724 



PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



ia our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of 

 works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps and in 

 front of General Smith. During the attack the ene- 

 my made repeated assaults on each of the corps not 

 engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with 

 heavy loss in every instance. That night he made 

 several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, 

 but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into 

 position for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we 

 again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of 

 driving him from his position. In this attempt our 

 loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have 

 reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was 

 the only general attack made from the Rapidan to 

 the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses 

 to compensate for our own losses. I would not be 

 understood as saying that all previous attacks re- 

 sulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as 

 much as I had hoped from them ; but they inflicted 

 upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the 

 end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. 



From the proximity of the enemy to his defences 

 around Richmond, it was impossible by any_ flank 

 movement to interpose between him and the city. I 

 was still in a condition to either move by his left 

 flank and invest Richmond from the north side, or 

 continue my move by his right flank to the south side 

 of the James. While the former might have been 

 better as a covering for Washington, yet a full sur- 

 vey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be 

 impracticable to hold a line north and east of Rich- 

 mond that would protect the Fredericksburg Rail- 

 road a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust 

 much of our strength to guard, and that would have 

 to be protected to supply the army, and would leave 

 open to the enemy all his lines of communication on 

 the south side of the James. My idea, from the 

 start, had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond 

 if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of com- 

 munication north of the James River, to transfer the 

 army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, 

 or follow him south if he should retreat. After the 

 battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the en- 

 emy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks 

 with the army he then had. He acted purely on the 

 defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offen- 

 sive immediately in front of them, and where, in case 

 of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. With- 

 out a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to 

 make, all could not be accomplished that I had de- 

 signed north of Richmond ; I therefore determined to 

 continue to hold substantially the ground we then 

 occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circum- 

 stances that might present themselves, until the cav- 

 alry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordons- 

 ville to effectually break up the railroad connection 

 between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and 

 Lynchburg ; and, when the cavalry got well off, to 

 move the armv to the south side of the James River, 

 bv the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut 

 off all his sources of supply except by the canal. 



On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under Gen- 

 eral Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the 

 Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions to Hun- 

 ter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottes- 

 ville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the 

 work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join 

 the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in 

 Sheridan's instructions. 



On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of 

 infantry under General Gillmore, and cavalry under 

 General Kautz, to capture Petersburg if possible, and 

 destroy the railroad and common bridges across the 

 Appouiattox. The cavalry carried the works on the 

 south side, and penetrated well toward the town, 

 but were forced to retire. General Gillmore finding 

 the works which he approached very strong, and 

 deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Ber- 

 muda Hundred without attempting one. 



Attaching great importance to the possession of 



Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and 

 City Point General Smith's command by water, via 

 the White House, to reach there in advance of the 

 Army of the Potomac. This was for the express pur- 

 pose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, be- 

 coming aware of our intention, could reenforce the 

 place. 



The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after 

 dark on the evening of the 12th ; one division of cav- 

 alry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps 

 crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and 

 moved out to White-Oak Swamp, to cover the cross- 

 ings of the other corps. The advance corps reached 

 James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City 

 Court-House, on the night of the 13th. 



During three long years the Armies of the Potomac 

 and Northern Virginia had been confronting each 

 other. In that time they had fought more desperate 

 battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of 

 two armies to fight, without materially changing the 

 vantage g_round of either. The Southern press and 

 people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in 

 the North, finding that they had failed to capture 

 Washington and march on to New York, as they had 

 boasted they would do, assumed that they only de- 

 fended their capital and Southern territory. Hence, 

 Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that 

 had been fought, were by them set down as failures 

 on our part, and victories for them. Their army be- 

 lieved this. It produced a morale which could only 

 be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fight- 

 ing. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, 

 North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible 

 as they were on our side, were even more damaging 

 to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him 

 wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses 

 in men were probably not so great, owing to the 

 fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost 

 invariably the attacking party; arid when he did 

 attack it was in the open field. The details of 

 these battles, which for endurance and bravery 

 on the part of the soldiery have rarely been sur- 

 passed, are given in the report of Major-General 

 Meade, and the subordinate reports accompany- 

 ing it. 



During the campaign of forty-three days, from the 

 Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be sup- 

 plied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over 

 narrow roads, through a densely-wooded country, 

 with a lack of wharves at each new base from which 

 to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit 

 cannot therefore be awarded to the quartermaster 

 and commissary departments for the zeal and effi- 

 ciency displayed by them. Under the general super- 

 vision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General 

 R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the 

 available roads between the army and our water 

 base, and but little difficulty was experienced in pro- 

 tecting them. 



The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah 

 Valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 

 first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate 

 command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his 

 forces into two columns, giving one, composed of 

 cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the moun- 

 tains by separate routes. Averill struck the Tennes- 

 see and Virginia Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 

 10th, and proceeding to New River and Christians- 

 burg, destroyed the road, several important bridges 

 and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a 

 junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General 

 Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy 

 at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engage- 

 ment, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired be- 

 hind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of 

 General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal 

 from command, and Major-General Hunter was ap- 

 pointed to supersede him. His instructions were 

 embraced in the following despatches to Major-Gen- 

 eral H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army: 



