FRANCE. 



B09 



() the following day, February 19th, an 

 ini|uTial dcciv.' cuiivoki-il tlio <'hamber of 

 in-lit of tlio Hi^Ii Court of Justice for 

 i -Jl, 1870, at Tours. The court met at 

 :i|n>inU'<l time, and tho trial terminated 

 in tlu- acquittal of tlio prinro from the ehurgo 

 ..I' voluntary hmuicMc. Ho was, however, sen- 

 tenced to defray tho expenses of tho trial, and 



iy an indemnity of 25,000 franc-, 

 on March _ >- 2<l tho Emperor addressed to 

 I 'rime- Minister Ollivior tho following impor- 

 tant letter, in which tho ministry is requested 

 to prepare a senatus-consultum, for dividing tho 

 le-i-Iut'ive, power between the two Chambers: 



I think it opportune, under present circumstances, 

 to adopt all reforms required by tho constitutional 

 itiu'iit of tlio empire, in order to put an end to 

 the immoderate desire for a change which prevails in 

 certain minds, and also not to leave public opinion 

 unsettled by creating instability. 



Tho first placo I accord to those reforms which 

 refer to the Constitution and the prerogatives of 

 the Senate. The Constitution of 1852 had, above 

 all thin*:*, to provide tho Government with the 

 means of establishing authority and order, but it re- 

 mained to be perfected. But it was necessary that 

 it should remain perfectible, as long as the state of 

 tho country would not permit the establishment of 

 public liberties on solid bases. At the present time, 

 when successive changes have gradually created a 

 constitutional regime in harmony with the bases laid 

 down in tho plebiscite, it is important to replace, in 

 the domain of law, all that more specially has refer- 

 ence to the preservation of legislative order, to im- 

 press a definite character upon the latest reforms, to 

 place the Constitution above all controversy, to call 

 upon the Senate that grand body which contains so 

 many brilliant men to lend to the new regime their 

 most efficacious concurrence. 



I therefore request you to come to an understand- 

 ing with your colleagues and lay before me the draft 

 of a stnatus-consultum which shall firmly fix the fun- 

 damental dispositions derived from the plebiscite of 

 1852, and which shall divide the legislative power 

 between the two Chambers, and restore to the nation 

 that portion of constituent power it had delegated to 

 me. NAPOLEON. 



On March 28th, Ollivier laid before the Sen- 

 ate the draft of the xenatus-cowultum, together 

 with a very full expose des motifs. The fol- 

 lowing extracts from the expose are of special 

 interest, as a review of the Napoleonic specu- 

 lations on, and experiments in, constitutional 

 government : 



The existence of a second Chamber is considered 

 by publicists as an axiom of political science ;and, 

 by tree nations, as a guarantee of social stability. 



The downfall of constitutions, monarchical or re- 

 publican, which have refused to admit that neces- 

 sity, is not less significant than the duration of those 

 which have adapted themselves to it. Tho power- 

 lessness of the Constitutions of the 3d September, 

 1703, and of the 4th November, 184S, does not prove 

 less than the energetic vitality of those of England 

 or the United States. Who, indeed, could reason- 

 ably deny that every thing should not be accorded to 

 the force of impulsion, that, in nature as well as in 

 science, an allowance should be made for the force 

 of resistance, and that progress is only certain wlu-n 

 it is the result of such a double action? Single as- 

 semblies are, doubtless, not necessarily hostile to a 

 conservative spirit ; they have often served it with 

 courage; sometimes, nevertheless, subject to the 

 pressure of the people, " whose nature is," according 



to the expression of Montesquieu, " to act with pa*- 

 hion," they have uborlinuti-l permanent ii.' 

 t<> impuUes of the moment. Therefore it is desirable 

 that a second assembly, with more control over itself, 

 and leas subject to pining influences, should pre- 

 vent, or at least moderate', precipitate or unreflecting 

 movements. 



A second Chamber, composed of all those men 

 who have made themselves illustrious in a civil or a 

 military career, would be useful if it had no other 

 effect than to accustom to habits of respect a society 

 which ban not always sufficiently remembered bow 

 much worship of tho pant renders a nation worthy of 

 the good fortunes of the future. But, in a monarchy, 

 a second Chamber has mot only a moral action ; it in 

 the natural intermediary between the hereditary and 

 the elective powers ; it foresees, appeases, moderates 

 shocks, and assures an additional protection to the 

 monarch, who is already covered by the ministerial 

 responsibility. 



Under the present organization two Chambers can- 

 not be said to exist. The Senate and the Legislative 

 Body move in two different spheres ; constitutional 

 laws are reserved for tho one, and ordinary measures 

 for the other, so that there exist a constitutional as- 

 sembly and a legislative one in juxtaposition, rather 

 than two legislative chambers. 



The Emperor saw the inconveniences of that r. '- 

 ffime, and has already granted to the Senate certain 

 participation in the legislative power; in 1867 by the 

 suspensive veto, and in 1869 by the absolute veto. 

 But such a share is not sufficient. The efficacy of it 

 is seen when the Legislative Assembly adopts meas- 

 ures vainly opposed by the ministers ; the Senate may 

 then come to the aid of tho Government. 



But what would tho Senate do if the Legislative 

 Assembly systematically rejected the bills presented 

 by the crown 1 Of what use would its veto be ? What 

 it would require in such a case is a right of approval, 

 and how could it exercise such a prerogative with 

 respect to laws not submitted to it f The situation 

 would be very different if the Government could, as 

 it pleased, lay its propositions before either Assem- 

 bly. 



The right of choosing the members of the second 

 Chamber is, in France, one of the attributes of the 

 crown. The nation, in instituting the dynasty, dele- 

 gated to the sovereign that right as well as tnat of 

 appointing the judges ; immobility baa in each case 

 appeared a sufficient guarantee for the independence 

 of the authority. The Councils-General have been 

 erroneously compared with the American Legisla- 

 tures. The former bodies, even when their powers 

 shall have been extended by a law of decentraliza- 

 tion, will only bear a very distant resemblance to the 

 American Assemblies, which are in reality Parlia- 

 ments. Besides, in tho United States, tho organiza- 

 tion of the Senate, in all its parts, is only the 

 quence of the Federal regime. None of the elective 

 systems proposed, down to this day, have appeared 

 to us more satisfactory. They would weaken the 

 Senate instead of strengthening it, and would reduce 

 it to the state of a pale imitation of the Legislative 

 Body. Moreover, why in a great country of uni- 

 versal suffrage abandon every thing to the chances 

 of election ? Why not reserve a means of rewarding 

 eminent services, of grouping together the illustrious 

 men of the country, of utilizing their experience, 

 and at the same time of introducing into puolic life, 

 of forming, by study, by discussion, and tne conduct 

 of affairs, distinguished men, who, having neither 

 tho local influence nor the popular favor which assures 

 electoral successes, would remain all their lives ex- 

 cluded, unemployed, and impatient, if power had not 

 been given to the Emperor to remark them, to call 

 them, and to place them in communication with the 

 country I There, however, exists in the organization 

 of the "Senate a void which requires to be filled up. 

 The Legislative Chamber restrains the sovereign by 

 the voting of supply and bills, and by the ministerial 



