226 



CUBA. 



annual interest charge would amount to over $20,- 

 000,000 a year. The Government in 1895 and 1896, 

 owing to the civil war, could collect no taxes, and 

 the customs receipts at Havana fell off to one quar- 

 ter the normal amount. The destruction of sugar 

 estates and tobacco fields took from the people their 

 principal means of support and deprived the Gov- 

 ernment of its main sources of revenue for many 

 years to come. The sugar crop, which was 1,050,- 

 030 tons in 1894, was estimated at less than 200,000 

 tons in 1896, and the tobacco crop at 50.000 bales 

 instead of the normal amount of 450,000 bales. The 

 total exports were valued at $60,000,000 still in 1895, 

 but in 1896 they were not expected to exceed $15,- 

 000.000. The Government estimates of expenditure 

 for 1896-'97 were $92,000,000, and of revenue $30,- 

 000,000. The increase of revenue over that even of 

 1894 was expected to come from a higher tax on im- 

 ports, although the whole produce of the country 

 would hardly pay for the foreign breadstuffs needed 

 to feed the starving population huddled in the cities. 

 When merchants and bankers exported all their gold 

 to Spain and the United States, and thousands gave 

 up business and returned to Spain, the Spanish Gov- 

 ernment authorized the Bank of Spain in Havana 

 to emit $12,000,000 of notes for the payment of cur- 

 rent obligations in Cuba, to be guaranteed by a re- 

 serve of $3,000,000 in silver coin deposited by the 

 Government and redeemed in gold. When the mer- 

 chants refused to take the new currency except at a 

 discount the Captain General issued a decree order- 

 ing all persons to accept the bills on a par with gold, 

 and endeavored to enforce it against the retailers 

 until they began to close their shops, against the 

 wholesalers until they emigrated, against the stock 

 exchange, and against the bankers, including the 

 Bank of Spain, which refused to accept them in 

 payment for gold drafts on Spain, until the banks 

 closed their exchange departments. 



Failure of Martinez Campos. When the Span- 

 ish Government found that it had to deal with an 

 uprising in Cuba as general and as formidable as 

 the ten years' rebellion of 1868-'?8, Marshal Campos 

 was placed in command of the great army that was 

 sent to reduce the new revolt because he was the 

 pacificator who had brought the former war to an 

 end, not by strategy and military organization 

 alone, though in these arts he stood pre-eminent in 

 the Spanish army, but by a conciliatory policy that 

 won the confidence of the Cuban people. When the 

 reforms that he promised and that were partially 

 carried out proved illusory the Cubans did not 

 blame him, but they lost all faith in the promises 

 of the Spanish Government. The crux of their 

 grievances was that the metropolis and Spanish 

 placeholders drained the island of between 40 and 

 and 50 per cent, of its annual income and steadily 

 diminished its wealth-producing capacity and im- 

 poverished the people. The Cubans did not respond 

 to the efforts of Campos to rally a strong party to 

 the support of the Government. The Integrists, 

 composed exclusively of European Spaniards, were 

 upholders of the existing colonial organization, 

 which conferred special privileges upon them, 

 though even they had a programme of reforms. 

 So were the Reformists, who proposed a decentral- 

 ized local administration, loyal to the Government, 

 and this party contained a small Cuban element. 

 The large Autonomist party, composed of native 

 Cubans, who aimed to establish a system of legisla- 

 tive, fiscal, and economical independence like that 

 of the self-governing English colonies, denounced 

 the revolution as vigorously in the beginning as did 

 either of the Spanish .parties. Campos, while trying 

 not to give offense to the Spanish parties, encouraged 

 the Autonomist hopes of a peaceful and constitu- 

 tional sol ut ion of the Cuban troubles. The strength 



of the revolutionary movement was much greater 

 than he anticipated. The Autonomist leaders in 

 Havana and some from the interior condemned 

 the revolution in a violent manifesto, but as Gomez 

 made his progress westward into the populous 

 provinces the party, which had listened in silence 

 to the voice of its leaders, began to melt away. 

 Some emigrated, but the majority went to swell 

 the ranks of the Cuban army or gave their hearts 

 and labor to the cause. The rebels, who numbered 

 about 20,000 fighting men in October, 1895, had been 

 organized by Gen. Maximo Gomez into groups 

 adapted for guerrilla warfare. Orders were then 

 issued that sugar-planters should make no crop 

 during the season of 1896, and to enforce this decree 

 the rebels decided to invade the provinces of 31 a- 

 tanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio. This invasion 

 was successfully carried out in December and Jan- 

 uary. The white Cubans joined the insurgents in 

 such numbers that the rebellion distinctly assumed 

 the character of a war between the Cubans and the 

 Spaniards, fought on the principle of driving the 

 Spaniards out of Cuba by exhausting the resources 

 of Government revenue and Spanish wealth. As 

 Gomez marched from the mountains of Santiago 

 westward through the length of the island to Pinar 

 del Rio, his approach gave the signal for the upris- 

 ing of five provinces in succession. The strategic 

 lines that Cnmpns attempted to hold proved in- 

 efficient, his garrisons were weak, and the constant 

 shifting of his troops was fatiguing and demoraliz- 

 ing as well as useless. The Captain General was 

 forced, when nearly all his Cuban supporters disap- 

 peared, to rely on the political support of the two 

 Spanish parties. He endeavored to harmonize the 

 Conservatives and the Reformists by dividing his 

 favors between them, but failed to compose their 

 quarrels. Gomez was able to make effective his 

 decree forbidding the grinding of sugar cane, and 

 thus deprived the Government of its revenues and 

 arrested all industry. The complete failure of all 

 the strategic plans of Campos and the losses and 

 stoppage of business and consequent distress pro- 

 duced by the successes of the rebels made the Span- 

 iards more bitter and vindictive. The Captain 

 General could not satisfy the Conservatives except 

 by adopting more rigorous methods, such as the 

 introduction of a reign of terror in the cities by the 

 imprisonment of all suspected sympathizers with 

 the revolution and the shooting of prisoners of 

 war. The Spaniards in Havana, frightened at the 

 proximity of the Cuban forces, despairing at seeing 

 the large Spanish army unable to check the ad- 

 vance of the rebels or to protect the zones of culti- 

 vation that Campos undertook to guard, finally 

 coalesced against him, and demanded his recall. 

 At the opening of 1896 the whole interior of the 

 island was in the hands of the rebels, while the 

 Spaniards held the towns. Ships had been bought 

 to blockade the coast, yet arms and ammunition 

 were continually being landed, and as yet no fili- 

 buster had been taken. The Spanish army v>as 

 practically standing on the defensive, although 

 Campos had received the re-enforcements that he 

 wanted. Except the towns, certain positions on 

 the coast, and the railroads that were kept in opera- 

 tion for short distances from the principal towns, 

 the island was practically Free Cuba under the 

 military rule of the insurgent generals. The Span- 

 iards seldom ventured inland in any direction from 

 their base, and never with a force of less than 2,000 

 or 3,000 men. Even then the disorganization of 

 their commissariat and the hostility of the country 

 rendered it impossible for them to keep the field 

 longer than a few days at a time. Of the Cubans. 

 the rich and the poor, white and black, the intelli- 

 gent and the uneducated classes, even the children 



