848 



VIRGINIA. 



be $50 or more (other than licenses requiring 

 the certificate of a court before being granted), 

 shall hereafter be issued only for three months, 

 or for a shorter time, and the fee, being one 

 fourth or less of the annual fee, shall be payable 

 quarterly or oftener. The object of this act is 

 to reduce the license fees, payable at each quar- 

 ter, or other period, below $15, and thereby to 

 prevent almost entirely the use of coupons in 

 payment. The number of tax-receivable cou- 

 pons annually maturing is 49,387, valued at 

 $999,870, of which there are 23,695 of $30 cou- 

 pons, worth $710,850; 17,500 of $15 coupons, 

 worth $262,500 ; and only 8,192 of a Iqwer de- 

 nomination, worth only $26,610. Under this 

 law, the last-mentioned coupons alone would be 

 available in payment of license fees. 



County Debts. The total debt of Virginia 

 counties for 1890 was $1,691,434, an increase of 

 $406,360 in ten years. All except $35,500 of 

 this amount is bonded. Nearly two thirds of 

 the counties have no debt. 



It was expected that these enactments would 

 be effectual in checking the inflow of coupons, 

 which had largely increased during 1888 and 

 1889. In January, while these measures were 

 under discussion in the General Assembly, vari- 

 ous cases involving the validity of much of its 

 former legislation regarding the debt coupons 

 were argued at length before the United States 

 Supreme Court. The decision of that tribunal 

 was rendered- on May 19. After reviewing the 

 history of the debt controversy, the court laid 

 down the following propositions as clearly estab- 

 lished by its former decisions : 



1. That the act of 1871 constituted a contract be- 

 tween the State and the holders of bonds and coupons 

 issued thereunder. 



2. That the various statutes passed for the purpose 

 of restraining the use of coupons for the payment of 

 taxes and other dues to the State, and imposing im- 

 pediments and obstructions to that use and to proceed- 

 ings instituted for the purpose of establishing their gen- 

 uineness, do in many respects materially impair the 

 obligation of that contract, and can not be held to be 

 valid in so far as they have that effect. 



3. That no proceedings can be instituted by any 

 holder of State bonds or coupons against the Common- 

 wealth directly or indirectly by suit against her exec- 

 utive officers to control them in the exercise of their 

 official functions as agents of the State. 



4. That any lawful holder of tax-receivable coupons 

 who tenders such coupons in payment of taxes or 

 debts due the State and continues to hold himself 

 ready to tender them is entitled to be free from moles- 

 tation on account of such taxes or debts, and may vin- 

 dicate such right in all lawful modes of redress by suit 

 to recover property or to recover damages by property 

 taken by injunction where the taking of the property 

 would be attended with irremediable injury or by de- 

 fense to any suit brought against him. 



Applying these propositions to the several 

 cases before it, the court considered first the 

 cases of Bryan, Cooper, and McGahey vs. State of 

 Virginia, where the point at issue was the con- 

 stitutionality of those provisions of the "coupon 

 crusher " and other acts that require the produc- 

 tion of the original bond in coupon cases, in or- 

 der to establish the genuineness of the coupons, 

 and which prohibit the admission of expert tes- 

 timony to prove such coupons. Regarding the 

 production of the bond, the court declares : " We 

 have no hesitation in saying that the duty im- 



posed upon the tax payer of producing the bonds 

 from which the coupons tendered by him were 

 cut at the time of offering the same in evidence 

 in court was an unreasonable condition, in many 

 cases impossible to be performed. It would de- 

 prive the coupons of their negotiable character. 

 It would make them fixed appendages to the 

 bond itself. It would be directly contrary to 

 the meaning and intent of the act of 1871 and the 

 corresponding act of 1879. We think that the 

 requirement was unconstitutional." The prohi- 

 bition of expert testimony was likewise deemed 

 unconstitutional, as imposing an unreasonable 

 obstruction in the way of the tax payer who of- 

 fers his coupons. 



In the case of H. W. Ellett against the State, 

 which was next taken up, the question was wheth- 

 er coupons could be tendered in payment of 

 court costs, it being contended by the State that 

 they could not, because the costs were compen- 

 sation due the officers. The court holds that, 

 although the costs were officers' compensation, 

 they were due the State in consequence of its lia- 

 bility to pay its officers, and therefore were pay- 

 able in coupons. 



In the next case, Cuthbert vs. State of Vir- 

 ginia, the court decided that the act imposing 

 on coupon brokers a license tax of from $500 to 

 $1,000 and of 20 per cent, of all sales was in- 

 valid, the tax being so onerous as to amount in 

 practice to a prohibition of the sale of coupons 

 by any one, and being, therefore, an impairment 

 of the original contract of the State, which made 

 these coupons payable to the bearer and recog- 

 nized their negotiability. 



The case, ex parts, Brown, next considered 

 presented the question of the constitutionality 

 of the act of Feb. 27, 1886, which limited the 

 time within which proceedings to prove cou- 

 pons due and payable prior to July 1, 1888, 

 should be begun to one year from the last-men- 

 tioned date. Upon this question it was affirmed 

 that " the passage of a statute of limitations giv- 

 ing a shorter time for bringing actions than ex- 

 isted before, even as applied to actions which 

 had accrued, does not necessarily affect the rem- 

 edy to such an extent as to impair the obliga- 

 tion of the contract within the meaning of the 

 Constitution, provided a reasonable time is given 

 for the bringing of such actions." But in view 

 of the large number of coupons outstanding, the 

 distance of many of the holders from the State 

 of Virginia, and the obstacles that the State had 

 already interposed to prevent the reception of 

 coupons, the court declared that one year was an 

 unreasonably short period of limitation, and that 

 the statute was therefore void. In each of these 

 cases the decision of the Supreme Court of Vir- 

 ginia was reversed. 



In the case of Hucless vs. Childrey, which was 

 an action to recover damages for refusal of a tax 

 collector to receive coupons in payment of a 

 liquor license, the court affirmed the judgment 

 of the United States District Court. The Vir- 

 ginia law required that this license should be 

 paid in money, and the court held that this does 

 not impair the contract or the bondholders. Li- 

 censes for liquor selling, it says, are not only im- 

 posed for the purpose of raising revenue, but 

 also for the purpose of regulating the traffic. A 

 State may for this purpose impose such condi- 



