340 



CONGKESS, U. S. 



"ITow, I ask the attention of the Senator 

 from Vermont to this point in the decision : 



In this commerce, thus sanctioned by universal 

 assent, every nation had an equal right to engage. 

 How is this right to be lost? Each may renounce it 

 for its own people ; but can this renunciation affect 

 others? No principle of general law is more univer- 

 sally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. 

 Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from 

 this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule 

 on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legisla- 

 tion can operate on itself alone. A right, then, which 

 is vested in all by the consent of all, can be divested 

 only by consent; and this trade, in which all have 

 participated, must remain lawful to those who cannot 

 fee induced to relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe 

 a rule for others, none can make a law of nations ; and 

 this traffic remains lawful to those whose Governments 

 have not forbidden it. 10 Wheaton, pp. 120-122. 



" There is the principle." 



Mr. Collamer : " The gentleman has a pecu- 

 liar way of reading that decision." 



Mr. Davis : " I read it according to the letter." 



Mr. Collamer : " Gentlemen who are tenacious 

 about that particular form of reading, are ut- 

 terly incapable of being answered to their sat- 

 isfaction. I cannot, by any version I can give 

 it, satisfy the gentleman ; but every lawyer who 

 reads that case and other cases cognate to the 

 same subject in other books, understands it 

 thus : when a question comes before a court in 

 relation to a prize of a vessel engaged in the 

 slave trade, upon the broad law of nations they 

 cannot declare it a prize if the nation to which 

 the vessel belongs make that business legitimate. 

 That is all there is in that decision. It is that 

 the law of nations recognizes slavery as existing 

 and lawful in those nations that make it so ; 

 and that is all." 



Mr. Davis : " There is a little more, Mr. Pres- 

 ident, notwithstanding the gentleman's position. 

 It decides that the slave trade was once prac- 

 tised by all the civilized nations of the world, 

 and it decides, furthermore, that it cannot be 

 restricted except by positive legislation of the 

 countries that choose to restrict it." 



Mr. Collamer : " Will the gentleman permit 

 me one moment on that point ? When it was 

 universal, it was because it was made so by the 

 acts of the several nations themselves. It was 

 not a law of nations ; it was the law of each 

 nation, and therefore of all ; but it was a law 

 for each nation that made it, not an intenna- 

 tional law ; and the very fact that some nations 

 may repeal that law, and prevent its being op- 

 erative on them, while others may retain it and 

 have it operative on them, shoAvs that it is not 

 a part of the law of nations, for that law can- 

 not be changed in that way. Another thing: 

 it never was a law of nature. The laws of 

 nature can never change, until nature and na- 

 ture's God change." 



Mr. Davis : " The gentleman is still mistaken. 

 I admit that the law of nations was made by 

 the practice of nations, and that is what this 

 opinion says. I will read an opinion directly 

 that will show it conclusively an opinion of 

 Judge McLean himself. Neither the Senator 



from Vermont nor any other Senator here can 

 find any positive express law of any nation upon 

 the earth sanctioning the slave trade, except 

 the Constitution of the United States, which 

 continued the traffic until the year 1808." 



Mr. Collamer : " Allow me to say to the gen- 

 tleman that on that point I take distinct issue 

 with him. The Constitution never continued 

 the slave trade one day. It merely said that 

 Congress should not interfere with the impor- 

 tation or immigration of such persons as the 

 States might think proper to admit until after 

 a certain time." 



Mr. Davis: "The Senator from Vermont 

 has informed me that he cannot convince me. 

 I agree with him in that proposition; and 

 there is another proposition on which there is 

 even less doubt than on that in my mind, and 

 that is that I cannot convince him. Therefore 

 I will proceed with my speech as though my 

 honorable friend was not a hearer at all. 



" The Supreme Court of the United States, 

 in the case of the Antelope, laid down the 

 doctrine and the principle that the law which 

 regulates the slave trade and establishes it as a 

 legal traffic arises from custom and usage alone, 

 not from positive enactment ; and further, that 

 the law of nations recognizing the validity of 

 the slave trade once existed among all the 

 civilized nations of the world. France had 

 colonies in the West India Islands ; England 

 had colonies there; so had Spain, Portugal, 

 Denmark, Sweden, Holland; and each one of 

 those nations was engaged in the slave trade. 

 Their usage for two centuries, according to the 

 language of this decision, established the slave 

 trade as a legal traffic. It existed, not by pos- 

 itive law, but by usage and custom conformed 

 to by all the civilized nations of the world ; 

 and having that authority and that extent of 

 existence, the only way in which it ceased to 

 exist anywhere in any of the countries of the 

 earth, was by positive local prohibition. I be- 

 lieve that Brazil still continues the trade. By 

 what authority ? By the law of nations. So 

 far as any nation has not by its own positive 

 legislation, or by its treaty stipulations, pro- 

 hibited the slave trade, it still exists in that na- 

 tion, and "with its people and subjects, as a 

 legitimate trade sanctioned by the law of nations. 

 The court say : 



No principle of general law is more universallv ac- 

 knowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Rus- 

 sia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from 

 this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule 

 on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legisla- 

 tion can operate on itself alone. A right, then, which 

 is vested in all by the consent of all, can be divested 

 only by consent ; and this trade, in which all have par- 

 ticipated, must remain lawful to those who cannot be 

 induced to relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe 

 a rule for others, none can make a law of nations, and 

 this traffic remains lawful to those whose Govern- 

 ments have not forbidden it. 



" Suppose the United Stntes Government had 

 never made the slave trade piracy, would it not 

 still exist as a legitimate trade to the people of 

 the United States, in which they might enter ? 



