CUBA. 



227 



df Spanish parents, were against Spain. American 

 and English planters, too. and managers of mines 

 usually wi>hed t'ortlio succe of the patriots, and 

 aided them in many ways. The mild methods pro- 

 1 liy Marshal Campos were not practiced by 

 Lieut. -(Jen. Pando and the other commanders in 

 the eastern part of the island, where persons were 

 continually arrested on suspicion and either shot or 

 deported to Africa. The Spaniards did not dare to 

 attack the Cubans in the mountains back of Santiago 

 and could not keep railroad communications per- 

 manently open for any distance in the eastern 

 province. The fighting there was left to guerrillas, 

 some of whom, especially the band of Lolo Benitez, 

 committed atrocities. On Dec. 26. 1895, the guer- 

 rillas of Col. Tejeda attacked the rebel bands of 

 Cabreco and Pancho Sanchez in San Prudencio, 

 driving them from one position, but finally being 

 themselves put to flight by a machete charge in a 

 difficult position on the mountain. 



In the central provinces the Cubans effectually 

 held the plains. The planters, who feared to grind 

 cane lest the rebels should burn their fields, were 

 threatened with court-martial by Lieut. -Gen. Pando 

 if they did not grind. Jose Maceo replied with an 

 order to destroy machinery if grinding was begun, 

 and when any attempted to grind cane their cane 

 fields were set on fire the same day. 



The sugar estates in the eastern division of the 

 island were permitted to grind because at the be- 

 ginning of the war arrangements were made be- 

 tween the proprietors and the Cuban leaders 

 whereby the privilege of grinding under the pro- 

 tection of those leaders was obtained by the pay- 

 ment of a war tax. In all other parts of the island 

 the Cuban leaders prohibited and prevented the 

 grinding of cane. In the beginning the Cubans 

 forbade the people to supply the towns with food, 

 but later they removed the interdict for the sake 

 of the families of patriots and noncombatants and 

 allowed food to enter on the payment of an import 

 duty to the revolutionary Government. 



A decree of the Republican Junta imposed later 

 a tax of 2 per cent, on the valuation of sugar estates, 

 machinery, and buildings, in return for which the 

 insurgent forces undertook to protect the property 

 against molestation from any source, provided no 

 attempt was made to grind against orders. This 

 tax Gen. Gomez was unable to collect from the 

 planters. 



A civil government was instituted, with the aged 

 Cisneros Betancourt. Marquis of Santa Lucia, as 

 President of the republic, but Maximo Gomez and 

 Antonio Maceo were the controlling spirits. The 

 insurgent forces were maintaining themselves in 

 the field without expense, while the Spanish army 

 wa< an ever-increasing burden upon the resources 

 of Spain, which was becoming almost unbearable. 

 Some of the rebel officers were black, but most of 

 them were white Cubans. In the east the rank and 

 file were black, but farther west they were almost 

 exclusively white. The insurgent troops were 

 trained when in camp, sometimes by Spanish drill 

 sergeants who had deserted on account of ill usage. 

 The cavalry were much better trained than the 

 infantry. They were well mounted, and were ac- 

 customed to charge the Spanish infantry in square, 

 often with success. In the broken country of San- 

 tiago province the fighting was of a guerrilla char- 

 acter, planned by the officers but executed by the 

 men as units. The army was organized in five 

 army corps, of which two operated in the eastern 

 province, one in Camaguey. and two in Las Villas 

 and the western department. Maximo Gomez was 

 general-in-chief and Antonio Maceo lieutenant 

 general. Both infantry and cavalry carried the 

 machete as a side arm and were armed with rifles, 



usually a Remington. Some carried the new small- 

 bore Mauser magazine rifle of the Spanish army, 

 taken from dead or captured Spaniards. There 

 were about :;o.(i()0 Cuban rebels in the field, while 

 17.ni 10 more were employed as artificers in the 

 army shops, postmen, and fanners growing fi od 

 for the army in the mountain plantations. This 

 force could at any time be doubled if there were 

 arms enough. The supply of ammunition was 

 often short, but fresh supplies of arms and ammuni- 

 tion were constantly being run into the country. 

 The Spanish Government had spent on the war 

 from Feb. 24, 1805, to Jan. 1, 11*06, more than 

 185,000,000. 



Invasion of the Western Provinces. When 

 the Spanish forces had been pushed back by the 

 advancing revolutionists from Cienfuegos to Colon, 

 and then from Colon to Jovellanos, and finally to 

 Coliseo, Gen. Campos, who was in personal com- 

 mand, determined to crush the enemy there on 

 Dec. 2-}. ISO"). He held Gomez in che'ck and his 

 line was pouring a deadly fire into the insurgents, 

 but his command to charge at the critical moment 

 was not given, the bugler having fallen. During the 

 delay Gomez received re-enforcements, and, renew- 

 ing the attack, broke the Spanish line. When Cam- 

 pos tried a flank movement the insurgents set fire to 

 the cane fields that the Spanish troops were cross- 

 ing. This demoralized the Spaniards, who fell 

 back. When Gomez's advance columns, under 

 Lacret and Serafin Sanchez, first entered Havana 

 province and attacked the Spanish outposts at 

 Guines a panic ensued in Havana, for it was sup- 

 posed that the Spanish troops had driven back the 

 insurgents as far east as Santa Clara province. 

 The rebel forces, as they marched eastward, de- 

 stroyed bridges and tore up the railroad tracks. 

 The province of Pinar del Rio was already overrun 

 with small bands of Cuban guerrilleros, who de- 

 stroyed cane fields and burned tobacco in the 

 Vuelta Abajo. In Matanzas Gomez and Maceo had 

 captured 17 Spanish forts, releasing the garrisons. 

 The insurgent armies advanced in the direction of 

 Havana in 3 columns, under Maximo Gomez. An- 

 tonio Maceo, and Quintin Bandera. burning and 

 plundering plantations as they pushed onward. 

 On Jan. 5 the force commanded by Gomez made a 

 vigorous onslaught on the center of the Spanish 

 line of intrenchments. broke through after a fierce 

 fight, and marched onward into Pinar del Rio. cap- 

 turing isolated garrisons, destroying railroad bridges 

 and stations, and burning towns where resistance 

 was offered. Fresh tnops were embarked in Spain 

 to re-enforce the Spanish army in Cuba, already 

 150.0(10 strong. Marshal Campos planned to 

 strengthen his strategic line in order to pen Gomez 

 in the west and cut off re-enforcements and sup- 

 plies. Gen. Navarro. Gen. Luque. and Gen. Valdez 

 pursued the insurgents into Pinar del Rio and at- 

 tempted to bring on a battle, which the rebels 

 evaded by countermarching, losing 20 or 30 men 

 whenever the pursuing columns overtook them. 

 Gen. Gomez recro.-sed the dead line prepared by 

 Gen. Campos, and on Jan. 12 had a severe encoun- 

 ter with Suarez Valdez near Batabano. turning the 

 position and passing ea-tward along the southern 

 coast of Havana province. Maceo terrorized the 

 loyalists of Pinar del Rio and devastated their 

 plantations, though pursued by 5 S| anish columns. 

 The towns of Cayajabos and Cjuieba Pacha, on the 

 north coast, were burned by rebel raiders, and Ca- 

 banas was held by Perico Delgado until he was 

 shelled out liy a Spanish gunboat, which completed 

 the destruction of the "place. While Gov. San 

 Pedro, of Pinar del Rio, was calling for new re- 

 enforcements to protect his province, the province 

 of Havana was at the mercv of the forces of Gomez 



