STATE-MILITIA, 



577 



States when called into the actual service of the 

 United States." 



The first act of Congress in regard to "organizing, 

 arming, and disciplining " the militia was passed iu 

 1792 ; but this, as well as subsequent acts, aimed at 

 little more than to secure a tolerable degree of uni- 



far more than they were called upon to furnish. 

 Massachusetts was ready with two and a half times, 

 Rhode Island with four times, Connecticut with 

 three times, Pennsylvania with 60 per cent., and 

 Missouri with three times more than they were asked 

 for. The great majority of the men were intelli- 



forrnity among the militia of the different States and gent, brave, and eager to do their duty ; but it 

 a certain amount of agreement with the arming and would probably be an exaggeration to say that 

 disciplining of the regular army. In all other im- ' 10,000 of the 75,000 had any more knowledge of the 

 portant respects the authority of the States was not duties of a soldier than is possessed by every intel- 



iuterfered with. 



The war of 1812-14 raised a number of questions 

 as to extent of the power over the State militia con- 

 ferred upon the general government by the Consti- 

 tution. 



Some maintained that the power conferred on the 

 President to act as commander-in-chief of the State 

 militia when in the actual service of the United States 

 was a power personal to himself and could not bo dele- 

 gated ; and as the appointment of officers had been 

 reserved to the States, the militia, even when in the 

 U. S. service, were under no obligations to obey any- 

 body but the State authorities or the President in 

 person. The governor of Vermont went so far as to 

 claim the right to order the militia of that State to 

 return home if, iu his discretion, he thought they were 

 more needed at home than iu front of the enemy 

 who had invaded a neighboring State. But the de- 

 cisions of the U. S. Supreme Court and the prece- 

 dents established by the exigencies of the great civil 

 war of 1861-65 have settled it, probably for all time, 

 that from the moment the militia are mustered into 

 the U. S. service they are, until the expiration of 

 their term of service, as much under the control of 

 the general government, for the purposes which they 

 were called out to aid in accomplishing, as the reg- 

 ular army itself. 



The conclusion of the war of 1812-15 and the over- 

 throw of Napoleon Bonaparte were followed, both in 



ligent citizen of full age. But there was something 

 worse than this. The officers were generally as ig- 

 norant as the men. It is not possible here, nor is it 

 necessary, to enter into details. The disastrous result 

 of the first battle of Bull Run was necessary in or- 

 der to convince the people that the attempt to im- 

 provise an army, in a few weeks' time, out of men 

 taken from the office, the farm, and the factory, is, 

 in modern warfare, but a waste of treasure and of 

 blood. 



The civil war also demonstrated another proposi- 

 tion. If its earlier events proved that untrained 

 troops led by untrained officers, no matter how great 

 their enthusiasm and bravery, were of small account, 

 its subsequent course showed with equal conclnsive- 

 ness that of all soldiers the well-trained " citizen- 

 soldier " is the most efficient. 



The greatest difficulty experienced in the earlier 

 stages of the civil war was the lack of competent 

 officers. Given a regiment in which the commis- 

 sioned officers all thoroughly understand their duties 

 while all the rest of the regiment consists of men 

 strong and willing, though without knowledge and 

 experience in military affairs, and it can be brought 

 to a high state of discipline and efficiency in a com- 

 paratively short time. But where officers as well as 

 men are obliged to learn their business after being 

 mustered into service, the time required increases in 

 nn appalling ratio. To educate officers by means of 



America and Europe, by a period of peace extending | actual service in time of war is a very costly opera- 

 over a third of a century. The war with Mexico tion. A largo number of militia officers during the 

 was not a war " to enforce the laws of the Union, to ! civil war achieved high distinction, but as a rule they 

 suppress insurrection," nor " to repel invasions," and were those who, from natural inclination, had devoted 

 it consequently afforded the general government no much time, before entering the service, to the study 

 occasion and no opportunity for calling out the [ of military science and to practice in organized 

 militia. No such call was made until the breaking | bodies of militia; or they were men of far more than 



out of the great civil war in 1861. During this long 

 period the interest of the people at large in military 

 affairs and their knowledge of the art of war grad- 

 ually decayed. The annual meetings for instruction 

 in drill and discipline, the so-called " training days," 

 became mere farces. They were regarded as a sheer 

 waste of time or as something worse, occasions of 

 drunkenness and revelry, profitable only to pedlers 

 and gamblers, and went out of fashion. 



When the great civil war broke out each State had 

 upon its statute books an elaborate code of laws in 

 regard to the militia. But by the great body of the 

 people, and especially among the country-people, 

 tiiose laws had long been practically ignored. In 

 most of the large cities one or two militia organiza- 

 tions existed. Some of these, in the accuracy of their 

 drill, the precision of their movements, and the com- 

 pleteness of theirappointments, would have compared 

 favorably with the best regiments of any regular army 



in the world, 

 exceptional. 



But such organizations were wholly 



It was under these circumstances, as regards the 



average abilities, animated by an enthusiasm and de- 

 termination which no obstacles could oppose. 



One of the most remarkable citizen-soldiers, prob- 

 ably in the opinion of professional military men the 

 most remarkable, developed by the civil war was 

 Gen. Alfred H. Terry, who captured Fort Fisher, 

 and at the close of the war was appointed a major- 

 general in the regular army. He entered the ser- 

 vice as a colonel, but it would be a great mistake to 

 suppose that he passed, without preparation, from 

 his office to his colonelcy. On the contrary, in his 

 boyhood he had a strong inclination toward every- 

 thing military. He served in the militia before the 

 war with a kind of serious zeal. From youth to 

 manhood he devoted much of his time to the study 

 of military science. During the Crimean war he 

 visited Europe for the express purpose of seeing 

 military operations on a large scale as conducted in 

 actual warfare. The consequence was that when he 

 led his regiment to the field there was probably no 

 graduate of West Point, no colonel in the regular 

 army, who knew more thoroughly and completely 



condition of the militia, that Pros. Lincoln, on April what he ought to do and how it ought to be done. 



15, 1861, issued his first call for 75,000 men for three 



The experience of our civil war appears to justify 



months' service. The enthusiasm of the people was the conclusion that, in a free country, the mainte- 



very great. Had the President called for twice that 

 number they would have been easily obtained. 

 The quotas of the loyal States were quickly filled 

 out. Most of those States, when their quotas were 



nance of a great standing army imposes upon the 

 people a burden at once enormous and unnecessary. 

 With suitable legal provisions and at a comparatively 

 small expense voluntary organizations sufficient both 



filled, refused to receive any more; other States ! in numbers and discipline can be maintained to meet 

 offered to the general government the services of , any sudden emergency and to insure time for prep- 



