ABYSSINIA. 



FORT MAKALLE, ABYSSINIA. 



veloped the Italian force by a swift movement. At 

 the same time another party gained a lodgment on 

 the mountain and forced the Bersaglieri to beat a 

 retreat, while Col. Brusati's regiment was also com- 

 pelled to abandon its position and the Alpine bat- 

 talion of the reserve to give way. The Shoans, who 

 had climbed the slope with great boldness, reached 

 the position held by Gen. Arimondi and plunged 

 into the ranks, firing point-blank at the officers and 

 throwing the Italians into such utter confusion that 

 they could not return the fire, not knowing friend 

 from enemy. Later the officers were able to order 

 a retreat, which took place in disorder. In the 

 winding and difficult paths the column divided, one 

 part, with Col. Brusati and Col. Stevani, going to- 

 ward Mai Ilafima, while the other, with Gen. Bara- 

 tieri, Gen. Ellena, and Col. Valenzano, fell back upon 

 Addicaie. 



Gen. Dabormida's brigade held the position as- 

 ' signed to it, in front of the Rebbi Arienne ridge, 

 until, after the battalion that had been moved in 

 the direction of the Chidane Meret ridge had been 

 driven back with heavy losses, the entire force ad- 

 vanced to the right in the direction of the Shell 

 of Muriam Sciavatu, where were the camps of Has 

 Makonen and lias Mangascia. For a moment the 

 Italian forces seemed to be victorious, but soon the 

 Shoans descended in dense masses on the Italian 

 right, and Gen. Dabormida. was compelled to bi 

 retreat, which, protected by the artillery, was cur- 

 ried out in an orderly manner till the guns had 

 spent their ammunition, after which the infantry 

 made repeated bayonet charges to check the Shoans. 

 Near Sauria Col. liagni, who commanded the re- 

 treat, had to abandon the guns, owing to a simulta- 

 neous attack on the front and Hank. Later the 

 column divided into two parts, one of which Col. 

 Ragni brought safely io Addicaie. 



The whole of the artillery and the transport col- 

 umn fell into the hands of the Abyssinians. In tin- 

 battle the Italian artillery, consisting of 52 guns, 



was practically useless because the rush of the 

 Abyssinians overwhelmed the Italian forces before 

 the artillery had time to come properly into action. 



The main body of the retreating army concen- 

 trated at Asmara, while a rear guard of 5,000 men 

 remained at Addicaie to cover the line of retreat. 

 The army of the Negus did not pursue the fleeing 

 columns, but advanced slowly to Entiscio, halfway 

 to Adigrat. For a week or more straggling bodies 

 of fugitives continued to arrive at Asmara. The 

 fate of 7,000 men was still unknown. Scouts esti- 

 mated the loss of the Abyssinians at 4,000 dead and 

 6.000 wounded. The Negus and his generals held 

 over 2,000 Italians as prisoners of war. 



Gen. Baldissera, who had been appointed com- 

 mander-in-chief of the forces in Africa on Feb. 22, 

 with full civil and military powers, arrived at Mas- 

 sowah and assumed command on March 4. He 

 reached Asmara two days later, when Gen. Baratieri 

 proceeded under arrest to Massowah, where in the 

 beginning of June he was tried by a military tribunal 

 on the charge of having inexcusably ordered an at- 

 tack upon the enemy's force in circumstances which, 

 as the result unhappily proved, rendered inevitable 

 the defeat of his command. He was charged further 

 with abandoning his post in action, in that he left 

 the field while the columns of Gen. Albertone and 

 Gen. Dabormida were still fighting, and retreated 60 

 miles on March 2 without knowing their fate. Gen. 

 Dabormida was killed and Gen. Albertone wounded 

 and captured while bravely fighting at the head of 

 their brigades. Half the other officers and a third 

 of the troops engaged perished on the field of battle. 

 Crispi was held largely responsible not only for the 

 attempt to conquer Abyssinia, but for the rash at- 

 tack upon the Abyssinian position which resulted 

 in disaster. Only a few days before Gen. Baratieri 

 marched upon Adua he received a petulant tele- 

 gram from the Premier complaining of the lack of 

 plan in the campaign, the small skirmishes and 

 waste of heroism without results, seeming a case of 



