A B V SSI XI A. 



military phthisis rather than a war. and saying 



that the Government was ready for any sacrifice 



necessary to save the honor of the army and the 



prestige of the monarchy, Gen. Baratieri was 



tried by a military court composed of 6 generals, 



who acquitted him of criminal intention or penal 



risibility, but deplored in their verdict the fact 



that the command of the Italian troops should have 



ontided to an incompetent leader. 



Proposed Harrur Expedition. The military 

 authorities, at the time when Gen. Baratieri's troop's 

 invadrd Tigiv, formed a plan of landing an expedi- 

 tion at the English port of Zeila and marching into 

 through llarrar in order to create a diversion 

 that would draw off a part of the Abyssinian forces 

 from the front. The British Government was anx- 

 ious to give the Italians aid. but hesitated to grant 

 permission to land at Zeila for fear of giving of- 

 fense to France, since llarrar. which Great Britain 

 wa^ willing to concede to Italy as a part of the 

 Abyssinian Empire, and hence of the Italian sphere 

 of interest, had once been an object of dispute be- 

 tween England and France, who had composed 

 their quarrel by entering into an agreement to re- 

 gard it as neutral and inviolable territory. Lord 

 >ury actually encouraged Gen. Ferrero. the 

 Italian ambassador at London, to make a formal ap- 

 plication for the permissive right of way through 

 Zeila. but afterward, when the need seemed urgent, 

 owing to the precarious position of Gen. Baratieri's 

 army when confronted by the whole of the Shoau 

 forces, the British Prime Minister hesitated to ful- 

 fill his promise, on the plea that the Indian Govern- 

 ment feared an invasion of the British possessions 

 in Somaliland in case of an Italian defeat. At 

 length, on Jan. 2. 1*%. Lord Salisbury announced 

 the consent of the British Government to the pas- 

 sage of Italian troops through Zeila. eoupled with 

 certain reservations that were intended to disarm 

 the susceptibilities of France. In consequence the 

 Italian Government was only half satisfied, and in 

 view of the objections entertained to the construc- 

 tion placed upon the Anglo-French Convention of 

 - Gen. Ferrero suggested that Baron Blanc, the 

 Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, address a note 

 to England and to France, setting forth the draw- 

 backs arising from the actual condition of affairs 

 that tho<e powers had created in llarrar. and de- 

 manding speedy relief therefrom in the name of in- 

 ternational law and morality and of the natural 

 and indispensable solidarity between civilized na- 

 tions as against barbarism. On Feb 5 Baron Blanc, 

 in a communication to Gen. Ferrer i re- 



gret that, whereas Lord RoseVicry's Government 

 had succeeded in being just toward Italy as well as 

 toward France, he was unable to gather the same 

 impression from the attitude of Lord Salisbury. 

 " who has adopted altogether the French contention 

 which makes the self-denying agreement entered 

 into between France and England in 1881. when 

 llarrar, evacuated by Egypt, became. a< it were, a 

 sort of rex inilliiix. a pretext for opposing the real- 

 ization of our rights of protector.; -ively 

 acquired and recognized by Europe. Such is the 

 position assumed by Lord Salisbury regarding our 

 determination to render effectual the pi- 

 recognized to u- -Mtutin<r a change in 

 the status of llarrar. I regard such an assertion as 

 contrary, not only to the agreement and declara- 

 tion of 'May 5. ls'ii-1. but to the acts of Berlin and 

 Brussels." The intended expedition to llarrar and 

 Shoa was not sent. 



Sietre of Kassala. After the Italian army in 

 Tigre had been routed by superior Shoan forces 

 the dervi-.li.'> appeared. IJO.OOO strong, and laid 

 siege to Kassala. Gen. Baldissera had discretionary 

 authority to evacuate Kassala as well as Adigrat. 



and on his advice the Italian Government had 

 about decided on that course, but it suddenly re- 

 versed the decision because the English Govern- 

 ment had meanwhile ordered the Dongola expedi- 

 tion with the ostensible object of aiding the Italians 

 as well as of forestalling a predicted dervish inva- 

 sion of Egypt, also because the English authorities 

 in Egypt considered that the evacuation of Kassala 

 would have a deplorable effect upon the situation 

 in the Soudan and in Egypt. On learning the de- 

 siivs aiul plans of the British Government, the 

 Marquis of Rudini lost no time in sending instruc- 

 tions to Mass,, \vali that K ;l s>ala should be held at 

 till the autumn, except under pressure of ex- 

 treme military necessities. The Italian Govern- 

 ment expressed gratitude to Great Britain for the 

 proposed co-operation of Egyptian forces against 

 the dervishes, but only as signifying the alliance 

 and community of interests between the two gov- 

 ernments in the Mediterranean, for the Dongola 

 expedition was described in the dispatches as "of 

 little military value to Italy." 



Early in March two large dervish forces, one of 

 them under Osman Digna. were reported to be ad- 

 vancing upon Kassala. On March 8 the dervishes 

 attacked the friendly chief who held the defiles at 

 Zabderat. near Kassala. but were repelled. On 

 March 18 a larger body renewed the attack and 

 put his men to flight, but with the aid of Italian 

 troops they recovered the position. On April 2 a 

 battalion that was guarding the road over which a 

 caravan was to pass was vigorously attacked by 

 5.000 dervishes. Col. Stevani set out in haste from 

 Kassala with his whole available force and sur- 

 prised the enemy and drove them back after a 

 sharp fusillade. The dervishes returned to the at- 

 tack with large re-enforcements, and were again 

 repelled and driven in headlong retreat toward 

 Tucruf. whence thev came. They suffered heavy 

 losses, while the Italians lost 100 killed and wound"- 

 ed. On the following day C'ol. Stevani made an at- 

 tack with 2.500 men on the fortifications at Tucruf, 

 capturing a part of them, but losing 10 Italian 

 officers and 300 Askari soldiers. Confident that 

 his force was strong enough to carry the works, he 

 proposed to renew the attack in the morning, but 

 Gen. Baldissera refused to sanction the undertak- 

 ing, and ordered the commandant, on the contrary, 

 to evacuate Kassala and fall back upon Agordat. 

 Col. Stevani had begun to act upon these instruc- 

 tions and had withdrawn a large part of the gar- 

 rison, and posted the troops in echelon along the 

 route, when the order to evacuate was counter- 

 manded for the political reasons mentioned. The 

 dervishes meanwhile had retired from Tucruf be- 

 yond the Atbara to Osobri, demoralized by the 



- sustained in the attacks to which they had 

 been subjected by the Kassala garrison, abandon- 

 ing in their flight many cattle and mules and a 

 large quantity of grain." After the fight of April 

 3 they buried 800 dead. The camps of the der- 

 vishes at Tucruf and Gulusit were protected by 

 palisades and regular siege trenches in three rows. 



Peace Negotiations with Menelek. The Ru- 

 dini Cabinet that succeeded the fallen Crispi min- 

 istry obtained on March 25 a vote of credit of 140.- 



"0 lire for Africa, including 20.000,000 lire pre- 

 viously voted. The sum was raised by the sale of 

 bonds negotiable only in Italy. While one party 

 in Italy, with which King Umberto was believed to 

 sympathize, called for a forward policy and a tri- 

 umphant vindication of Italian arms, and while the 

 Radicals and Socialists cried out still more loudly 

 for complete withdrawal from Africa. Gen. Bal- 

 dissera. with the approval of the Rudini-Ricotti 

 Cabinet, sent Major Salsa to the Negus to begin 

 pourparlers for the negotiation of an honorable 



