CUBA. 



237 



the contra! position on the trocha, in the night of 

 Oct. '?'.?, trying UK- dynamite shells, which produced 

 terror and destruction in the town. (ien. Mufioz 

 with a picked force made an attempt to penetrate 

 the hills and capture Ma<-i <>'- fortified camp at 

 Cacarajicara, but, like (Jen. Indan's advance upon 

 Taen Taco, it ended in a decided defeat for the 

 Spanish tl . Segura surprised and cap- 



tured a rebel out post at Soroa. wh.ich the insurgents 

 made two vain attempts to retake. Macro's pusi- 

 tion in the hills, extending ~2W miles, could be de- 

 fended by a few men at any point against a great 

 number, and in this range of hills, 16 to 24 miles 

 wide, the Cubans could grow food crops and main- 

 tain a complete commissariat service, including sad- 

 dleries ami shoe factories. Though every fertile 

 spot was planted to vegetables, food was sometimes 

 scarce, and clothing was very scantily supplied, for 

 there were 30,000 noncombatants to feed, since Gen. 

 Weyler had compelled the families of the revolu- 

 tionists to flee for refuge to the rebel camps. For 

 ammunition and medicines his army had to depend 

 mainly on outside sources. Limited quantities of 

 powder, cartridges, and dynamite were made by the 

 Cubans themselves. Some of the men were armed 

 with Mauser rifles, but the majority had Reming- 

 tons or Winchesters, which, however, in the hands 

 of good marksmen were more effective than the 

 Spanish magazine rifles handled by half-trained 

 youths, such as made up the latest re-enforcements 

 from Spain. The hills were naturally protected by 

 the thick woods or underbrush that covered their 

 sides, and their summits could be reached only by 

 narrow mule paths, which the Cubans protected by 

 obstacles and a great number of dynamite mines. 

 Mm-eo's army was divided into groups of 500. more 

 or less, each operating in a given district and all 

 in constant communication with the general head- 

 quarters. Maceo with his staff and about 4.000 

 men had his headquarters in the hills between San 

 Cristobal and Cayajabos. The inhabitantsof Pinar 

 del Rio were in many districts adherents of Spain, 

 for the tobacco plantations belonged largely to 

 Spaniards, and the cultivator- were natives of the 

 Canary Islands. The southern and western parts 

 of the province were originally placed under the 

 command of Roberto Bermudez. a Cuban officer 

 who believed in retaliation and reprisals, and whose 

 inhumanity toward the Canary Islanders and the 

 families of volunteers drove the peasants to seek 

 Spanish protection in the cities. Maceo, who was 

 opposed to such a policy, relieved Bermudez. pla- 

 cing Ducasse. a French mulatto, in command of the 

 wi-.-tern territory. Gen. Maceo pursued Fabian tac- 

 tics whenever the Spaniards advanced in force upon 

 his intrenched positions in the hills, never giving 

 battle unless the troops could be /caught in some 

 awkward defile or hollow and his men were posted 

 on the neighboring heights in sufficient numbers to 

 overwhelm the Spanish force. Ordinarily the Span- 

 iards advanced slowly with their artillery ready for 

 u-e. and arrayed themselves in line of battle and 

 opened fire with their guns whenever Perico Del- 

 gado with his sharpshooters, who formed the Cuban 

 vanguard, fired upon them from the cover of a 

 wood. Before the Spaniards were able to get the 

 range the Cubans vanished, and when after the can- 

 nonade the Spanish infantry advanced they found 

 the position deserted. The Spanish column, tired out 

 by the long march, having consumed their rations, 

 returned to their post, content with the hollow vic- 

 tory. If they reached an intrenched position com- 

 manding a turn in the road the Cubans sometimes 

 did terrible execution at the exposed spot and fired 

 their last cartridges before the Spaniards could 

 bring their guns to bear on the already deserted 

 earthworks. Gen. Mufioz and Gen. Inclan made a 



combined attack near Manuelito on the rebel out- 

 . and after several hot engagements forced 

 Perico Diax and I'erie<> I Mgado to retreat into the 

 Rubi hills, lie-enforcements had been sent from 

 Spain until the army in Cuba numbered ^OO.OUO 

 men. The cavalry force, which had formerly been 

 deficient, was now supplied, and there were field 

 pieces 'and mountain guns were abundant. The 

 Spaniards at home and in Cuba demanded speedy 

 and decisive results from the sacrifices they had 

 made before the means that were painfully provided 

 for the prosecution of the war should be exhausted, 

 for the mothers of Spain had made riotous demon- 

 strations when the troops embarked, and the last 

 loan of $50,000.000 was a contribution of the peo- 

 ple of Spain raised after the financial houses of Eu- 

 rope had declined to float another Spanish loan.' 



Gen. Weyler went to the field to direct the opera- 

 tions, the first objective being Maceo's position in 

 the Rubi hills, against which he sent, not one or 

 two columns, but 36,000 men under 6 generals. 

 He advanced with the main body from Guanajay. 

 intending to enter the hills by the principal road 

 and assail the front of Maceo's' position, while Gen. 

 Gonzalez Munoz set out from Cabanas to cut off 

 the retreat of the Cubans, Col. Segura moved for- 

 ward from Soroa, Gen. Melguizo attacked Maceo's 

 left, and Gen. Echague left Cayajabos to shut them 

 in on their right. The Spaniards closed in on their 

 objective point simultaneously on Nov. 11. Gen. 

 Echague was the first to encounter the rebels, en- 

 gaging the force of Vidal Ducasse near Rosario. 

 which fell back after fighting three hours in order 

 to support Maceo's rear, as it was menaced by 

 Segura's column. Gen. Weyler, with the principal 

 attacking forces under Gen. Aguilar and Gen. 

 Sanchez Echeverria, was unable to enter the hills, 

 but Gen. Mufioz did after being held in check for a 

 whole day by Perico Diaz, for Maceo and his forces 

 had quietly abandoned the position and retreated 

 to Valparaiso, and thence into the Roble hills. The 

 troops of Munoz were decimated at the foot of the 

 hills by a withering fire delivered by the rebels 

 from behind rocks and trees, and when at length 

 the}' reached the top hundreds were slain by the 

 explosion of a dynamite mine. The next day Maceo 

 was attacked in a stronger position by Echague's 

 column, which by the aid of his dynamite gun he 

 repelled with heavy losses. Gen Weyler inarched 

 around to Soroa. harassed continually in the forest. 

 by Cuban sharpshooters, while Gen. Munoz followed 

 up Maceo. who again evaded battle, striking into 

 the wild and inaccessible Tapia hills, where in May 

 he had inflicted a crushing defeat on Gen. Inclan's 

 column at Cacarajicara and at Gnimones had routed 

 a column led by Serrano Altimiro. Weyler's opera- 

 tion cost him a great many officers and men and 

 subjected the troops to excessive fatigue and dis- 

 ease without any valuable result. While the Span- 

 iards in Havana were disheartened over the appar- 

 ent futility of Weyler's plan of campaign they were 

 overcome with dread on account of the bold raids 

 of the insurgents in the neighborhood of Havana 

 and the arrival in Matanzas of fresh rebel f< 

 On Dec. 1 Raoul A ran go and Nicolas Valencia 

 stirred the Havana garrison to nervous activity by 

 attacking the town of Guanabacoa. within 5 miles 

 of the capital, where they secured a large quantity 

 of provisions. Trains were blown up by dynamite 

 and skirmishes took place constantly between small 

 bodies of troops in Havana and Matanzas in which 

 now one side and now the other was victorious, 

 while both despoiled and devastated the country. 

 Gomez meanwhile was moving westward by slow 

 stages, stopping to burn sugar plantations where 

 preparation-; were being made for grinding sugar 

 cane. In Pinar del Rio Gen. Melguizo's force rav- 



