PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form 

 two columns, one under General Crook, on the Ka- 

 nawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one 

 on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand 

 men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble be- 

 tween Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the 

 infantry and artillery advance to Cedar Creek with 

 such cavalry as could be made available at t"fe mo- 

 ment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah 

 Vallev, and advance as far as possible ; while Gen- 

 eral Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with 

 part of his force and move down the Tennessee Rail- 

 road, doing as much damage as he could, destroying 

 the >*ew River bridge and saltworks, at Saltville"Va. 



Owing to the weather and bad condition of the 

 roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of Mav, 

 when, every thing being in readiness and the roads 

 favorable, orders were given for a general movement 

 of all the armies not later than the 4th of May. 



Mr first object being to break the military power 

 of the rebellion and capture the enemy's important 

 strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler 

 should succeed in his movement against Richmond, 

 as that would tend more than any thing else, unless 

 it were the capture of Lee's army* to accomplish this 

 desired result in the East. If 'it failed, it was my 

 determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee 

 to retreat or to* so cripple him that he could not 

 detach a huge force to go north and still retain 

 enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well 

 understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, 

 before starting on the campaign, that it was my 

 intention to put both their armies south of the James 

 River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it. 



Before giving General Butler 'his instructions, I 

 visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation 

 pointed out the apparent importance of getting pos- 

 session of Petersburg and destroying railroad com- 

 munication as far south as possible. Believing, how- 

 ever, in the practicability of capturing Richmond 

 unless it was reinforced, 'I made that the objective 

 point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac 

 was to move simultaneously with him. Lee could not 

 detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did 

 not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of 

 the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the 

 north of James River. 



I mav here state that, commanding all the armies 

 as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General 

 Meade in independent command of the Army of the 

 Potomac. My instructions for that army were all 

 through him, and were general in their nature, leaving 

 all the details and the execution to him. The cam- 

 paigns that followed proved him to be the right man 

 in the right place. His commanding always in the 

 presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has 

 drawn from him much of that public attention that 

 his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would 

 otherwise have received. 



The movement of the Army of the Potomac com- 

 menced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under 

 the immediate direction ana orders of Major-General 

 Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the 

 whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth and 

 Sixth Corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the 

 Second Corps at United States Ford, the cavalry, 

 under Major General Sheridan, moving in advance), 

 with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 

 4,000 wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. 

 The arerace distance travelled by the troops that 

 day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a 

 great success, and it removed from my mind the most 

 serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of 

 crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well- 

 appointed, and ably-commanded army, and how so 

 large a train was to' be carried through'a hostile coun- 

 try and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance 

 corps (the Fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren com- 

 rt met and encaged the enemy outside his 

 near Mine Bun. The battle raged 



furiously all day, the whole army being brought into 

 the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the 

 field, which, considering the density of the forest and 

 narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable 

 promptness. 



General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at 

 the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with 

 the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappa- 

 hannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the 

 road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move 

 until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan 

 was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such 

 notice was received. This crossing he was apprised 

 of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the 

 morning of the 6th, he was leading his corps into 

 action near the Wilderness tavern, some of his troops 

 having marched a distance of over thirty miles, 

 crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. 

 Considering that a large proportion, probably two- 

 thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, 

 unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accoutre- 

 ments of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. 



The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at 

 five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued 

 with unabated furr until darkness set in, each army 

 holding substantially the same position that they had 

 on the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy 

 made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, cap- 

 turing several hundred prisoners, and creating con- 

 siderable confusion. But the promptness of General 

 Sedgwick, who was personally present and command- 

 ing that part of our line, soon reformed it and re- 

 stored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnois- 

 sances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his 

 intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering 

 a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident 

 to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied 

 him of his inability to further maintain the contest in 

 the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of po- 

 sition, and that he would wait an attack behind his 

 works. I therefore determined to push on and put 

 my whole force between him and Richmond; and 

 orders were at once issued for a movement by bis 

 right flank. On the night of the 7th the march* was 

 commenced toward Spottsylvania Court-House, the 

 Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the 

 enemy having become apprised of ojur movement, 

 and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach 

 there first. On the 8th, General Warren met a force 

 of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and 

 delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line 

 taken utf at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily 

 driven back on the main force, within the recently 

 constructed works, after considerable fighting, re- 

 sulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning 

 of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against 

 the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. 

 The 9th, 10th, and llth were spent in manoeuvring 

 and fighting, without decisive results. Among the 

 killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished 

 soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding 

 the Sixth Army Corps. Major-General H. G. Wright 

 succeeded him in command. Early on the morning 

 of the 12th, a general attack was made on the enemy 

 in position. The Second Corps, Major-General Han- 

 cock commanding, carried a salient of his line, cap- 

 turing most cf Johnston's division of Ewell's Corp* 

 and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance 

 was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not 

 prove decisive. The ISth, 14th, 15th, loth, 17th, and 

 18th were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the 

 arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deem- 

 ing it impracticable to make any further attack upon 

 the enemy at Spottsylvania Court-House, orders were 

 issued on the ISth with a view to a movement to the 

 North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night 

 of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's 

 Corps came out of its works on our extreme right 

 flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, _with 

 heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the Xortb 



