390 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 



furnish examples of the useful character of mediation. 

 We flatter ourselves, besides, that in proffering to place 

 ourselves at the disposal of the belligerent parties_to 

 facilitate between them negotiations, the basis of which 

 we abstain from prejudging, we have manifested to the 

 patriotism of the United States all the considerations 

 to which it is entitled, now perhaps still more than 

 ever, after such a new proof of moral force and energy. 

 We are none the less ready, amid the wishes which we 

 form in favor of peace, to take into account all suscepti- 

 bilities of national feeling, and we do not at all ques- 

 tion the right of the Federal Government to decline 

 the cooperation (concours) of the great maritime 

 Powers of Europe. 



But this cooperation, is it not the only means which 

 offers itself to the Cabinet of Washington to hasten the 

 close of the war? And if it believes that it ought to 

 repel any foreign intervention, could it not honorably 

 accept the idea of direct informal conferences (pour 

 parler) with the authority which may represent the 

 States of the South. 



The Federal Government does not despair, we know, 

 of giving a more active impulse to hostilities; its 

 sacrifices have not exhausted its resources, still less its 

 perseverance and its steadfastness. The protraction 

 of the struggle, in a word, has not shaken its confi- 

 dence in the definite success of its efforts. But the 

 opening of informal conferences between the belli- 

 gerent parties does not necessarily imply the imme- 

 diate cessation of hostilities. Negotiations about peace 

 are not always the consequence of a suspension 01 war- 

 fare ; they precede, on the contrary, more often the 

 establishment of a truce. How many times have we 

 not seen plenipotentiaries meet, exchange communi- 

 cations, agree upon all the essential provisions of 

 treaties, resolve, in fine, the question even of peace 

 or war, whilst the leaders of armies continued the 

 strife and endeavored even to the latest moment to 

 modify by force of arms the conditions of peace? To 

 recall only one memory, drawn from the history of the 

 United States the negotiations which consecrated 

 their independence were commenced long before hostil- 

 ities had ceased in the New World, and the armistice 

 was not established until the act of the 30th November, 

 1862, which under the name of provisional articles 

 embraced in advance the principal clauses of the 

 definitive treaty of 1783. 



Nothing, therefore, would hinder the Government 

 of the United States, without renouncing the advan- 

 tage which it believes it can attain by the continuation 

 of the war, from entering upon informal conferences 

 with the Confederates of the South, in case they should 

 show themselves disposed thereto. Representatives 

 or commissioners of the two parties could assemble at 

 such point as it should be deemed proper to designate, 

 and which could, for this purpose, be declared neutral. 

 Reciprocal complaints would be examined into at this 

 meeting. In place of the accusations which North and 

 South mutually cast upon each other at this time, 

 would be substituted an argumentative discussion of 

 the interests which divide them. They would seek out 

 by means of well ordered and profound deliberations 

 whether these interests are definitively irreconcilable 

 whether separation is an extreme which can no 

 longer be avoided, or whether the memories of a com- 

 mon existence, whether the ties of any kind which 

 have made of the North and of the South one sole and 

 whole Federative State, and have borne them on to so 

 high a degree of prosperity, are not more powerful 

 than the causes which have placed arms in the hands 

 of the two populations. A negotiation, the object of 

 which would be thus determinate, would not involve 

 any of the objections raised against the diplomatic 

 intervention ot Europe, and, without giving birth to 

 the same hopes as the immediate conclusion of an 

 armistice, would exercise a happy influence on the 

 march of events. 



Why, therefore, should not a combination which 

 respects all the relations of the United States obtain 

 the approbation of the Federal Government? Per- 

 suaded on our part that it is in conformity with their true 



interests, we do not hesitate to recommend it to their 

 attention ; and, not having sought in the project of a 

 mediation of the maritime Powers of Europe any vain 

 display of influence, we would applaud, with entire 

 freedom from all susceptibility of self-esteem, the open- 

 ing of a negotiation which would invite the two popu- 

 lations to discuss, without the cooperation of Europe, 

 the solution of their difference. 



I request you, sir, to give this assurance to the 

 Cabinet of Washington, while commending to its 

 wisdom counsels dictated by most sincere interest in 

 the prosperity of the United States. You are more- 

 over authorized, if Mr. Seward expresses the wish, to 

 leave with him a copy of this despatch. 



Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration. 

 DROUYN DE L'HUYS. 



To M. MEECIEE, Minister of France at Washington. 



On the 6th of February, 1863, Mr. Seward 

 addressed a despatch to Mr. Dayton in reply to 

 his note stating that mediation between the 

 combatants was about to be proposed, and ex- 

 pressing the views under which such a proposi- 

 tion would be received by the Government of 

 the United States. This important despatch 

 was as follows : 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, Feb. 6, 1863. 

 SIR: The intimation given in your despatch of 

 January 15th (No. 255), that I might expect a special 

 visit from M. Mercier has been realized. He called on 

 the 3d instant, and gave me a copy of a despatch 

 which he had just then received from M. Drouyn de 

 1'Huys under the date of the 9th of January. 



I have taken the President's instructions, and I 

 now proceed to give you his views upon the subject in 

 question. 



It has been considered with seriousness, resulting 

 from the reflection that the people of France are 

 known to be faultless sharers with the American na- 

 tion in the misfortunes and calamities of our unhappy 

 civil war ; nor do we on this, any more than on other 

 occasions, forget the traditional friendship of the two 

 countries, which we unhesitatingly believe has in- 

 spired the counsels that M. Drouyn de 1'Huys has 

 imparted. 



He says, " the Federal Government does not des- 

 pair, we know, of giving more active impulse to hos- 

 tilities ;" and again he remarks, " the protraction of 

 the struggle, in a word, has not shaken the confidence 

 (of the Federal Government) in the definitive success 

 of its efforts." 



These passages seem to me to do unintentional in- 

 justice to the language, whether confidential or public, 

 in which this Government has constantly spoken on 

 the subject of the war. It certainly has had and avowed 

 only one purpose a determination to preserve the in- 

 tegrity of the country. So far from admitting any 

 laxity of effort, or betraying any despondency, the 

 Government has, on the contrary, borne itself cheer- 

 fully in all vicissitudes, with unwavering confidence in 

 an early and complete triumph of the national cause. 

 Now, when we are, in a manner, invited by a friendly 

 power to review the twenty-one months' history of the 

 conflict, we find no occasion to abate that confidence. 

 Through such an alternation of victories and defeats 

 as is the appointed incident of every war, the land and 

 naval forces of the United States have steadily ad- 

 vanced, reclaiming from the insurgents the ports, 

 forts, and posts which they had treacherously seized 

 before the strife actually began, and even before it was 

 seriously apprehended. So many of the States and dis- 

 tricts which the insurgents included in the field of their 

 projected exclusive slaveholding dominions have al- 

 ready been reestablished under the flag of the Union, 

 that they now retain only the States oT Georgia, Ala- 

 bama, and Texas, with half of Virginia, half of North 

 Carolina, and two thirds of South Carolina, half of Mis- 

 sissippi, and one third respectively of Arkansas and 



