 at Shinkcr's Neck, about twelve miles below here, 

 but our demonstration was simply for the purpose of 

 , drawing down there as large a force of the enemy as 

 possible. 



I then decided to cross here because, in the first 

 place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us to 

 cross here but down below. In the next place I felt 

 satisfied that this was the place to fight the most de- 

 cisive battle, because if we could divide their forces 

 by penetrating their lines at one or two points, sepa- 

 rating their left from their right, then a vigorous at- 

 tack with the whole army would succeed in breaking 

 their army in pieces. 



The enemy had cut a road along on the rear of the 

 line of the heights where we made our attack, by 

 means of which they connected the two wings of 

 their army, and avoided a long detour round through 

 a bad country. I obtained from a colored man from 

 the other side of the town information in regard to this 

 new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to 

 obtain possession of the new road, and that was my 

 reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I 

 did not intend to make the attack on the right until 

 that position had been taken, which I supposed would 

 stagger the enemy, cutting their lines in two. And 

 then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front, 

 and drive them out of the works. 



By Mr. Gooch : Do I understand you to say that it 

 was your understanding that Gen. Halleck and Gen. 

 Meigs, while at your headquarters in Warrenton, and 

 before you commenced the movement of your army, 

 sent orders to Washington for the pontoons to be im- 

 mediately forwarded to Falmouth? 



Answer : That was my understanding, certainly. 



Question : In your judgment, could the pontoons 

 have been forwarded to you in time for you to have 

 crossed the Rappahannock when you expected, if all 

 possible efforts nad been made by those charged with 

 that duty? 



Answer : Yes, sir, if they had received their orders 

 in time. 



Question : Did the non-arrival of these pontoons at 

 the time you expected prevent your crossing when you 

 expected to cross and interfere with the success of 

 your plans ? 



Answer : Yes, sir. 



Thus it was the design of Gen.Burnside that 

 the pontoons should leave Alexandria on Nov. 

 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time 

 with the advance of his army. The right grand 

 division reached Falmouth on Nov. 17. The 

 pontoons left Alexandria on Nov. 19, and ar- 

 rived at Fredericksburg after the movements 

 of Gen. Burnside had not only become known, 

 but after Gen. Lee had advanced his forces 

 from Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of 

 Fredericksburg, and had fortified them. They 

 were not used until the night of Dec. 10. 



A plan for the movements of Gen. Burnside 

 had now been arranged between President 

 Lincoln, Gen. Halleck, and himself, by which it 

 was determined that the army should move 

 across the Rappahannock at a certain place 

 and at a certain time. This was departed from 

 by Gen. Burnside, who was induced to move 

 the army across at a different place and at an 

 earlier day. His reasons for this change he 

 thus states in his report : 



During my preparations for crossing at the place 



I had first selected, I discovered that the enemy had 

 thrown a large portion of his force down the river and 

 elsewhere, thus weakening his force in front, and also 

 thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the 

 crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I 

 hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over 

 at that place to separate by a vigorous attack the 

 forces of the enemy on the river below from the force 

 behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in 

 which case we could fight him with the greatest ad- 

 vantage in our favor. To do this we had to gain a 

 height on the extreme right of the crest, which height 

 commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for 

 the purpose of more rapid communication along his 

 lines; which point gained, his position along the 

 crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could 

 have been driven from them easily by an attack on 

 his front in connection with a movement in rear of the 

 crest. 



During the night of the 10th of December, 

 therefore, the pontoons were conveyed to the 

 river, and the artillery to the number of one 

 hundred and forty-three pieces was placed in 

 position opposite the city. Between four and 

 five o'clock on the morning of the llth, the 

 work of, building four bridges was commenced. 

 One was to be made at the point where the 

 railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two oth- 

 ers opposite the city but nearer Falmouth, and 

 the fourth nearly two miles below for the 

 crossing of the left wing under Gen. Franklin. 

 A dull haze so obscured the movement, that it 

 was not discovered for some time by the Con- 

 federate pickets. The bridges were thus part- 

 ly constructed, when a brisk and deadly fire 

 of musketry from along the banks of the river 

 and windows of the houses was opened, which 

 compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to 

 the cover of the surrounding hills where they 

 formed again, and about six o'clock the work 

 was recommenced. The Confederates had 

 now become aroused to a sense of what was 

 going forward, and with reinforcements of 

 sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and 

 houses. The pontonniers, nothing daunted by 

 the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely 

 to work. A storm of bullets covered them. 

 The planks and boats were riddled by every 

 volley. Once more they were compelled to 

 withdraw, and again fell back to the cover of 

 the ridge of hills running parallel with the 

 river. Orders were now given to the artillery 

 to open fire on the city. The Federal batter- 

 ies commenced an almost simultaneous bom- 

 bardment, directing their fire chiefly at the 

 houses in which the sharpshooters had con- 

 cealed themselves. At the first fire they be- 

 came untenable, and the riflemen retreated to 

 the rear of the town, and took shelter behind 

 the buildings unharmed. The fire of the a^ 

 tillery, which commenced at seven o'clock, was 

 continued incessantly until one o'clock. The 

 fog somewhat obscured its results, but bod- 

 ies of the Confederates with great stubborn- 

 ness still kept within the city. The Confed- 

 erate batteries on the heights in the rear con- 

 tinued silent. Not a gun was fired, About 

 ten o'clock, the workmen were again formed 

 for a third attempt to build the bridges. Yol- 



