356 Rents 



so now its subdivision was generating little tenancies, with chief- 

 tenants as a sort of middlemen between the dominus and the coloni. 

 To protect the colonus, the powers of the conductor* had to be strictly 

 limited : to ease the labour-problem and retain the conductor, a certain 

 amount of task-work had to be required of the colonus. And this last 

 condition was ominous of the coming serfdom. 



If the economic situation and the convenience of non-resident 

 landlords operated to produce a widespread system of letting to small 

 tenants, it was naturally an object to levy the rents in such a form as 

 would best secure a safe and regular return. To exact a fixed money- 

 rent would mean that the peasant must spend time in marketing his 

 produce in order to procure the necessary cash, and thereby lessen the 

 time spent in actual farm-labour. In bad years he would look for an 

 abatement of his rent, nor would it be easy to satisfy him : here was 

 material for disputes and discontent. Such difficulties were known in 

 Italy and elsewhere, and jurists recognized 2 an advantage of the 

 ' partiary ' system in this connexion. An abatement of rent due in a 

 particular year need not imply that the landlord lost the amount of 

 abatement for good and all. If the next year produced a ' bumper ' 

 crop, the landlord was entitled to claim restitution of last year's abate- 

 ment in addition to the yearly rent. This too, it seems, in the case of 

 a tenant sitting at a fixed money-rent. But the partiarius colonu s is 

 on another footing: he shares gain and loss with the dominus, with 

 whom he is a quasi-partner 3 . It was surely considerations of this kind 

 that led to the adoption of the share-rent system on these great African 

 estates. By fixing the proportion on a moderate scale, the peasant 

 was fairly certain to be able to pay his rent, and he would not be 

 harassed with money transactions dependent on the fluctuations in 

 the price of corn. Under such conditions he was more likely to be 

 contented and to stay on where he was, and that this should be so was 

 precisely what the landlord desired. On the other hand the big con- 

 ductor might pay rent either in coin or kind. He was a speculator, 

 doubtless well able to take care of his own interests: probably the 

 normal case was that he agreed to a fixed cash payment, and only 

 took the lease on terms that left him a good prospect of making it a 

 remunerative venture. But on this point there is need of further 

 evidence. 



When the emperor took over an estate of this kind, such an exist- 



1 conductor and coloni are both bound by the statute for the fundus or saltus. In theory 

 both are tenants of the emperor, in practice the conductor has the upper hand, as Cuq points 

 out. 



2 Compare Dig xix 2 15* with 25 6 . 



3 quasi sodetatis iure. Of course not a real socius. See Index, colonia partiaria, and 

 Vinogradoff, Growth of the Manor note 91 on p 109. 



