GERMAN-FRENCH WAR. 





r retreat. As the southern and 

 cent nil minis from Metz and Vordun were con- 



1 l>y the Germans, the northern road load- 



r I Iriey offered the only chance of escape. 



ami tlio cavalry was, therefore, at once ordered 



li the French movement in this direc- 

 tion. Tho remainder of the day was spent in 

 consultations by the King, the prince, General 

 Mtiltko, and the chief of the general staff of 

 t!u> Second Army, General Stiehlo. On the 

 morning of August 18th, all the preparations 

 tor a general attack upon the positions of the 

 French were completed. The King himself was 

 on the battle-field at four o'clock, and assumed 

 the command of both the First and Second 

 A nnies. Altogether, eight German army corps 

 were ready to take part in the decisive bat- 

 tlo, which was to cut off the retreat of the 

 French ; besides the five which had taken part 

 in the battles of Courcelles and Vionville 

 (Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth), the 

 Second (Pomeranians), under command of 

 General Fransocki, the Twelfth, containing the 

 army of the kingdom of Saxony, under the 

 Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, and the Corps 

 of the Guard, under Prince August of Wilr- 

 tomberg. The Gorman army was drawn up 

 as follows : The right wing, south of Gravel otto, 

 consisted of the Seventh and Eighth Corps, 

 under General Steinmetz, to which the Second 

 Corps, which left Pont-a-Mousson at two o'clock 

 on the morning of the 18th, served as a re- 

 serve ; the Ninth Corps, with the Hessian di- 

 vision, formed the centre ; the left wing was 

 composed of the Guard and the Twelfth Corps. 

 The Third and Tenth Corps were a reserve for 

 both the centre aud left wing. On the French 

 side the corps of 1'Adtnirault was placed in the 

 centre ; the corps of Frossard and Decaen on 

 the left, the corps of Canrobert on the right, 

 and the Guard, as a reserve, on the right wing. 

 The centre of the French army was at the 

 village of Amanvillers, on both sides of which 

 it held the heights of St. Privat, Leipsig, Mos- 

 cow, St. Hubert, and Point du Jour. Accord- 

 ing to the Gorman plan of battle, the Seventh 

 and Eighth Corps were to take the heights 

 and woods east and south of Gravelotte ; the 

 Ninth was to advance from Rezonville against 

 Vernevillo and Amanvillers ; on the left, the 

 Guard was to march in a northerly direction 

 over Doncourt upon St. Marie ; still more to 

 the left the Saxons were to march northward 

 through Jarney, to pass by St. Marie, to cross 

 the road of Briey to turn the positions of the 

 French, and to attack their greatest bulwark, 

 the village of St. Privat la Montague, in flank 

 and in the rear, while Duke August of Wiir- 

 temberg would attack it in front. The bat- 

 tle was opened about noon by the Ninth 

 Corps, which took Vernoville and advanced 

 upon Amanvillers, but was kept at bay by the 

 brave resistance of the French. The Guard 

 took the village of St. Ail, not far from Aman- 

 villers, and, about three o'clock, after a brief but 

 violent encounter with the enemy, the village 



of St. Marie, thereby cutting off a further re* 

 treat of the French on the northern road from 

 Metz to Verdun. At five o'clock p. M., Prince 

 August, hoping that the Saxons would soon 

 arrive, ordered an assault upon St. Privat, the 

 highest point of the whole battle-field, and the 

 key of the French position. The German* 

 fought with extraordinary bravery, bnt al- 

 though St. Privat burned in several places, 

 they were repulsed with immense slaughter, 

 and were unable to make any headway, until, 

 about seven o'clock, when the Saxon infantry, 

 which had made a wider circuit than was ex- 

 pected, and caused the evacuation of Roncourt, 

 arrived from the north. Tho attack was sim- 

 ultaneously and on all sides renewed both by 

 the Guard and the Saxons ; but still the French 

 held out with desperate bravery, and although 

 the whole place was burned down, the ruins 

 were taken only step by step. Finally, under 

 the cover of the darkness they effected a re- 

 treat on the road to Metz. In the centre, the 

 Ninth Corps, reSnforced by divisions of the 

 Third and Tenth, especially their artillery, 

 toward evening took Amaavillers, and com- 

 pelled the enemy to retreat. On the right 

 wing, General Steinmetz hastened to join in 

 the battle, as soon as the thunder of cannon 

 from Verneville notified him of the advance 

 of the Ninth Corps. After one hour's firing 

 he silenced the French artillery on the points 

 of Point du Jour, which is separated from the 

 heights of Gravelotte by a woody ravine. The 

 brigade of Goltz took the village of Vaux and 

 stormed the heights of Jussy. The Eighth 

 Corps advanced from Rezonville against the 

 bois de Genevaux, silenced the batteries of 

 the enemy, took, after repeated attacks and 

 most severe losses, St. Hubert, but was unable 

 to get possession of the heights behind it. A 

 last onset which the French made from the 

 heights of Gravelotte was repulsed. Then the 

 Second Corps, which had not yet taken any 

 part in the battle, received orders to storm the 

 heights of Rozerieuller, with the exception of 

 St. Privat the best fortified and an apparent- 

 ly impregnable point of the French position. 

 Again the French stood their ground with great 

 bravery, and inflicted terrible losses upon the 

 storming columns ; but again it was of no avail ; 

 the heights were taken and the French driven 

 back under the cannon of Fort St. Quentin. 

 The German victory was complete. The 

 Twelfth Corps received orders to dispatch two 

 squadrons to destroy the railroad leading from 

 Metz to Thionville and the telegraph, and also 

 to send a larger force to Woippy, where the 

 road branches off. The orders were executed 

 during the night, and thus Metz was isolated 

 on all sides. The loss of the German army, 

 exclusive of the Second Corps, amounted to 

 620 officers and over 13,000 men. 



The results of the battles near Metz were of 

 decisive influence upon the progress of the 

 war. The best portion of the French army 

 was shut up in a fortress, and made unavaila- 



