PETITION. 



185 



appears in the development of the elective system in 

 tnia country and elsewhere. The election is means of 

 selecting an agent, while the right of communicating 

 with the legislative body is means of directing that 

 agent in the discharge of his duty. To affirm that the 

 right to select an agent tends to displace the right to 

 direct him when selected, is neither consonant with 

 logic or common sense. The tendency of the elective 

 system in highly composite communities and govern- 

 ments appears to be in the direction of integrating the 

 material interests of the community in the formation 

 of a public policy with especial reference to some 

 exigency in public affairs that for the time being dis- 

 places other interests however important. Public 

 agents selected with reference to a particular exigency, 

 and as the exponents of a particular policy, espe- 

 cially when that policy is based on material interests, 

 are likely to need all available modes of communica- 

 tion with their constituencies in order to know the 

 state of opinion and feeling on other than material 

 interests. 



The press has important functions in keeping in mind 

 the aspirations and wishes of the people, but represents 

 public opinion in an indirect and reflex way only, while 



not claimed that attention to the representations of the 

 opponents of slavery would directly operate as a breach 

 of the public faith, but that it would indirectly have 

 that effect. The ground taken was that the agitation 

 of the question of the abolition of slavery endangered 

 the institution, although in what form that danger was 

 to be realized was not stated among the reasons given 

 for the action of Congress. The exclusion of the 

 petitions was based upon a purpose to suppress the 

 agitation of the slave question, which means the sup- 

 pression of the right of public discussion of the bear- 

 ing of public measures. It was not claimed at that 

 day that the methods of agitation implied anything 

 beyond popular discussion, and, therefore, agitation 

 meant discussion and nothing more. The question is 

 resolved to the_ simple inquiry whether the right of 

 petition may with propriety be denied as a means of 

 suppressing discussions on public questions where such 

 discussion may possibly, in some indirect way, entail 

 changes on the condition of some section of the coun- 

 try by which it is regarded as undesirable, and in this 

 fpi-m of statement needs no elucidation. It is a no- 

 ticeable fact that the States that took part, through 

 their representatives, in this effort to suppress the 



the petition, memorial, and remonstrance to the legisla- freedom of discussion of public affairs are the same 

 tive body may be made, and commonly are made, the States that vehemently opposed the Alien and Sedition 

 vehicle of collective opinion and sentiment. If the j laws upon the ground that they sought to suppress the 

 morals and humanity of a community ought to have ! freedom of speech and of the press, 

 any place in an organized system of 4egi8lation, that | The action of the House of Representatives in thus 

 place must be assigned in the means of communication ! refusing to receive petitions coming from the people 



" of the United States must be weighed by the provis- 

 ions of the first article of amendment of the Constitu- 

 tion of the United States, which declares the right of 

 the people peaceably to assemble and petition the gov- 

 ernment for a redress of grievances. The term " griev- 

 ances," as here used, was borrowed from the history of 

 early times when the people having no hand in making 

 the laws, if aggrieved by laws unsuited to their condi- 

 tion and wants, assumed the attitude of supplicants to 

 the law-making authority for that which they deemed 

 to be for their good, and the subjects of their requests 

 were termed grievances where they complained of bad 

 laws or asked the enactment of good ones. With the 

 progress of liberal ideas this privilege of communicat- 

 ing with the law-making power came to be recognized 

 as a right that might be claimed under the principles 

 determining the nature and sanctions of government 



between the legislative body and collective bodies of 

 citizens. The right of petition thus stands as the ex- 

 ponent of the conscience and aspirations of the com- 

 munity as well as of its neglected interests, material 

 and social. 



Assuming then that there is reason for maintaining 

 the right of petition, as essential to sustaining the 

 proper relations between the 'agents of government 

 and the governed, and the effect upon that right of 

 the action induced by the slavery agitation is of prac- 

 tical importance. It is evident that right was denied, 

 at first in substance and afterwards in form, to those 

 who sought to express their convictions as to the social 

 character of slavery to Congress. That denial took 

 place on two grounds : first, that Congress was asked to 

 do that which it had no authority to do ; and, second, 

 that what was sought would occasion a breach of the 

 public faith pledged to the States of the Union that 

 sustained the institution of slavery. That Congress 

 had authority to act on the representations made to it 

 of the social evils arising from slavery, even in the 

 States, cannot be denied with any reason. If it ap- 

 peared to Congress that the institution of slavery as it 

 existed in the States was detrimental to the interests 

 of the wholo Union, it had authority under the Consti- 

 tution to frame articles of amendment to the Constitu- 

 tion to be submitted to the States for ratification, which 

 if receiving the assent of three-fourths of the States 

 would become part of the Constitution and would be com- 

 petent to inhibit slavery within the States. Whether 

 the case presented by the petitions on the subject of 

 slavery was such as to call for the exercise of that 

 power was a question for consideration by Congress, 

 and if it had t\ie right to consider that subject it was 

 its duty to receive petitions in relation to it. 



Placing the impropriety of the consideration of what 

 was asked by the petitions upon the ground that it 

 would be a breach of public faith to the slave States 

 was virtually admitting that Congress possessed the 

 power of prohibiting slavery in the District of Colum- 

 bia and the Territories. The affirmation here implied 

 is that wherever there is a governmental policy that, 

 in the opinion of a portion of the people and of the 

 States, is necessary to be maintained on the ground of 

 public faith, the residue of the people and States shall 

 not be permitted to oppose that conclusion by means 

 of the right of petition. Bald as such a ground would 

 be it is stronger than the case actually stated. It was 

 VOL. IV. M 



as adjusted to the needs of social man. Still further 

 progress in the right understanding of governmental 

 principles found the right derived from the fact that 

 the people were the source of all public authority, 

 whicn could not exist without their authorization or 

 permission, and therefore were entitled to make known 

 their desires to those who were intrusted with the 

 formation of laws. 



The Bill of Rights, which is a fixed feature of all 

 the American constitutions and was derived from the 

 institutions and ideas of England, as the product of 

 popular revolution in that country, perpetuates the 

 right of petition as a fundamental right incident to the 

 relations between the agents of government and the 

 people. By comparing together the various forms in 

 which this right is recognized in the constitutions of 

 the various States and comparing them with the Con- 

 stitution of the United States, it is made clear that the 

 term grievances is used in no narrow or technical sense 

 but as comprehending all that may be within the 

 authority of the law-making power to promote the well- 

 being of the citizen. 



It has never been supposed that a legislative body 

 deriving its powers from a written constitution embody- 

 ing the Bill of Rights, as the expression of the prin- 

 ciples of liberty that should be the foundation of all 

 governmental authority exercisable, could decline to 

 exercise the powers enjoined by it or do that which it 

 prohibits for any prudential reason whatever without 

 an infraction of the obligations imposed by it. Where 

 one clause of the bill secures the right of popular dis- 



