310 



FRANCE. 



responsibility ; it is itself restricted by the control 

 of the Senate and by the right of dissolution pos- 

 sessed by the Emperor. But the Senate is subject to 

 no moderating power. Suppose that a conflict should 

 arise between it and the other Chamber, or the sover- 

 eign ? as occurred in France with respect to the con- 

 version of rente, or in England relative to electoral 

 reform, there exists no means of overcoming the dif- 

 ficulty, and one alone of the powers might paralyze 

 inderfnitely the action of the two others. There was, 

 consequently, a necessity to introduce into the Con- 

 stitution a principle which should fill the place, with 

 respect to the immovable Chamber, of the right of 

 dissolution to which the temporary Assembly is ex- 

 posed. With that view we propose to you to decide 

 that the Emperor shall have the faculty of increasing 

 the number of the Senators. Thus the influence of 

 the nation may be exercised in a direct manner on a 

 body which would escape all control if it remained 

 firm. But the number of Senators shall never be 

 allowed to exceed two-thirds of the Deputies, nor 

 shall more than twenty be appointed annually. If. 

 from a fear of being subject to the preponderance of 

 the Senate, its individuality were destroyed, such a 

 step would be going from one extreme to another ; 

 and, instead of improving the institution, would com- 

 promise it. 



As soon as the Senate shall have been associated 

 in the legislative power, it cannot be allowed to re- 

 tain the exclusive right of modifying the Constitu- 

 tion ; for, instead of being_ a moderator, it would be- 

 come a dominating authority. But to whom should 

 that mission be confided? "We think that there is 

 cause to make a distinction between the different ar- 

 ticles of the Constitution. Some are only a textual 

 reproduction, or an intimate or necessary consequence 

 of the dispositions of the plebiscite ; others are or- 

 ganic rules of lesser importance. We propose to you 

 to declare that these latter shall belong to the legis- 

 lative power; that consequently the elective body, 

 as well as the Senate and the Emperor, shall have 

 the right of demanding a revisal of them, and that 

 none of the modifications thus effected by one of the 

 three powers shall be valid until after the vote or 

 sanction of the two others. 



As to that part of the Constitution which repro- 

 duces the plebiscitary dispositions, or is closely con- 

 nected with them, wo have already made it the very 

 substance of the constituent power ; and, in order 

 that the sharing should have an authentic and defi- 

 nite character, we have summed up in an annex all 

 the classes or the present Constitution, which, re- 

 taining their primitive nature, will form that or the 

 empire ; all the rest will only have the value of a law. 

 Thus restricted, the Constitution only contains that 

 which is attached to the right of the dynasty and the 

 organization of the public powers. Under such cir- 

 cumstances we found that there would be no impro- 

 priety in protecting it against too facile or too fre- 

 quent changes : we have returned to the rigor of 

 principles we have restored the constituent power 

 to the whole nation ; the country only can hencefor- 

 ward modify the fundamental pact, on the proposi- 

 tion of the Emperor. The Constitution will not be 

 unchangeable ; but a plebiscitum alone will have the 

 faculty of bringing it to perfection. A direct legisla- 

 tion by the people was claimed in former times by 

 the democratic party. This pretension, chimerical 

 for ordinary laws, is well founded in respect of those 

 of a constitutive character, referring only to a few 

 simple points easy to be apprehended. The neces- 

 sity of proceeding by way oiplebiscita does not render 

 progress impossible^ as the voting of one doesnot pre- 

 sent greater difficulties than the summoning of a con- 

 stituent assembly or a convention ; the only effect is 

 that of rendering longer and more serious the prepa- 

 ration that will precede reforms. And all this is 

 desirable. Constitutional controversies, too much 

 prolonged, irritate, sow divisions, and form an obsta- 

 cle to the daily task of governments. "While people 



are in altercation about the equilibrium of powers, 

 they cannot study practical reforms, or devote them- 

 selves to the moral, intellectual, and material amelio- 

 ration of the greatest number, the supreme object of 

 all political science. 



And, after all, where is the advantage of passing 

 such a- multitude of laws ? As Joseph de Maistre 

 said excellently well about the government of our 

 neighbors, "The true Constitution is that public 

 spirit, admirable, unique, infallible, above all praise, 

 which conducts^ preserves, and saves every thing 

 what is written is nothing." 



"We can now take an account of what has happened 

 since 1852. 



In principle, as we have already pointed out, the 

 constituent power, as being the very essence of sov- 

 ereignty, resides in the whole nation. But, in reality, 

 this faculty has rarely been exercised by the country 

 itself. In ancient times it was delegated to a single 

 individual, to a legislator, according to the expression 

 of Eousseau. Since the Revolution of 1789 it has 

 been confided to Assemblies, called Constituent, or 

 Conventions ; in 1852 the people pronounced direct- 

 ly, and fixed personally their own destinies. But the 

 plebiscita only regulated the fundamental principles 

 of the new Government. The task of drawing from 

 them the practical conclusions, the necessary conse- 

 quences, was intrusted by popular suffrage to the 

 sovereign, assisted by a Senate composed ot the most 

 notable persons in the country. Thus, in 1851 and in 

 1852 ; the people did two things it used directly one 

 portion of the constituent power, and delegated the 

 other to the Emperor. It returned plebiscites and au- 

 thorized senatus-consulta. 



The limit within which the senatiig-consultum was 

 to operate was fixed by the terms and motives of the 

 delegation agreed to. There would be no mistake 

 about the matter. The public had just emerged from 

 a revolution ; every man might have convinced him- 

 self, by personal experience, of the danger of sud- 

 den innovations, and of the risk incurred by violent 

 transformations. Order was demanded before every 

 thing else. But whether that old traditions had not 

 been stifled in some hearts by present fears, or that 

 the logical clear-sightedness which is the appanage of 

 our race, surviving the impulses of a reaction, did 

 not allow men to forget that a perpetual dictatorship 

 would be the gravest and most humiliating of disor- 

 ders ; thanks also to the sagacity of a prince, who, be- 

 ing master of every thing, chose to command nothing, 

 the people did not delegate their constituent power 

 to be used against liberty ; on the contrary, they con- 

 fided to the sovereign they had taken for their chief 

 the mission of establishing freedom, but, wishing 

 that liberty to be solid,they only asked for it to be 

 progressive ; and, being cured by events of the thirst 

 for startling novelties, and the taste for absolute sys- 

 tems, they left to the man of their choice the power 

 of determining the hour when the development of 

 each immunity would become opportune. 



Such was the compact concluded in 1851 and 1852 

 between universal suffrage and the heir of the name 

 of Napoleon. This treaty has been executed. Nu- 

 merous Benatus-consvlta have been passed, and there 

 is not one of them that has not consecrated a con- 

 quest of some free institution. The preference was 

 first given to civil liberties ; but, after 1860, political 

 ones had their turn, and they have never since lost 

 it. One need only recall to memory the days of 

 January 19th and September 8th. From progress to 

 progress, France has arrived, without any convulsion, 

 and through a series of beneficial struggles in which 

 no parties were defeated, at the point of giving her- 

 self a strong and free government, -which, without 

 weakening any of the essential mainsprings of au- 

 thority, discourages no hope of improvement, and 

 which, independent alike of those wlio seek to uree 

 it onward and of those who strive to keep it back, 

 secures the destinies of democracy by the establish- 

 ment of a constitutional government. 



