738 



PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



plies the enemy may have collected south of the Eoanoko. 

 All the troops will move with four days' rations in haver- 

 sacks, and eight days 1 in wagons. To avoid as much hauling 

 M possible, and to (rive the Army of the James the same 

 number of days' supply with the Army of the Potomac, Gen- 

 eral Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to 

 have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road 

 to fill up the passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man 

 will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transpor- 

 tation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount 

 of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which 

 the army has to operate making the use of much artillery 

 impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be re- 

 duced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of 

 the army commanders. 



All necessary preparations for carrying these directions 

 into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves 

 of the Ninth Corps should be massed as much as possible. 

 Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack on 

 the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should 

 make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, 

 without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, 

 then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up so as to 

 join or cooperate with the balance of the army. To prepare 

 for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them, 

 same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep 

 vigilant watch upon his Iront, and if found at all practicable 

 to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north 

 of the James should be followed up with great promptness. 

 An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the en- 

 my has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded 

 as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local re- 

 ierves, principally for the defence of Kichmond. Prepara- 

 tions may be made for abandoning all the line north of the 

 James, except enclosed works only to be abandoned, how- 

 ever, after a Dreak is made in the lines of the enemy. 



By these instructions a large part of the armies operating 

 against Kichmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, 

 may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skele- 

 ton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst 

 they hurl every thing against the moving column, and return. 

 It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of 

 troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without 

 taking advantage of it The very fact of the enemy coming 

 out to attack, if he docs so, might be regarded as almost con- 

 clusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would 

 have It particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, 

 in case of au attack from the enemy, those not attacked are 

 not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the 

 army to which they belong, but that they will move prompt- 

 ly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also 

 enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders 

 when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, 

 I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the 

 enemy. U. 8. GRANT, Lieutenant-GeneraL 



Major-Generals M i:.u>i:. ORD, and SUEBIDAN. 



Earlv on the morning of the 25th the enemy as- 

 saulted our lines in front of the Ninth Corps (which 

 held from the Appomattox River toward our left) 

 and carried Fort Steadman, and a part of the line to 

 the right and left of it, established themselves and 

 turned the guns of the fort against us ; but our troops 

 on either flank held their ground until the reserves 

 were brought up, when the enemy was driven back 

 with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and 1,900 

 prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three 

 hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred 

 and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the 

 other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their 

 respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured 

 and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket line 

 in front of the Second and Sixth Corps, and eight 

 hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made 

 desperate attempts to retake this line, but without 

 success. Our loss in front of these was fifty -two 

 killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and 

 two hundred and seven missing. The enemy's loss 

 in killed and wounded was far greater. 



General Sherman having got his troops all quietly 

 in camp about Goldsboro , and his preparations for 

 furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at 

 City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he 

 would be ready to move, as he had previously written 

 me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed 

 for twenty days, if it should become necessary to 

 bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in 

 cooperation with our forces in front of Richmond and 



Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this move 

 ment to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning sud- 

 denly to the. right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or 

 thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Rich- 

 mond and Danville Railroad, striking it in the vi- 

 cinity of Burkeswlle, or join the armies operating 

 against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This 

 plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he 

 received no further directions in the mean time. I 

 explained to him the movement I had ordered to 

 commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not 

 prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut 

 the cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and South 

 Side Railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further 

 supplies, and also prevent the rapid concentration 

 of Lee's and Johnston's armies. 



I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning 

 should bring the report that the enemy had retreated 

 the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sher- 

 man's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for 

 Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a 

 long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming 

 most of the summer, might become necessary. By 

 moving out I would put the army in better condition 

 for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction 

 of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the 

 two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the ene- 

 my to abandon much material that he might other- 

 wise save. I therefore determined not to delay the 

 movement ordered. 



On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with 

 two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, Major- 

 General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the 

 Twenty-fifth Corps, Brigadier-General Birney com- 

 manding, and McKenzi&s cavalry, took up his lino 

 of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, 

 and reached the position assigned him near Hatch- 

 er's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th 

 the following instructions were given to General 

 Sheridan : 



Crrr POINT, VA., March 28, 1865. 



GENERAL : The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn 

 road at 8 A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at 

 about 9 A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach 

 the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth 

 Corps, after the latter reaching Dlnwiddie Court-IIousc. 

 Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and with- 

 out being confined to any particular road or roads. You 

 may go out by the nearest roads in the rear of the Fifth 

 Corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Din- 

 widdie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you 

 can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his in- 

 trenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should 

 he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can bo 

 attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, 

 and with full reliance that the army will engage or follow, 

 as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and 

 will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I 

 not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main 

 intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danvillo 

 road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross 

 the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, 

 and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much 

 detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which 

 I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as pos- 

 sible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as 

 possible. You can then pass on to the South Side road, west 

 of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. 



After having accomplished the destruction of the two rail- 

 roads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's 

 army, you may return to this army, selecting your road fur- 

 ther south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join 

 General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, got 

 the information to mo as early as possible, so that I may send 

 orders to meet you at Goldsboro'. 



U. 8. GKANT, Lieutcnant-General. 



Major-General P. II. SHERIDAN. 



On the morning the 29th the movement commenced. 

 At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-House, 

 and the left of our infantry line extended to the Qua- 

 kerroad, near its intersection with the Boydtou plunk 

 road. The position of the troops, from left to right, 

 was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, 

 Wright, Parke. 



Every thing looked favorable to the defeat of the 



