PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



727 



retreating during the night. Learning the exact con- 

 dition of affairs at Washington, I requested by tele- 

 graph at 11.45 p. M. on the 12th the assignment of 

 Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all 

 the troops that could be made available to operate in 

 the field against the enemy, and directed that he 

 should get outside of the trenches with all the force 

 he could, and push Early to the last moment. Gen- 

 eral Wright commencea the pursuit on the 13th ; on 

 the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, 

 on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred ; 

 and on the 20th General Averill encountered and de- 

 feated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, 

 capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred 

 prisoners. 



Learning that Early was retreating south toward 

 Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth 

 and Nineteenth Corps be got back to the armies 

 operating against Richmond, so that they might be 

 used-iii a m6vement against Lee before the return of 

 the troops sent by him into the vallev ; and that 

 Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Vallev, 

 keeping between any force of the enemy and Wash- 

 ington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. 

 I ielt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, 

 the fact would be developed before the Sixth and 

 Nineteenth Corps could leave Washington. Subse- 

 quently the Nineteenth Cocps was cxcepted from the 

 order to return to the James. 



About the 25th it became evident that the enemy 

 was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsyl- 

 vania, and the Sixth Corps, then at Washington, 

 was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. 

 The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a 

 raiding party into Pennsylvania, which, on the SOth, 

 burned Chambersburg and then retreated, pursued 

 by our cavalry toward Cumberland. They were met 

 and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished 

 numbers escaped into the mountains of West Vir- 

 ginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph 

 wires were frequently dovyn between Washington 

 and City Point, making it necessary to transmit 

 messages a part of the way by boat. It took from 

 twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches 

 through and return answers back ; so that often or- 

 ders would be given, and then information would be 

 received showing a different state of facts from those 

 on which they were based, causing a confusion and 

 apparent contradiction of orders that must have con- 

 siderably embarrassed those who had to execute 

 them, and rendered operations against the enemy less 

 effective than they otherwise would have been. To 

 remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that 

 some person should have the supreme command of 

 all the forces in the Departments of \Vest Virginia, 

 Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle Depart- 

 ment, and I so recommanded. 



On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan 

 to report in person to Major-General Halleck, chief 

 of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assign- 

 ment to the command of all the forces against Early. 

 At this time the enemy was concentrated in the 

 neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under 

 General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monooacy, 

 at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 

 leaving open to the enemy Western Maryland and 

 Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was I hesi- 

 tated to give positive orders for the movement of our 

 forces arMonocacy, lest by so doing I should expose 

 Washington. Therefore, on the 4th I left City Point 

 to visit Hunter's command, and determine for my- 

 self what was best to be done. On arrival there, and 

 after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to 

 him the following instructions : 



MONOCACY BRIDGE, MD., August 5, 1864 8 p. M. 



GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without 

 delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such 

 railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may bo 

 necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so 

 doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found 

 that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large 



force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever 

 found ; follow him, If driven south of the Potomac, as long 

 as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has 

 but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with 

 the main force, detaching under a competent commander a 

 sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to 

 their homes. In detaching snch a force, the brigade of cav- 

 alry now en route from Washington via Eockville may be 

 taken into account. 



There are now on their way to join you three other bri- 

 gades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 5,000 men and 

 horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of farther 

 orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One 

 brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the 

 Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected yon will have to go 

 first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to in- 

 vite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, ana 

 stock wanted for the use of your command ; such as cannot 

 be consumed, destroy. It is not desirably that the build- 

 ings should be destroyed they should rather be pro- 

 tected ; but the people should be informed that, so long as 

 an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids 

 must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all 

 hazards. 



Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south ; and 

 to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided 

 in your course by the course he takes. 



Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, 

 giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal 

 citizens in the country through which you march. 



U. 8. GRANT, Lieutenant-GeneraL 

 Major-General D. HXTNTER. 



The troops were immediately put in motion, and 

 the advance reached Hallton that night. 



General Hunter having, in our conversation, ex- 

 pressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I 

 telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Wash- 

 ington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, 

 with orders to take general command of all the troops 

 in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monoc- 

 acy, who would turn over to him my letter of in- 

 structions. I remained at Monocacy until General 

 Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and 

 after a conference with him in relation to military 

 affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by 

 way of Washington. 



On the 7th of August the Middle Department and 

 the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and 

 Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle Mil- 

 itary Division," and Major-General Sheridan was as- 

 signed to temporary command of the same. 



Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals 

 Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan froni the 

 Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at 

 Harper's Ferry about the llth of August. 



His operations during the month of August and 

 the fore part of September were both of an offensive 

 and defensive character, resulting in many severe 

 skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we 

 were generally successful, but no general engage- 

 ment took place. The two armies lay in such a po- 

 sition the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan 

 Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front 

 of Berrysville that either could bring on a battle at 

 any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy 

 the States of Maryland and Pennsvlvania for long 

 distances before another army could be interposed 

 to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated 

 about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally, 

 the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the 

 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both ob- 

 structed by the enemy, became so indispensably ne- 

 cessary to us, and the importance of relieving' Penn- 

 sylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened 

 invasion was so great, that I determined the risk 

 should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order 

 for an attack without knowing more than I did of 

 General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the 

 probable result, I left City Point on the loth of Sep- 

 tember to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, 

 after conference with him, what should be done. I 

 met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so dis- 

 tinctly how each army lay ; what he could do the 

 moment he was authorized, and expressed such con- 



