464 



SEDITION". 



had a necessary tendency to displace the ideas of the 

 duty of popular submission to authority that were 

 derived from monarchical institutions. Tin- cnun- 

 ri:\tioii of a measure of popular right in ex 

 what had been regarded a- OM&pfttibM with govcrn- 

 niental stability, and which hail never been reduced 

 loan exaet statement by actual political experience 

 left an important political problem for experimental 

 solution. 



This principle, affirming the popular origin of 

 political authority, was the reason of the Declara- 

 tion of Independence and the sanction of the armed 

 struggle that established its affirmations. _Iu 

 America the ultimate consequences of the tendencies 

 inherent in this new and bold doctrine were coun- 

 teracted by inherited English tendencies that 

 estimated political institutions according to historic 

 rather than philosophical interpretations. In France 

 a prepared intellectuality that had appealed from 

 history to reason, and popular aspirations inteii-i- 

 tied under the pressure of dynastic interests had 

 d the acceptance of the advanced conception 

 of popular right. The displacement of the historic 

 government of that country opened its institutions 

 to the chances of a conflict between reason, rapacity 

 and revenue that soon demonstrated the instability 

 of government not properly related to antecedent 

 experience. 



Profound apprehensions were felt by the conser- 

 vative portion of the American people for t lie safety 

 of our own government which was thought to be 

 expored to the influences that were producing the 

 Instability of French institutions to a condition that 

 threatened constitutional order in government. It 

 was apprehended that emissaries of ultra-revolu- 1 

 tionary ideas would foment among our people 

 dfasatSs&ction witli their government and with 

 established social order and would embarrass if not 

 overthrow the government. The Federal party- 

 then in power sought to relate the institutions of 

 the country to past governmental experiences, while 

 a growing sentiment demanded an unshackled 

 Advance to certain ideal conditions that attracted 

 the popular enthusiasm. 



The apprehensions excited by the condition of poli- 

 tics in France, induced tin- enactment by Congress 

 iu IT'.W of the Alien and Sedition laws. 'The latter 

 prescribed punishment for seditions libels against 

 the government and its officers and for seditious 

 conspiracies, but the law w. is ,-i temporary expedient 

 expiring by its limitation in ISItl. While this l.-nv 

 cannot be regarded as an attempt to establish in 

 this country the common law doctrines in regard to 

 sedition it certainly was a reactionary step that 

 failed through it* want of adjustment to the prin- 

 ciple- of government. AS regarded the penalties 

 attached to scd. lions conspiracy the law is not open 

 to the name critic-inn, but as an attempt to stifle 

 criticism upon the conduct of the government, it 

 ainly misconceived the tendencies that gave 

 direction to thought and action in America. 



The policy of the Federal party in this respect had 

 its roots in distrust of popular institutions that did 

 not contain Of governmental authority 



that in the end could set a limit to popular tendencies. 

 The theory of popular sovereignty was not freed 

 from the influence of the long prevail-ill notions of 

 personal sovereignly, and it seemed to many pi fled 

 minds that the mechanism of government with its 

 inherent conservative tendencies might still supply 

 a check to popular tendencies. If the idea of pop- 

 ular liU-rlv was not clear at that day the instinct 

 associated with that idea was fixed and potent nnd 

 was tin- cau>e of the ov< i throw of the policy of re- 

 pressing popular agitation. 



In oar colonial life we imported the common law 

 of England that thus became the |.oint of <l<-|>ar(- 

 nrc for whatever might be the dUtiuclive product 



of our peculiar conditions and tendencies. The law 

 of Kngland regarded the raisir.g of commotion and 

 disturbance in the Stiite for the purpose of chang- 

 ing the government or its measures as a revolt 

 against, legitimate authority and clothed such con- 

 duct with the qualities of a public wrong under I he 

 name of u sedition." It is more accurate to say 

 that sedition was a parent stock from which a va- 

 riety of crimes branched out than to say that it 

 was in itself a distinctive crime. While as aflcct- 

 ing the life or security of the person of the sove- 

 reign, seditious conduct on the part of a single 

 individual might be of consequence, it was only 

 when numbers united for seditious purposes that 

 the stability and authority of the government could 

 be regarded as in jeopardy, and hence the develop- 

 ment of the consequences of sedition dealt mainly 

 with the conduct of associated persons. Yicwid 

 on this side sedition implied the assembling to- 

 gether of persons from the motive of hostility to the 

 government or its measures and the conduct at- 

 tending and resulting from such assembling. An 

 unlawful assembly as punished h\ the law of Eng- 

 land was measured by a very vague standard that 

 in its application left much to the slate of the 

 times a ml to the temper of those administering it. 

 A definition of an unlawful assembly as "any meet- 

 ing whatever of great numbers of people with such 

 circumstances of terror as cannot but endanger the 

 public peace and raise fear and jealousies among 

 the King's subjects." is a net that can be made to 

 catch great or little fish as circumstances might 

 require. If the object of such an assembly was lo 

 enforce some personal right or to redress some per- 

 sonal wrong, without any direct bearing upon the 

 government, the most that would result from :in 

 attempt to execute its pwpo-cs I \ force, would bo 

 to involve the a- tors in the consequences of the 

 crime of riot. lint, if the object was the redress of 

 public L'rievancts, and force was employed, th. re- 

 sponsibility wa> for the consequences of treason. 



As the discussion of radical changes in ti.e structure 

 and policy of government must produce those con- 

 sequences above described as indicating nn unlaw- 

 ful assembly it is evident that the system thai g:i\e. 

 rise to such definitions of the limitations of popular 

 action was essentially b:i.- d upon the idea that 

 such changes could not properly originate with the 

 mass of the people. Such a system could have no 

 place in the doctrines of America, and the attempt 

 to graft it upon our institutions was a serious error 

 that had a large share in revolutionizing the slate 

 of parties and opinions it; the United. Slates. At. 

 I he present day the term "sedition" hardly has a 

 place in the law language of this country, fts only 

 use in the statutes of the United Stales is in con- 

 nection with the regulations for the government of 

 the army and the navy, where sedition is named as 

 a military oflence. 



The attempt to change the struct tire or to control 

 or resist the operations of the government by force. 

 has not lost the character derivi d from (he institu- 

 tions of Kngland, for the principli s of popular 

 government while giving the utmost liberty to 

 rational methods find no place for brute for-. It is 

 true that we have limited the scope of the crime of 

 treason to the case of armed hostility to the govern- 

 ment, but in various forms penal consequences have 

 Mai-bed to applications of force to antagonize 

 the operations of the government. 



The right of the |>cople to assemble and 

 rale upon public grievances is fixed in the constitu- 

 tion of the United States and those of the Stales, 

 so (hat (he popular assembly, whether dclilM-rating 

 up' .11 changes in the structure or opera! M ns of Iht; 

 government or on the conduct of those administer- 

 ing it, is placed upon hi nul of privilege 



beyond the control of the law-making authority M> 



