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UNITED STATES. 



backs were a legal tender* was involved. The 

 act of Congress declaring those notes a legal 

 tender in the payment of debts was passed on 

 February 25, 1862. Was this act constitutional 

 and valid, so far as relates to debts previously 

 contracted? This forms one of the most im- 

 portant points of the decision. Chief-Justice 

 Chase, in delivering the opinion, said : 



It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine 

 whether the act of February 25, 1862, so far as it 

 makes United States notes a legal tender in payment 

 of debts contracted prior to its passage, is constitu- 

 tional and valid, or otherwise. Under a deep sense 

 of our obligation to perform this duty to the best of 

 our ability and understanding, wo shall proceed to 

 dispose of the case presented by the record. 



We have already said, and it is generally if not 

 universally conceded, that the Government of the 

 United States is one of limited powers, and that no 

 department possesses any authority not granted by 

 the 'Constitution. 



It is not necessary, however, in order to prove the 

 existence of a particular authority, to show a particu- 

 lar and express grant. The design of the Constitu- 

 tion was to establish a government competent to the 

 direction and administration of the affairs of a great 

 nation, and at the same time to mark, by sufficiently 

 definite lines, the sphere of its operations. To this 

 end it was needful only to make express grants of 

 general powers, coupled with a further grant of such 

 incidental and auxiliary powers as might be required 

 for the exercise of the powers expressly granted. 

 These powers are necessarily extensive. It has been 

 found, indeed, in the practical administration of the 

 Government, that a very large part, if not the largest 

 part, of its functions have been performed in the ex- 

 ercise of powers thus implied. * * * * 



It has not been maintained in argument, nor in- 

 deed would any one, however slightly conversant 

 with constitutional law, think of maintaining that 

 there is in the Constitution any express grant of le- 

 gislative power to make any description of credit cur- 

 rency a legal tender in payment of debts. 



We must inquire, then, whether this can be done 

 in the exercise of an implied power. 



The rule for determining whether a legislative 

 enactment can be supported as an exercise of an im- 

 plied power was stated by Chief-Justice Mar- 

 shall, speaking for the whole court, in the case of 

 " McCulloch us. The State of Maryland (4 Wheaton, 

 121), and the statement then made has ever since 

 been accepted as a correct exposition of the Consti- 

 tution. His words were these: "Let the end be 

 legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Consti- 

 tution, and all means which are appropriate, which 

 are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro- 

 hibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of 

 the Constitution, are constitutional." And. in an- 

 other part of the same opinion, the practical opera- 

 tion ot this rule was thus illustrated : " Should Con- 

 gress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures 

 which are prohibited by the Constitution^ or should 

 Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, 

 pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not in- 

 trusted to the Government, it would be the painful 

 duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a 

 decision come before it, to say that such an act was 

 not the law of the land. But, where the law is not 

 prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of 

 the objects intrusted to the Government, to under- 

 take here to inquire into the degree of its necessity 

 would be to pass the line which circumscribes the 

 judicial department and tread on legislative ground." 

 (Ibid., 423.) 



It must be taken, then, as finally settled, so far as 

 judicial decisions can settle any thing, that the 

 words " all laws necessary and proper for carrying 

 into execution" powers expressly granted or vested 



have in the Constitution a sense equivalent to that 

 of the words, laws not absolutely necessary indeed, 

 but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional 

 and legitimate ends ; laws not prohibited, but con- 

 sistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution 

 laws really calculated to effect objects intrusted to 

 the Government. 



The question before us, then, resolves itself into 

 this : Is the clause which makes United States notes 

 a legal tender for debts contracted prior to its enact- 

 mentj a law of the description stated in the rule ? 



It is not doubted that the power to establish a 

 standard of value by which all other values may be 

 measured, or, in other words, to determine what shall 

 be lawful money and a legal tender, is in its nature 

 and of necessity a governmental power. It is in all 

 countries exercised by the government. In the 

 United States, so far as it relates to the precious 

 metals, it is vested in Congress by the grant of the 

 power to coin money. But can a power to impart 

 these qualities to notes, or promises to pay money, 

 when offered in discharge of preexisting debts, be 

 derived from the coinage power, or from any other 

 power expressly given ? 



It is certainly not the same power as the power to 

 coin money. "Nor is it, in any reasonable, satisfac- 

 tory sense, an appropriate or plainly-adapted means 

 to the exercise of that power. Nor is there more 

 reason for saying that it is implied in, or incidental 

 to, the power to regulate the value of coined money 

 of the United States, or of foreign coins. This 

 power of regulation js a power to determine the 

 weight, purity, form, and impression, of the several 

 coins and their relation to each other, and the rela- 

 tions of foreign coins to the monetary unit of the 

 United States. 



Nor is the power to make notes a legal tender the 

 same as the power to issue notes to be used as cur- 

 rency. The old Congress, under the articles of Con- 

 federation, was clothed by express grant with the 

 power to emit bills of credit, which are in fact notes 

 for circulation as currency, and yet that Congress 

 was not clothed with the power to make these bills a 

 legal tender in payment. And this court has recent- 

 ly held that Congress, under the Constitution, pos- 

 sesses the same power to emit bills or notes, us inci- 

 dental to other powers, though not enumerated 

 among those expressly granted ; but it was express- 

 ly declared at the same time that this decision con- 

 cluded nothing on the question of legal tender. In- 

 deed, we are not aware that it has ever been claimed 

 that the power to issue bills or notes has anv iden- 

 tity with the power to make them a legal tend'er. On 

 the contrary, the whole history of the country refutes 

 that notion. The States have always been held to 

 possess the power to authorize and regulate the issue 

 of bills for circulation by banks or individuals, sub- 

 ject, as has been lately determined, to the control of 

 Congress, for the purpose of establishing and secur- 

 ing a national currency, and yet the States are ex- 

 pressly prohibited by the Constitution from making 

 any thing but gold and silver coin a legal tender. 

 This seems decisive on the point that the power to 

 issue notes and the power to make them a legal ten- 

 der are not the same power, and that they Have no 

 necessary connection with each other. 



But it has been maintained in argument that the 

 power to make United States notes a legal tender in 

 payment of all debts is a means appropriate and 

 plainly-adapted to the execution of the power to carry 

 on war, of the power to regulate commerce, and of 

 the power to borrow money. If it is, and is not pro- 

 hibited, nor inconsistent with the letter or spirit of 

 the Constitution, then the act which makes them 

 such legal tender must be held to be constitutional. 



Let us, then, first inquire whether it is an appropri- 

 ate and plainly adapted means for carrying on war? 

 The affirmative argument may be thus stated : Con- 

 gress has power to declare and provide for carrying 

 on war ; Congress has, also, power to mit bills or 



