18 



ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 



without restriction, the total amount outstand- 

 ing on .July 1. IS'.H), being $411,440,000. The 

 Qovernmenl attempted to check the depreciation 

 of the currency by the childish and futile expe- 

 dient of prohibiting speculation in gold, and at 

 tin- same time authori/.ecl a new emission of 

 $40,000,000 of bank notes. The movement was 

 momentarily arrested by the law passed on Oct.18, 

 ordering tlu> currency issues to be gradually 

 reduced to $100,000,000, and declaring that no 

 new nut. -s should be issued before May 1, 1891. 

 Takinir advantage of a reaction in speculative val- 

 and the general distrust of the capabilities 

 of the ministers to deal with the crisis, manipu- 

 lator- i.f the irold market afterward sent up the 

 premium to 21~>. The mercantile community 

 saw ruin before them, and the laboring classes, 

 who form three fourths in number of the de- 

 positors in the banks, witnessed their savings 

 red need by two thirds, with the prospect of the 

 dollar becoming worth only five cents in gold, as 

 formerly. A mass meeting* was called in Buenos 



B, which was attended by 15,000 armed men, 

 aii'l a revolution was imminent, when the press- 

 ure of public opinion made the ministers, who 

 with the President were held to be chiefly re- 

 sponsible for the financial crisis, resign. When 

 Francisco Uriburu assumed the department of 

 Finance, in April, 1890, his advent was wel- 

 roiueil l.y an immediate fall in gold of 75 points. 

 Tin- corruption of the previous ministers was 

 made apparent by the discovery of custom-house 

 frauds amounting to ten or fifteen million dol- 

 lars a year. An English syndicate that was 

 heavily interested in Argentine securities bought 

 the Western Railroad of Buenos Ayres from the 



for $41,000,000 in gold, in order to provide 

 means to arrest the crisis. But this object was 

 frustrated by the surreptitious issue of addi- 

 tional paper currency, on the discovery of which 

 S.-nor I'Hbuni called for the removal of Senor 

 I'acheco and the other directors of the Na- 

 tional Bank. 



!h. New Financial Programme. Presi- 

 dent Caiman saved himself by changing minis- 

 ter-, and his fate depended on the performance 

 of t he new Cabinet. At the opening of the Con- 



oi i .May 10, he declared that it was not the 

 intention of the Government to inflate the cur- 

 rency, but to reduce expenditure, and proposed 



niport duties should be made payable half 

 in U"ld. a measure that was carried out. He 

 declared that, instead of discouraging, he would 

 welcome the formation of opposition parties. 

 The bane ,,f Argentine politics has been the dic- 

 tatorial ami partisan exercise by the President of 

 power- far in excess of any contemplated in the 

 "i' ion and the subordination of all the 

 int.-r.-t- of the country to the advantage of the 

 party in control of the Government. No Presi- 

 dent had made himself more hated than Juarez 

 < Vlman. Hut even his enemies regarded his ac- 

 ceptance of independent ministers and his patri- 

 profesBiorifl a> indicative of a radical change 

 of methods and policy. Senor Uriburu arranged 

 ' I"' preliminaries of an Kn^lish loan of 10,000,- 

 > sterling, and on June 7 the Cabinet approved 

 his financial scheme, including the dismissal of 

 the Government directors ,,r th e National Bank. 

 l>r. Celman was n,,t siilTicienily free from party 

 dictation to sanction this step", and when lie re- 



fused to sign the order Senor Uriburu resigned, 

 and on June 9 was succeeded by Juan Augustin 

 Garcfa. The Minister of Justice likewise retired, 

 Jose Antiqueta taking this portfolio. Senor Gar- 

 cia promised to carry out the economical and ad- 

 ministrative reforms announced by the retiring 

 minister, and to place the currency on a sound 

 basis by realizing on the securities in the treas- 

 ury of the value of $65,000,000, and concluding 

 the English loan on the conditions proposed, 

 which were that no new paper currency or cedu- 

 las should be issued for three years. In order to 

 rescue his friends from the consequences of the 

 illegal issues of notes that had already been made, 

 the President decided to reverse this* policy. On 

 July 7 he sent a message to the Chambers au- 

 thorizing the issue of $100,000,000 of cedula or 

 hypothecary notes. The financial situation was 

 already disturbed by the passing of dividends by 

 the National Bank. The price of gold rose to 

 215. Distrust of the Government and of the 

 National Bank, increasing with each new au- 

 thorized or unauthorized emission of bank notes, 

 caused an actual dearth of money because the 

 banks added to their reserves as the situation 

 became more critical, and thus withdrew more 

 and more currency from the general circulation. 

 Individuals also began to hoard, losing faith in 

 all banks. Some clamored for the issue of notes 

 to take up all the cedula, others for unlimited 

 emissions of paper, with the cancellation of all 

 gold contracts. 



Revolutionary Outbreak. The Union Civ- 

 ica was a party organized to oppose the criminal 

 improvidence and misgovern ment of the Presi- 

 dent and his party. Celman was reputed to have 

 amassed a fortune of $50,000,000 in gold during 

 his tenure of office, while his subordinates were 

 said to be more dangerous and unprincipled than 

 himself. For months the assassination of the 

 President was debated as the best means of rid- 

 ding the Republic of the incubus under which 

 it was sinking. When a state of panic resulted 

 from the violation of his pledges of reform, with 

 gold fluctuating between 200 and 300, and the 

 credit system in danger of breaking down alto- 

 gether, the revolutionary spirit rose to the criti- 

 cal point. Without the army a revolutionary 

 uprising must necessarily fail ; but in the army 

 the Opposition had strong and devoted adher- 

 ents. It was among the officers that the violent 

 overthrow of the Government was favored, rath- 

 er than among the civilians, who feared that the 

 effects would be more disastrous to the country 

 than the evils of bad government. Two officers, 

 named Palma and Morisine, informed the civil au- 

 thorities that there existed among their brother- 

 officers of the garrison of Buenos Ayres a conspir- 

 acy to upset the Celman Government and banish 

 the President from the country. In consequence 

 of their revelations Gen. Campos, Col. Figueroa, 

 Maj. Casariego, and other officers were arrested 

 and armed police and cavalry were set to watch 

 suspected bodies of infantry and artillery. These 

 measures did not tend to allay disaffection, and 

 the situation was felt to be so grave that Gen. 

 Roca, Vice- President Pellegrini, and other lead- 

 ers of his own party warned Celman that he must 

 promptly adopt a reform policy to avert disaster. 

 On July 23 he promised to submit the nomina- 

 tion of his successor to a convention of all former 



