VICKSBURG. 



737 



gestion that tended to weaken the national government 

 as against the States. 



The prominence of questions of constitutional au- 

 thority in the vetoes that occurred in the early history 

 of the country tended to associate that power specifi- 

 cally with questions of that character, and to create an 

 opinion that it was improperly used where the occa- 

 sion of its use was a difference between the executive 

 and Congress as to the policy of public measures. The 

 Constitution drew no such distinction, while it pro- 

 vided ample means for subjecting the action of Con- 

 gress to the limitations imposed upon it by the Con- 

 stitution, by conferring authority to uphold those lim- 

 itations upon the national judiciary. The circumstance 

 that the proper effect of the veto under the Constitu- 

 tion was to require Congress to act by a larger number 

 than a mere majority in certain cases, points the con- 

 clusion that the object of the veto was to secure mature 

 consideration in such cases, and that object would em- 

 brace questions of policy as well as those that involve 

 constitutional powers. Viewed in this light, the con- 

 stitutional veto may be regarded as a power placed in 

 the hands of the executive, by which a more mature 

 consideration may be required on the part of Congress 

 than what is implied by its acting by a mere majority. 

 Such executive authority does not contradict the prin- 

 ciple of representative legislation, but only exacts a 

 more full expression of the legislative mind in cases 

 where differences exist between the opinions of the 

 executive and the legislative departments of the gov- 

 ernment The fact that the termination of a session 

 of Congress before the expiration of the time allowed 

 by the Constitution for the action of the President 

 npon bills presented to him for his approval may, and 

 often does, defeat legislative action, way be regarded 

 as an accident of the system that is unavoidable, and 

 not as impugning the principle that under no circum- 

 stances should the executive will prevail over that of 

 the legislative body; although advantage may be taken 

 of that fact to defeat legislative action, yet the result 

 can only be ascribed to the abuse of a proper power 

 which may not be dispensed with, although possible to 

 be abused. 



It is plainly inferrible from the nature of the execu- 

 tive office that the veto was not intended to interfere 

 with matters of detail in legislation, for a minute in- 

 quiry on the part of the executive into the details of 

 legislation would be inconsistent with the proper dis- 

 charge of the executive duty that demands a general 

 oversight of the interests of the government. As 

 means of protecting the great interests of the country, 

 its nature can be readily understood, for legislative 

 bodies are likely, notwithstanding the checks and 

 guards afforded by parliamentary organization, to act 

 at times hastily and improvidently, especially under 

 the influence of excitement arising from popular ap- 

 prehensions of public evils, and for the vindication of 

 the principles tnat sustain the administration of jus- 

 tice and a wise public policy, such means of securing 

 deliberation can readily be understood. As parliamen- 

 tary bodies are liable, notwithstanding the means of 

 securing deliberation afforded by 'the experience of 

 government, to act without due deliberation, it would 

 seem necessary that some means should be devised for 

 the protection of the important public interests in 

 such an event, and the executive veto is the only means 

 for that purpose that has been proved by the experi- 

 ence of government. (A. J. w.) 



VICKSBURG, SIEOE OF. After the battle of 

 Corinth, Oct. 3-4, 1862 (see CORINTH), Gen. Grant, 

 in command of the department of the Tennessee, 

 proposed to Gen. H. W. Halleck, then general- 

 m-cnief of all the national armies, a movement 

 having as its objective the capture of. Vicksburg. 

 His views being approved, he, on Dec. 8, ordered 

 Gen. Sherman to move down the Mississippi from 

 Memphis with this ulterior object, while Grant him- 

 self should co-operate with him by land. The cap- 



ture of his secondary base of supplies at Holly 

 Springs, Dec. 20, and the difficulty of protecting 

 the long line of communications, induced him to 

 abandon the land expedition and take command in 

 person of the movement down the Mississippi. On 

 arriving at Milliken's Bend, 20 miles above Vicksburg, 

 on the west side of the river, he found Sherman there, 

 and directed him to attempt the capture of the strongly 

 fortified position of Haines' Bluff, on the Yazoo River. 

 Sherman crossed the Mississippi at the head of 32,000 

 troops, and ascended the Yazoo, landing immediately 

 below the bluff. His assault was repulsed with severe 

 loss, and Grant, establishing his head-quarters at Mem- 

 phis, commenced preparations for co-operation with 

 Sherman in a concentrated movement against Vicks- 

 burg. On Dec. 29, 1862, he arrived at the head of 

 50,000 men at Young's Point, nearly opposite the 

 mouth of the Yazoo River, 3 miles above Vicksburg, 

 Admiral Porter co-operating with a fleet of gun-boats 

 carrying 280 guns and 800 men. Various modes pre- 

 sented themselves for reaching the high ground behind 

 Vicksburg, whence only it could be assaulted. Three 

 received especial consideration: (1) By crossing the 

 river below Vicksburg and co-operating with Gen. 

 Bunks, who was Moendrog the river in command of an 

 expedition from New Orleans ; (2) By constructing a 

 canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg for the 

 passage of gun-boats and transports, and which would 

 be kept open as a line of communication for supplies; 

 (3) By turning the Mississippi out of its course and 

 crossing its bed. Each of these plans, specious in 

 theory, was found impracticable, mainly on account 

 of the weather, the swollen condition of the river, and 

 the state of the country. After spending about three 

 mouths at Young's Point "trying," Gen. Grant says, 

 " to get on high land and waiting for the river to re- 

 cede, he determined to attempt a plan more hazard- 

 ous than any of the others. This was to run the 

 batteries of Vicksburg with his gun-boats and trans- 

 ports, march his troops down the west bank of the 

 Mississippi from Milliken's Bend to a point in the 

 neighborhood of New Carthage, and ferry them thence 

 over to the cast bank. The movement was begun 

 March 2'.t. when the troops set out on their march 

 to New Carthage and Hard Times. On the night of 

 April 1 G the fleet ran the batteries of Vicksburg under 

 a hot fire. On April 29 Gen. Grant reconnoitred 

 Grand Gulf, and finding it too strong to promise suc- 

 cess to an assault, ran its batteries with his gun-boats, 

 etc., as he had done those of Vicksburg, to a point 

 farther down the river. On the 30th the advance of 

 his army was ferried across to the east bank at Browns- 

 burg, 30 miles south of Vicksburg, and forthwith 

 inarched out in the direction of Port Gibson, near 

 which, on May 1, it encountered Gen. Bowen at the 

 head of some 7000 men, defeated him, and chased 

 him for some miles. On May 3 the Big Black River 

 was reached and also the Mississippi at Grand Gulf, 

 at which place he made his head-quarters for a few 

 days. 



Grant now found himself between two hostile armies 

 one with head-quarters at Jackson, 45 miles east of 

 Vicksburg (of which Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, sent 

 as Confederate general-in-chief of the Vicksburg cam- 

 paign, took the command on May 13), the other under 

 Gen. J. C. Pemberton, with head-quarters at Vicks- 

 burg. With the view of relieving his front, Grant had 

 ordered Sherman to make a feigned attack on Haines' 

 Bluff, which compelled the Confederates to despatch 

 troops to its relief. This feint had been successfully 

 executed on April 30, whereupon Sherman marched 

 to join the main army. Three days were spent in 

 Grand Gulf in ferrying over Sherman's army and recon- 

 noitring towards Vicksburg. By the evening of May 

 6 Sherman's corps had joined the main army in 

 Grand Gulf, and it became Grant's policy to cut him- 

 self adrift from his base, and, by a rapid movement, 

 to strike first the one and then the other of the hostile 



