228 



CUBA. 



and Angel Guerra, who eluded the columns of sev- 

 eral Spanish generals, and yet were able to stop 

 and destroy railroad trains and ravage villages in 

 the center of the province. The town of Managuas, 

 only a few miles from the capital, was attacked on 

 Jan. 12, and many houses were destroyed before 

 relief came. The inhabitants of Havana could hear 

 the firing of the Spanish artillery. All railroad and 

 telegraph communications were cut by the rebels, 

 and the people of the capital felt that they were 

 practically besieged and feared lest the town might 

 actually fall if the rebel forces of Jose Maceo and 

 Rabi, which had appeared on the borders of Matan- 

 zas, should join Gomez. The volunteers of Havana 

 were in. mutiny, refusing to fight unless Campos 

 changed his policy for one that would create alarm 

 and terror among the revolutionists or was relieved 

 by a general who would carry out the drastic 

 methods advocated by the Conservatives. A meet- 

 ing of business men and political leaders reiterated 

 this demand. While Campos remained firm, the 

 Madrid Government gave way. On his refusing to 

 resign, he was ordered to transfer the civil govern- 

 ment to Lieut.-Gen. Sabas Marin, which he did on 

 Jan. 17, giving as the explanation of his laying down 

 the command when the enemy was at the gates of 

 the capital under orders from Madrid : " Popular 

 opinion believes that a mild policy should not be 

 continued with the enemy, while I believe that it 

 should be ; these are questions of conscience." 



The Revolutionary Government. The revo- 

 lutionary Junta, which in the early part of the re- 

 bellion had its seat in the Sierra Maestra range, at 

 the eastern end of the island, and later near Las 

 Tunas, also in Santiago de Cuba, established itself 

 permanently, after Gomez and Maceo, driving the 

 forces of Campos before them, carried the war into 

 the western provinces, on the mountain of Cubitas, 

 in Camaguey, 25 miles from Puerto Principe. This 

 impregnable position, which could not be reached by 

 Spanish artillery, was occupied by President Cisneros 

 with his band of 800 followers, despite the strenuous 

 efforts of Marshal Campos to prevent it, while the 

 Spanish forces were occupied by the raid of Gomez 

 into Santo Clara and Maceo's movements on the bor- 

 der of Matanzas. Cubitas was made the chief store- 

 house and manufacturing establishment of the revo- 

 lutionists. There were compounded the dynamite 

 and giant powder which the Cubans employed for 

 destroying railroads and making mines to protect 

 the approaches to their strongholds. Mail service 

 was established late in 1895, which was not con- 

 fined to dispatches and reports, but was the only 

 postal system in operation over two thirds of the 

 island, replacing the Spanish post offices in the 

 greater part of Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, 

 Santa Clara, and Matanzas. In these provinces, 

 and eventually in Havana and Pinar del Rio, Go- 

 mez and Maceo organized a system of local govern- 

 ment that was respected by "the people generally. 

 Gomez districted each province, and while moving 

 about with no apparent object, except to keep out 

 of the way of the Spanish troops, he completed the 

 organization of the country. In each district he 

 appointed civil and military governors. The whole 

 island was divided into prefectures, and each pre- 

 fecto had a list of the adherents of the revolution 

 within his jurisdiction, and was able to collect taxes 

 regularly for the republican Government in four 

 of the six provinces, and to administer the law and 

 adjudicate disputes, filling the place formerly occu- 

 pied by the Spanish alcaldes, whom Gen. Weyler 

 replaced with military commanders. President 

 Cisneros boasted that peace reigned and civil laws 

 were administered in the provinces where the re- 

 public was supreme, and war was waged only in 

 the sections that Spain still attempted to control. 



The local officials kept the rebel commanders ad- 

 vised of every movement of the Spanish troops. 

 The organization of the rebel Government in Pinar 

 del Rio was intrusted to Maceo. 



Gen. Marin's Campaign. The Spanish forces 

 in Cuba had the nominal strength of 120.000 regu- 

 lars and 80,000 volunteers, the latter remaining in 

 the cities and towns for home defense, except a few 

 regiments that were sent into the field. Gen. Cam- 

 pos had drawn all the available troops from Santi- 

 ago, Santa Clara, and Puerto Principe, and massed 

 an army of 50,000 men in the narrow part of the 

 island formed by the provinces of Matanzas and 

 Havana, in the hope of shutting up the rebel forces 

 after Gomez had accomplished his boast that he 

 would invade the western provinces and stop the 

 grinding of cane, in order to cut off Spain's main 

 revenue. Gomez avoided all the traps that were 

 laid for the purpose of surrounding and crushing 

 him, sometimes by a narrow escape. Repeatedly 

 his vanguard or his rearguard was sharply engaged, 

 and once he found himself in the midst of a Spanish 

 camp, and escaped only by shooting down the 

 soldiers who surrounded his horse. After destroy- 

 ing about one third of the cane in the fields and 

 compelling most of the planters to stop grinding, 

 he issued a proclamation forbidding the further 

 burning of cane fields, but threatening to destroy 

 buildings and machinery on the sugar estates if the 

 planters resumed operations. Gen. Pando drafted 

 more troops from Santiago to Havana. The opera- 

 tions against Maceo were continued with greater 

 vigor. In the numerous skirmishes the rebels lost 

 200 men. Gen. Marin threw a new strategic line 

 across the island between Havana and Batabano, 

 and prepared to mass there troops enough to pre- 

 vent Maceo's return from Pinar del Rio. Gen. 

 Marin, hoping to strike a decisive blow, went to 

 take personal command of the operations against 

 Maceo, but was unable to draw the insurgents into 

 a battle. Perico Diaz, on Jan. 80, set a trap on 

 the strong line itself, not far from Artemisia, for a 

 large force under Gen. Canella that was sent out 

 from Guanajay to head off Maceo. After 400 rebel 

 infantry had thrown the Spanish ranks into con- 

 fusion by suddenly opening fire from behind a stone 

 wall, the rebel leader dashed down with 1,000 cav- 

 alry in a machete charge, killing nearly 200. Two 

 Spanish battalions which advanced from the trocha 

 through a blunder attacked each other, and before 

 they had recovered from their confusion Gen. Jil, 

 who had a force of rebels concealed, fell upon them. 

 While the Spaniards were thus engaged with Gen. 

 Diaz and Gen. Jil, Maceo proceeded to the southern 

 end of the trocha and crossed with 600 men near 

 the coast. When the Spanish commander became 

 aware of that he concentrated his forces to prevent 

 Gomez from making a junction with Maceo, which 

 gave the opportunity to the bulk of Maceo's army, 

 now almost bare of ammunition, to cross the trocha 

 without opposition. On Feb. 1 a rebel force of 400 

 captured a train carrying a large quantity of Mau- 

 ser rifles and cartridges on the strong line south of 

 San Felipe. Col. Seguro, leading the vanguard of 

 Gen. Canella's column, was surrounded by rebels a 

 few days later, but was saved by the opportune 

 arrival of the cavalry of Col. Ruiz. Usually the 

 rebels vanished when the Spaniards appeared in 

 force. They were able to hold the field and harass 

 the Spanish, because all the common people were 

 their friends. Gomez had but 2,000 men under 

 his immediate command, and Maceo 6.000 or 8,000, 

 while the detached bands of Miro, Bermudez, Soto- 

 mayer, Delgado. and Zayas numbered fewer than 

 2,000 all told. The insurgents were short of ammu- 

 nition, and therefore could not meet the Spaniards 

 in an infantry battle with even forces. But by evading 



