104 Risks of Attic agriculture 



individualism was superseding old-fashioned patriotism. The old simple 

 views of life and duty had been weakened by the questionings of many 

 thinkers, and no new moral footing had yet been found to compete 

 with immediate personal interest. Athens was the chief centre of this 

 decline, for the intellectual and moral influences promoting it were 

 strongest there: but it was surely not confined to Athens. The failure 

 of Thebes after the death of Epaminondas was one of many symptoms 

 of decay. She had overthrown Sparta, but she could not herself lead 

 Greece: her utmost achievement was a fatal equilibrium of weak states, 

 of which the Macedonian was soon to take full advantage. And every- 

 where, particularly in rural districts, the flower of the male population 

 was being drained away, enlisting in mercenary armies, lured by the 

 hope of gain and willing to escape the prospect of hard and dreary lives 

 at home. In short, each was for his own hand. 



Such an age was not one to encourage the peaceful and patient toil 

 of agriculture. The great cities, above all Athens, needed cheap corn. 

 Their own farmers could not supply this, and so importation 1 was by 

 law favoured, and as far as possible inforced. Thus times of actual 

 dearth seldom occurred, and home-grown corn was seldom a paying 

 crop. Thrown back all the more on cultivation of the olive and vine 

 the products of which were available for export, the farmer needed time 

 for the development of his planted (ire^vrev^evr]) land, and the waiting 

 for returns necessitated a larger capital. He was then exposed to risk 

 of greater damage in time of war. For his capital was irretrievably 

 sunk in his vineyard or oliveyard, and its destruction would take years 

 to repair that is, more waiting and more capital. This was no novel 

 situation. But its effect in reducing the number of small peasant farmers 

 was probably now greater than ever. Not only were mercenary armies 

 relentless destroyers and robbers (having no fear of reprisals and no 

 conventional scruples to restrain them), but their example corrupted 

 the practice of citizen forces. Even if no righting took place in this or 

 that neighbourhood, the local farmers 2 must expect to be ruined by the 

 mere presence of their own defenders. When we bear in mind the risks 

 of drought in some parts or floods in others, the occasional losses of 

 live stock, and other ordinary misfortunes, it is fair to imagine that the 

 farmer of land needed to be a man of substance, not liable to be ruined 

 by a single blow. And the sidelights thrown on the subject by the 

 indirect references in the orators are quite consistent with this view. 



The loss of the Thracian Chersonese in the disasters of 405 BC had 



1 References are too numerous to be given here. A locus classicus is Dem Lept 30-3 

 pp 466-7, on the case of Leucon the ruler of Bosporus. We hear also of corn imported from 

 Sicily and Egypt, and even (Lycurg 26 p 151) from Epirus to Corinth. 



2 Demosthenes Olynth I 27 p 17. 



