PRIVATEERING. 



257 



their own vessels or at the public expense. There 

 were also free plunderers, who hired public vessels and 

 sailed them with crews and outfits of their own, the 

 expedition of the French against the Portuguese at 

 Rio Janeiro, in the reign of Louis XIV., being an ex- 

 ample. It was toward the end of the sixteenth century, 

 in the middle of the war in the Netherlands, that let- 1 

 ters of marque began to be issued. William of Orange j 

 appears to have used this method, and he was met in 

 retaliation by the Spanish government. The French 

 adopted privateering about 1555. 



The advantage of privateering on the side of a nation 

 with a small navy, when it is at war with a nation 

 having a large commercial marine, is very evident. 

 The United Stoics had this advantage during the war 

 of the American Revolution, yet ^Benjamin JFranklin, 

 in his correspondence with the British authorities, de- 

 clared that though the practice of privateering may be 

 incidentally beneficial, yet "it is a remnant of piracy, 

 and is far from being profitable to all engaged in it or 

 to the nation that authorizes it." He claimed that 

 farmers, fishermen, and merchants should not be mo- 

 lested by enemies even in times of war ; and his doc- 

 trine was incorporated in the treaty of 1785 between 

 the United States and Prussia, which he fashioned. 

 This treaty provided that neither of the contracting 

 parties should issue any commission to any private 

 armed vessels against the other, empowering them to 

 take or destroy its trading vessels, or to interrupt com- 

 merce. When this treaty expired, in 1799, this 

 article was nut renewed. Had it been renewed, and 

 had Great Britain and the United States agreed to the 

 same, it would have been a fortunate thing for the 

 former power in the war of 1812, and for the latter 

 in the civil war of 1861. Thomas Jefferson is known 

 to have approved of the practice of privateering, and 

 to his influence may be attributed much of the priva- 

 teering carried on by Americans in the war of 1812. 

 During the war of the Revolution the people of the 

 United States had engaged in the practice in but a 

 small degree, except toward the latter end. New Lon- 

 don, Conn., became head-quarters for the privateers, 

 and this fact afforded an excuse to the British for burn- 

 ing it in September, 1781. The Legislative A>M -m- 

 bly of France in 1792 proposed that all nations should 

 do without privateering, but not one of them adopted 

 the suggestion. 



The war of 1812, the second between Great Brit- 

 ain and the United States, proved the opportunity of 

 the Americans to prey upon British commerce. Con- 

 gress declared war June 18, 1812, but 75 days before 

 that date there was a list of 18 privateers already fitted 

 out at Baltimore, and by October 15 there were 26 

 from New York. The first British ship was captured 

 July 1, and by July 14 it is said that there were at 

 least 65 privateers at sea. In November the owners 

 of 24 privateers from New York petitioned Congress 

 to reduce the duties on prizes, and to allow captors to 

 dis|>ose of such prizes. The first privateers of this war 

 carried less than 10 guns, but later from 20 to 30 guns 

 were earned. It is stated that a contract was made in 

 Boston for the building of a privateer in 18 working 

 days. The estimate is that within 2 years more than Six) 

 British vessels were captured. The lint of American 

 privateers numbered 250 in all, of which 58 were from 

 Baltimore. 55 from New York, 40 from Salem, Mass., 

 32 from Boston, and 14 from Philadelphia. At the 

 opening of the war the effective force of the American 

 navy consisted of only 7 frigates, with a total of 278 

 IBM 



In 1818 Congress passed a law forbidding the enlist 

 ment. within the United States, of any person on 

 lioanl of any privateer belonging to a foreign power. 

 In IS'J4 the United States urged upon Great Britain 

 the abolition of privateering, but that, entreaty was not 

 h'-cile.d. Thirty years later, io 1854, Lord Clarendon 

 advised such abolition. James Buchanan, then the 

 ambassador of the United States at the court of St. 



James, replied that this would pot be satisfactory un- 

 less all the naval powers should agree that war should 

 not be waged against private property on the high 

 seas, in the same way that it had been already agreed 

 that war should iiot be waged against private property 

 on land. While the law of 1818 was very strict in for- 

 bidding American citizens to enter the service of for- 

 eign privateers, yet the United States, according to 

 Buchanan's statement, could not agree that it would 

 not use its merchantmen in case of war. 



A very important step toward the entire abolition 

 of privateering was taken at the treaty of Paris in 

 1 856. This treaty contained four points relating to pri- 

 vateering, which it was agreed should be regarded as 

 an entirety. These points were to bind only those 

 states assenting, and it. was the understanding that 

 those states signing would try to secure the signatures 

 of other states not represented. The four poitits were 

 as follows : " 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the ex- 

 ception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with 

 the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to 

 capture under an enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order 

 to be binding, must be effective ; that is to say, main- 

 tained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to 

 the coast of an enemy." Nearly all of the secondary 

 states of Europe and America signed the treaty. The 

 United States, through W. L. Marcy. then Secretary 

 of State, refused to s'.jn, but declared that the treaty 

 would be signed "it. case the cjause abolishing pri- 

 vateering were amended by adding that the private 

 property of the subject or citizen of a belligerent on 

 the high seas should be exempted from seizure by pub- 

 lic armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be 

 contraband of war." The great powers refused to 

 allow this change. When the civil war of 1801 

 broke out the U. S. government found itself in a 

 very difficult position on this account. W. H. Seward, 

 then Secretary of State, offered the assent of the 

 United States to the treaty of Paris without the 

 amendment noted above ; but this was declined by the 

 governments of Great Britain and France if coupled 

 with the condition that it was to be made applicable 

 to the use of privateers by the Confederate States. 



Pres. Lincoln's proclamation of April 15, 1861, call- 

 ing for 75,000 men to put down the insurrection and 

 to repossess the ports, was answered by the granting 

 of letters of marque and reprisal by the Confederate 

 States. Lincoln then, April 19, declared a blockade 

 of all the Southern ports, and threatened the Confed- 

 erate privateers with punishment for piracy. A long 

 debate took place in the British House of Lords in M;iy 

 and the ground taken by the President was strongly 

 denounced.^ Finally, England declared that no Con- 

 federate prizes should be carried to the British ports. 

 The French declared that privateers might enter 

 their ports with prizes which they could not sell, and 

 that such privateers should remain only 24 hours. 

 The Spanish government enacted a similar require- 

 ment. The recognition .of the Confederate States as 

 belligerents by the British government was a severe 

 blow to the U. S. government, for the latter was very 

 poorly prepared to show that the blockade was an 

 effective one. The Confederates followed up their ad- 

 vantage by threatening retaliation in case the captured 

 crew of the privateer Savannah were treated as pirates. 

 The trial found the court, in doubt as to whether the 

 U. S. government could treat as pirates those of it8 

 own citizens who were alleged traitors against it, and 

 so the ease fell to the ground. This left the seas open 

 to the Confederate privateers, and the opportunity was 

 eagerly seized. Swift steamers, like the Sumter, Nash- 

 ville, and Alabama, preyed upon the American com- 

 merce. 



For years after the end of the civil war the U. S. 

 government sought compensation from Great Britain 

 on the ground that the latter had allowed the escape 

 of the privateers from British ports. In 1871 tne 



