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call science, on the one hand, and philosophy on 

 the other, forthwith disappears. They are DOl 

 sentially unlike: their ilitlVrences are differences of 

 degree in generality and unification. "As each 

 widest generalization of science comprehends and 

 consolidates the narrower generalizations of its 

 own division, so the generalizations of philosophy 

 comprehend and consolidate the widest generaliza- 

 tions of science." Philosophy is thus presented as 

 the final product of that process which begins with 

 a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on 

 lishing propositions that are broader and more 

 separated from particular cases, and ends in uni- 

 versal propositions. (Jr. to bring the definition to 

 its simplest and clearest form : knowledge of the 

 lowest kind is ummified knowledge : science is 

 partially unified knowledge ; philosophy is com- 

 pletely unified knowledge.'' 



If p'hilosophy is to undertake this complete unifi- 

 cation of knowledge, it must establish some ulti- 

 mate proposition which includes and consolidates 

 all the results of experience. Assuming, as we 

 must ever continue to assume, that in the mani- 

 festations of the Unknowable in and through the 

 phenomenal universe, congruities and incongruities 

 exist and are cognizable by us. Mr. Spencer shows 

 that in the last analysis all classes of likeness and 

 unlikeness merge in one great difference the dif- 

 ference between object and subject. His postu- 

 lates, therefore, are "an Unknowable Power; the 

 existence of knowable likenesses and differences 

 among the manifestations of that Power: and a 

 resulting segregation of those manifestations into 

 those of subject and object." From these postu- 

 lates philosophy has to proceed to the achievement 

 of its purpose as above set forth. 



Pushing the argument through a consideration 

 of space, time, matter, motion, force, the indestruc- 

 tibility of matter, and the continuity of force. Mr. 

 Spencer at length reaches his ultimate dictum the 

 persistence of force ; a dictum that possesses the 

 highest kind of axiomatic certitude for two rea- 

 sons : it constitutes the required foundation for all 

 other general truths, and it remains stable and un- 

 resolvable the one inexpugnable yet inexplicable 

 element of consciousness. Force is thus, for Mr. 

 Spencer, the ultimate conception, and the persist- 

 ence of force furnishes the universal criterion of 

 his system of thought. Of such persistence of 

 force under the forms of matter and motion, all 

 phenomena are necessary results. Eliminate this 

 conception, and consciousness collapses. " The 

 sole truth which transcends experience by under- 

 lying it is thus the Persistence of Force. This, 

 being the basis of experience, must be the basis of 

 any scientific organization of experiences. To this 

 an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a 

 rational synthesis must build up." 



The first deduction drawn from this ultimate 

 universal truth is that of the persistence of rela- 

 tions among forces otherwise, the uniformity of 

 law ; whence we pass to the necessary corollaries, 

 the doctrines of the transformation and equiva- 

 lence of forces, and of the rhythm of motion. Both 

 these principles are shown to hold good throughout 

 the whole range of phenomena, from the physical 

 and chemical to the psychical and social. These 

 truths, then, have the character of universality 

 which constitutes them parts of philosophy, prop"- 

 erly so called. " They are truths which unify con- 

 crete phenomena belonging to all divisions of Na- 

 ture, and so must be components of that complete 

 coherent conception of things which Philosophy 

 seeks. . . . Having seen that matter is indestruct- 

 ible, motion continuous, and force persistent 

 having seen that forces are everywhere under- 

 going transformation, and that motion, always 



following the line of least re-i invariably 



rhythmic, it remains to discover the similarly iu"- 

 variable formula expressing the fombiin-d c 

 quences of the actions thus separately formulated." 



From this point Mr. Spencer prooeeda to n-dui-i- 

 to systematic and comprehensive expression tin- 

 laws of that continuous redistribution of matter 

 and motion which is going on throughout the uni- 

 ver-e in general and in detail. All sensible exist- 

 ences, and the aggregates which they compose, have 

 their history, and this history covers the entire 

 period between their emergence from the imper- 

 ceptible and their final disappearance again into 

 the imperceptible. The redistribution of matter 

 and motion which brings about this passage from 

 the imperceptible, through the various stages of 

 the perceptible, and back to the imperceptible, 

 comprises two antagonistic processes: one charac- 

 terized by the integration of matter and the dissi- 

 pation of motion ; the other by the absorption of 

 motion and the disintegration of matter. The 

 former produces consolidation and definite! 

 the latter, diffusion and incoherence. These two 

 universal antagonistic processes are evolution and 

 dissolution. The entire universe is in a state of 

 continual change, and in terms of these processes 

 all changes, small or great, inorganic, organic, 

 physical, vital, psychical, social, have to be inter- 

 preted. To deprive the law of evolution, hereupon 

 formulated, of any merely empirical character. Mr. 

 Spencer shows at length that there are all-pervad- 

 ing principles underlying the all-pervading process. 

 Evolution means always an integration of matter 

 and concomitant dissipation of motion, or, in other 

 words, increasing coherence to definiteness ; but it 

 commonly implies much more than this, and we 

 must recognize the secondary changes by which 

 this primary change is habitually complicated be- 

 fore the formula of evolution can be set down as 

 complete. These secondary changes are indeed the 

 most conspicuous characteristics of the evolutionary 

 process; and it is not surprising, therefore, that it 

 was from these that Mr. Spencer started, that it 

 was with these that he remained for a long time 

 preoccupied, that it was these which he first defined 

 in philosophic terminology. He found himself con- 

 fronted at the outset by the special fact of the de- 

 velopment of man individually and in society that 

 is. the fact of progress. What, then, is progress? 

 This was the specific question to which, for a num- 

 ber of years, he was slowly feeling his way to an 

 answer. In his earliest publication, the ""Letters 

 on the Proper Sphere of Government," was implied 

 the belief that societies are not manufactured, but 

 grow: and from the side of natural law. therefore, 

 this question of progress was approached. In the 

 pages of "Social Statics" he elaborated his first 

 reply. There, borrowing from Coleridge the theory 

 that Coleridge in turn had derived from German 

 speculation that life is "a tendency toward indi- 

 viduation" he undertook to show that it is in the 

 fulfillment of this tendency that all progress will 

 be found to consist. But this tendency resolves 

 itself into two closely related processes : one making 

 for more and more sharply defined separateness ; 

 the other for increasing unity of organization. 



Taking the principle of differentiation by itself 

 he attempted in " Progress : Its Law and Cause," to 

 expand it into a complete theory of universal evo- 

 lution. In this he was helped by von Baer's law, 

 " that the series of changes gone through during 

 the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum 

 into an animal, constitute an advance from homo- 

 geneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure." 

 Overlooking the principle of integration, Mr. Spen- 

 cer announces this generalization as his text. " We 

 propose," he writes, in the early part of his essay, 



