360 



GERMAN-FRENCH WAE. 



lie, tlie new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jules 

 F avre, issued (September 6th) a circular to the 

 diplomatic agents of France. He held impe- 

 rial France alone responsible for the war, and, 

 as the republic was desirous of peace, he in- 

 sisted that there was no reason for continuing 

 the war, and that the German armies should 

 return home. In case they wanted to continue 

 the war, he wished them to understand that 

 France, restored to herself, would be uncon- 

 querable ; that no foot of French soil, no 

 stone of its fortresses, would be sacrificed. If 

 Napoleon was responsible for the beginning of 

 the war, King William would bear the respon- 

 sibility for its continuance. When the Ger- 

 man troops were with unexpected rapidity 

 completing the investment of Paris, Favre, on 

 September 17th, issued a second circular, in 

 which he admitted that victorious Prussia, 

 having been provoked to war, had a right to 

 demand an indemnity; but again protested 

 against " unacceptable conditions." A few 

 days before the second French circular was is- 

 sued, Count Bismarck, in two diplomatic cir- 

 culars, dated Eeims, September 13th, and 

 Meaux, September 16th, had indicated the 

 conditions on which victorious Germany, at 

 the conclusion of peace, would insist. The 

 Chancellor of the North-German Confedera- 

 tion stated that France was not so guiltless as 

 Favre endeavored to prove, but that the ag- 

 gressive war against Germany had been de- 

 manded by nearly the whole Senate and Corps 

 Legislatif, and nearly all the organs of public 

 opinion. In consequence of the result of the 

 present war, " Germany must be prepared for 

 another attack from France, whatever condi- 

 tions of peace she may impose. On that ac- 

 count, Germany must demand material guar- 

 antees against future aggressions, not from a 

 transitory government, but from the French 

 nation, which has shown a readiness to follow 

 any leader in a war against Germany. Ger- 

 many must render future attacks by France 

 upon her southwestern frontier more difficult, 

 by advancing this frontier, and by bringing the 

 threatening fortresses into her power." As 

 long as France remains in possession of Stras- 

 bourg and Metz, its offensive is strategically 

 stronger than the German defensive, with re- 

 gard to the entire south and the western bank 

 of the Bhine in Northern Germany. In the 

 hands of Germany, Strasbourg and Metz have 

 a defensive character ; for from Germany no 

 disturbance of the peace of Europe is to be 

 feared. At the same time Bismarck gave the 

 neutral powers to understand that France 

 would soon abandon her useless resistance if 

 she clearly saw that she could not rely on aid 

 from any foreign power. Those two circulars 

 were not yet known in Paris when Favre 

 wrote his second circular ; but, anxious to as- 

 certain the real demands of the Germans, 

 Favre, through the mediation of the English 

 ambassador, asked for an interview with Bis- 

 marck at the castle of Ferrieres. The request 



was gladly granted. Favre twice met Bis- 

 marck on September 19th, and a third time on 

 September 20th. Bismarck declared that he 

 could not enter into a detailed discussion of 

 the frontier demanded by Germany until France 

 accepted the principle of a cession of terri- 

 tory. At present, the line of Thionville, Metz, 

 Saarburg, Pfalzburg, and the Vosges down to 

 Belfort, would answer the intentions of the 

 German Government. Favre was willing to 

 pay any amount of indemnity, but persisted 

 in rejecting the cession of territory as humili- 

 ating, yea, as dishonoring for France. Bis- 

 marck reminded Favre that France had but 

 recently demanded the cession of territory 

 from Italy and Germany, and that, in 1815, 

 Landau and Saar-Louis, which for more than a 

 hundred years had been French towns, had 

 been restored to Germany; but Favre showed 

 himself unyielding on this point. At the third 

 interview, the question of an armistice was 

 discussed, during which the elections for a 

 Constituent Assembly were to be held. As 

 the armistice was altogether in the interest of 

 France, Bismarck declared the consent of his 

 Government to the armistice to be dependent 

 upon a military equivalent. As such, he de- 

 manded the surrender of Strasbourg, Toul, 

 and a few smaller places; and, if Paris was to 

 be allowed to receive fresh provisions, the oc- 

 cupation of one of the forts commanding the 

 city. When this demand was absolutely re- 

 fused, Bismarck declared, as the German ulti- 

 matum, that an armistice of from fourteen to 

 twenty-one days would be allowed on condi- 

 tion that, in and before Paris, the military 

 status quo be maintained ; that hostilities in 

 and before Metz, within a certain limit, be con- 

 tinued ; and that the fortresses of Strasbourg, 

 Toul, and Bitsch, be surrendered ; the garrison 

 of the former to be prisoners of war, while 

 the two latter would be allowed to march off. 

 Favre returned to Paris, and on the next day, 

 September 21st, informed Bismarck that the 

 Government did not accept the conditions of 

 the armistice. The Government of Tours, on 

 September 23d, issued a proclamation charging 

 Prussia with the design of degrading France 

 to the rank of a second-class power, and pro- 

 testing that, rather than submit, Paris would 

 allow itself to be buried beneath its walls. In 

 a dispatch, dated October 1st, Bismarck stig- 

 matized the charge of Gambetta as ridiculous. 

 Only three days after the interview between 

 Favre and Bismarck, the fortress of Toul, which 

 by many Frenchmen was regarded as im- 

 pregnable, surrendered. The fortress was of 

 great importance for the Germans, as being 

 the only point on the railroad from Strasbourg 

 to Paris in the hands of the French. The re- 

 mainder of the railroad had been repaired by 

 the Germans, and the occupation of Toul 

 would therefore enable them to use the entire 

 railroad from Strasbourg to Paris for the trans- 

 portation of the artillery, ammunition, and 

 provisions, needed for the siege of the French 



