358 PROVISION OF BORROWING FACILITIES. 



every five shares with a maximum of four votes ; in another the 

 maximum is sixteen. Possibly a maximum of five votes, e.g., one for 

 every five or fraction of five shares up to twenty-live would prevent 

 all undue preponderance of wealth while giving to the experienced 

 men, with a considerable stake in the Fund, sufficient voting 

 power to prevent ignorance and inexperience from rash resolutions. 

 The single vote system seems successful in Europe, and is based on 

 the true co-operative principle ; the unlimited stock vote is generally 

 condemned. In Madras and in the mofassil some of the most experienced 

 men disbelieve altogether in the existing voting system, whether the 

 individual or the stock vote system. They recommend that the 

 general meeting should not consist of all subscribers, especially when 

 the society becomes a large one ; a really representative meeting 

 would, in such case, be too unwieldly to manage, while a door is 

 opened to great abuses whenever matters of importance, elections, &c., 

 are concerned. They recommend either a resort to intermediate 

 bodies, each member of which should represent a group of subscribers, 

 or that the general meeting should consist only of shareholders holding 

 above a certain minimum number of shares so that the mass of subs- 

 cribers have no votes, but enjoy all other privileges. Possibly this latter 

 plan may be advisable in cities with very large societies, but for small 

 societies the individual or the modified stock vote system seems 

 preferable as giving all persons a working interest in the society. 

 It has also been suggested by very experienced and disinterested men, 

 one being chairman of a large Fund directed almost gratuitously, 

 that the executive power of a general meeting should be removed 

 altogether ; it should be a mere meeting to receive and adopt reports ; 

 the real control should be exercised by a board of control of twenty 

 to twenty-five members, chosen at the first general meeting from the 

 men of highest reputation, who would hold office permanently, all 

 vacancies being filled up by the board itself ; this board should control 

 all the operations of the managing committee. Such a boe>rd of 

 control was, in fact, in existence, it is said, in the old societies of this 

 presidency, but has for many years been abolished under the ideas 

 engendered by the Joint Stock Companies' Act. The proposal is, to 

 a certain extent, parallel with the practice in the old Land ba,nks of 

 Germany, where the general meeting is of rare occurrence, its place 

 being taken by a council of delegates ; it exactly recalls also the 

 universal committee of supervision in Europe, which, in every society, 



