AKMY OPERATIONS. 



Gen. Halleck was previously aware that a movement 

 was contemplated by Gen. Burnside. Gen. Halleck, 

 with Gen. Burnside, held that the officers who had 

 made those representations to the President should be 

 at once dismissed the service. 



Gen. Burnside remained here at that time for two 

 days, but no conclusion was reached upon the subject. 

 When he returned to his camp he learned that many 

 of the details of the general movement, and the details 

 of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the 

 rebel sympathizers in Washington, thereby rendering 

 that plan impracticable. When asked to whom he had 

 communicated his plans, he stated that he had told no 

 one in Washington except the President, Secretary 

 Stanton, and Gen. Halleck; and in his camp none 

 knew of it except one or two of his staff officers, who 

 had remained in camp all the time. He professed 

 himself unable to tell how his plans had become known 

 to the enemy. 



A correspondence then took place between the Pres- 

 ident, Gen. Halleck, and Gen. Burnside. Gen. Burn- 

 side desired distinct authority from Gen. Halleck, or 

 some one authorized to give it, to make a movement 

 across the" river. While urging the importance and 

 necessity of such a movement, ne candidly admitted 

 that there was hardly ageneral officer in his command 

 who approved of it. Wnile willing to take upon him- 

 self all the responsibility of the movement, and promis- 

 ing to keep in view the'President's caution concerning 

 running any risk of destroying the Army of the Poto- 

 mac, he desired to have at least Gen. Halleck's sanc- 

 tion or permission to make the movement. Gen. Hal- 

 leck replied that while he had always favored a forward 

 movement, he could not take the responsibility of giv- 

 ing any directions as to how and when it should be 

 made. 



Gen. Burnside then determined to make a movement 

 without any further correspondence on the subject. 

 He was unable to devise any as promising as the one 

 just thwarted by this interference of his subordinate 

 officers, which interference gave the enemy the time, 

 if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to 

 do. He, however, devised a plan of movement, and 

 proceeded to put it in execution. As is well known, 

 it was rendered abortive in consequence of the severe 

 storm which took place shortly after the movement 

 began. 



Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency 

 of the weather, there was another powerful reason for 

 abandoning the movement, viz., the almost universal 

 feeling among his general officers against him. Some 

 of those officers freely gave vent to their feelings in the 

 presence of their inferiors. In consequence of this, 

 and also what had taken place during the battle of 

 Fredericksburg, &c., Gen. Burnside directed an order 

 to be issued, which he styled General Order No. 8. 

 That order dismissed some officers from the service, 

 subject to the approval of the President, relieved 

 others from duty with the Army of the Potomac, and 

 also pronounced sentence of death upon some desert- 

 ers who had been tried and convicted. 



Gen. Burnside states that he had become satisfied 

 that it was absolutely necessary that some such exam- 

 ples should be made, in order to enable him to main- 

 tain the proper authority over the army under his com- 

 mand. The order was duly signed and issued, and 

 only waited publication. Two or three of his most, 

 trusted staff officers represented to Gen. Burnside that 

 should he then publish that order, he would force upon 

 the President the necessity of at once sanctioning it, 

 or, by refusing his approval, assume an attitude of 

 hostility to Gen. Burnside. The publication of the 

 order was accordingly delayed for the time. 



Gen. Burnside came to Washington and laid the 

 order before the President, with the distinct assurance 

 that in no other way could he exercise a proper com- 

 mand over the Army of the Potomac; and he asked 

 the President to sanction the order, or accept his re- 

 signation as major-general. The President acknowl- 

 edged that Gen. Burnside was right, but declined to 

 decide without consulting with some of his advisers. 



To this Gen. Burnside replied, that if the President 

 took time for consultation he would not be allowed to 

 publish that order, and therefore asked to have his re- 

 signation accepted at once. This the President de- 

 clined to do. 



Gen. Burnside returned to his camp, and came again 

 to Washington that night at the request of the Presi- 

 dent, and the next morning called upon the President 

 for his decision. He was Informed that the President 

 declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded 

 to relieve him from his command of the Army of the 

 Potomac, and to appoint Gen. Hooker in his place. 

 Thereupon Gen. Burnside again insisted that his re- 

 signation be accepted. This the President declined to 

 do ; and, after some urging, Gen. Burnside consented 

 to take a leave of absence for thirty days, with the 

 understanding that, at the end of that time, he should 

 be assigned to duty, as he deemed it improper to hold 

 a commission as major-general and receive his pay 

 without rendering service therefor. Gen. Burnside ob- 

 jected to the wording of the order which relieved him 

 from his command, and vyhich stated that it was at his 

 own request, as being unjust to him and unfounded in 

 fact ; but upon the representation that any other order 

 would do injury to the cause, he consented to let it re- 

 main as it then read. 



The foregoing statements of the facts proved, to- 

 gether with the testimony herewith submitted, so fully 

 and directly meet the requirements of the resolution, 

 referred to them, that your committee deem any com- 

 ment by them to be entirely unnecessary. 



Subsequently a letter appeared from Gen. 

 Cochrane, of which the following is an extract : 



I have no copy of my evidence, nor have I seen 

 Gen. Newton's. But I remember 'to have stated ex- 

 plicitly that I knew nothing of Gen. Burnside's plan ; 

 that I knew only of the dispirited condition of the 

 troops, and the sense of apprehension which depressed 

 them, and that I recognized it as a duty to communi- 

 cate this knowledge to those whose duty it was to apply 

 it. This much I testified that I had said to the Presi- 

 dent; and I then further said to the committee that had 

 I been the depository of the commanding general's 

 plans, and the possessor of facts which would neces- 

 sarily have baffled those plans, and have involved the 

 army in irretrievable ruin, I would have considered it 

 no less than treason not to have disclosed the facts 

 that I was impressed that another defeat, then and 

 there, would have been fatal to our cause ; and that it 

 was upon my deepest lovalty that I had spoken that 

 the geese had doubtless disturbed the sleeping Roman 

 sentinel, when their alarm saved the capital from the 

 Gauls ; but that I had never heard that the geese had 

 been punished for disturbing the sentinel, though I 

 had heard that they had been honored for saving the 

 state. 



The following has appeared as so much of 

 the order No. 8 as relates to the dismissal and 

 relief of certain officers : 



General Order No. 8. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Jan. 28(7, 1SC8. 



* # * * * 



First. Gen. Joseph E. Hooker, Major-General of 

 Volunteers and Brigadier-General of the United States 

 Army, having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary 

 criticisms of the actions of his superior officers, and of 

 the authorities, and having, by the general tone of his 

 conversation, endeavored to create distrust in the minds 

 of officers who have associated with him, and having, 

 by omissions and otherwise, made reports and state- 

 ments which were calculated to create incorrect im- 

 pressions, and of habitually speaking in disparaging 

 terms of other officers, is hereby dismissed the service 

 of the United States, as a man unfit to hold an important 

 commission during a crisis like the present, when so 

 much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and 

 patriotism are due from every soldier in the field. The 



