PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



721 



On the 81st of March, in addition to the foregoing 

 notification and directions, he was instructed as 

 follows : 



1st If successful in your expedition against Shrevcport, 

 that you turn over the defence of the Red River to General 

 Bteele and the navy. 



2d. That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception 

 of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with 

 four thousand men, if they will turn their attention imme- 

 diately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of 

 the force required for this service might be taken from the 

 colored troops. 



Sd. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the 

 force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be 

 reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six 

 thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory 

 necessary to hold until active operations can again be re- 

 sumed west of the river. According to your last return this 

 would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective 

 men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect 

 to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you 

 think the force here stated too small to hold the territory re- 

 garded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say con- 

 centrate at least twenty -five thousand men of your present 

 command for operations against Mobile. With these and 

 such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no 

 time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack 

 upon Mobile* Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to re- 

 port to Admiral Farragut This gives him a strong naval 

 fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own ar- 

 rangements with the Admiral for his cooperation, and select 

 your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is 

 that Pascagoula should be your base, but, from your long 

 service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about 

 the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be 

 cooperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now 

 start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence 

 the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a pro- 

 found secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the 

 earliest possible moment. 



U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 



Major-Gcneral N. P. BANKS. 



Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's 

 army would be his objective point ; that wherever 

 Lee went he would go also. For his movement two 

 plans presented themselves : One to cross the Rap- 

 idan below Lee, moving by his right flank ; the other 

 above, moving by his left. Each presented advan- 

 tages over the other, with corresponding objections. 

 By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all 

 cliance of ignoring Eichmond or going north on a 

 raid. But if we took this route, all we did would 

 have to be done whilst the rations we started with 

 held out ; besides, it separated us from Butler, so 

 that he could not be directed how to cooperate. If 

 we took the other route, Brandy Station could be 

 used as a base of supplies until another was" secured 

 on the York or James Rivers. Of these, however, it 

 was decided to take the lower route. 



The following letter of instruction was addressed 

 to Major-General B. F. Butler : 



FORT MONROE, VA., April 2, 1864. 



GENERAL : In the spring campaign, which it is desirable 

 shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is pro- 

 posed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the 

 field, as far as this object can be accomplished. 



It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or 

 three large ones to act as so many units, awing to the abso- 

 lute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken 

 from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can 

 be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of 

 the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. 

 By such movement they interpose themselves between the 

 enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the 

 number necessary to guard important points, or at least oc- 

 cupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no 

 greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being 

 the greater objects toward which our attention must be di- 

 rected in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the 

 force we can against them. The necessity of covering Wash- 

 ington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your 

 department with your army, makes it impossible to unite 

 these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, there- 

 fore, what comes nearest this of any thing that seems prac- 

 ticable : The Army of the Potomac will act from its present 

 base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect 

 all the forces from your command that can be spared for gar- 

 rison duty I should say not less than twenty thousand 



VOL. v. i6 A 



effective men to operate on the south side of James River, 

 Richmond being your objective point To the force yon 

 already have will be added about ten thousand men from 

 Sonth Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore. who will 

 command them in person. Major-General W. V. Smith ia 

 ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into 

 the field from your own department 



General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at For- 

 tress ^onroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th 

 Instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not 

 receive notice by that time to move, you will make such dis- 

 position of them and your other ifcrccs as you may deem 

 best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to 

 be made. 



When yon are notified to move, take City Point with as 

 much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, 

 and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly 

 as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at 

 this time for your further movements. 



The fact that has already been stated that is, that Rich- 

 mond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be 

 cooperation between your force and the Army of the Po- 

 tomacmust be your guide. This indicates the necessity 

 of your holding close to the south bank of the James River 

 as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his 

 intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac 

 would follow, and by means of transports the two armies 

 would become a unit. 



All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to 

 your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use 

 your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad about 

 Hick's Ford about the time of the general advance, it would 

 be of immense advantage. 



You will please forward for my information, at the earliest 

 practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may 

 give for the execution of this order. 



U. 8. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. 



Major-General B. F. BUTLEB. 



On the 16th, these instructions were substantially 

 reiterated. On the 19th, in order to secure full co- 

 operation between his army and that of General 

 Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move 

 from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade 

 moved from Culpepper. The exact time I was to 

 telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it 

 would not be earlier than the 27th of April ; that it 

 was my intention to fight Lee between Culpepper and 

 Richmond if he would stand. Should he, however, 

 fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make 

 a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the 

 James River; that, could I be certain he would be 

 able to invest Richmond on the south side so as to 

 have his left resting on the James, above the city, I 

 would form the junction there; that circumstances 

 might make this course advisable anyhow; that he 

 should use every exertion to secure footing as far up 

 the south side of the river as he could, and as soon 

 as possible after the receipt of orders to move ; that 

 if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain 

 as large a force as possible. 



In cooperation with the main movements against 

 Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other 

 troops necessarily kept in departments remote from 

 the fields of immediate operations, and also those 

 kept in the background for the protection of our 

 extended lines between the loyal States and the 

 armies operating against them. 



A very considerable force, under command of 

 Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protection 

 of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and 

 Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be 

 withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the 

 North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of 

 the enemy, they could act directly to their front and 

 give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. 

 By such movement they would either compel the 

 enemy to detach largely for the protection of his 

 supplies and lines of communication, or he would 

 lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to 

 organize all his available force into two expeditions, 

 to move from Beverly and Charleston, under com- 

 mand of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East 

 Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, 

 General Ord having been relieved at his own request, 

 General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, 



