PROVISION OF BORROWING FACILITIES. 359 



controls the work of the managing board, and safeguards the cause of 

 the society. 



It is, of course, open to Funds to frame Articles as they please in 

 any of the above directions. 



The directorate usually consists, at least at first, of the most 

 experienced and influential men, retiring, as usual, by rotation, but 

 re-eligible. They are now almost always paid, either by a share in 

 the net profits, after the guaranteed interest has been distributed to 

 members, or by honoraria settled at the general meeting ; they usually 

 get sitting fees also. In some the directors are paid at a fixed and 

 often a very large proportion of the profits, in others according to 

 the number of meetings they have attended. In the largest mofassil 

 society working rather as a bank, the president and directors work 

 gratuitously) while the secretary, auditors and appraisers each get an 

 honorarium settled at the general meeting ; the staff, of course, is 

 always paid by salary. In Germany the directorate of the Sclmlze- 

 Delitzsch banks is usually paid both by salary and by a share in the 

 profits ; in Italy this was also the case, but SIGNOU LU/ZATTI strongly 

 recommends and the suggestion is now largely adopted that their 

 services be given gratuitously ; in some of the very largest banks, 

 e. $., Milan, this is pre-eminently the case ; in the Raiffeiscn and 

 Wollemborg Loan societies all services are gratuitous except those of 

 the accountant. It seems to be the rule that in these co-operative 

 Mutual Credit societies in Europe, and in the United States, as also 

 the case of the English Trustee Savings banks and Irish Loan societies 

 under the Act of 1843, the directorate gives its services gratuitously; 

 the Schulze Delitzsch societies are the exception, and the express 

 complaint made against them is that they are tending towards the 

 position of mere Commercial societies, and losing their "mutual" 

 character ; the desire for large profits, and consequently larger 

 "tantiemes' 3 to the directors, is not merely keeping up the rate of 

 interest, but diverting the societies from their true role of assisting 

 and guiding the poorer classes. This complaint may or may not be 

 well founded j the desire for profits does bring about exactly such 

 results in general, and there is a very strong feeling among the 

 promoters of Mutual societies that dividends other than fixed, and 

 wages depending on dividends, are a mistake fixed inteivst and, if 

 necessary, moderate honoraria for expenses out of pocket, arc 

 recommended. 



