118 



AEMY OPERATIONS. 



At this time, the authorities at "Washington 

 were led to believe that large detachments 

 were going from Gen. Bragg's army to recin- 

 force Gen. Johnston in Mississippi. Gen. Rose- 

 crans was therefore urged to take advantage 

 of this opportunity to drive Gen. Bragg back 

 into Georgia, and thus secure East Teunessee 

 from the possession of the enemy. Gen. Burn- 

 side was also ordered to cooperate with him. 

 The following correspondence occurred be- 

 tween Gens. Halleck and Rosecrans : 



MURFREEBBOBO, TKNN., JttH6 llth, 1868. 



Your despatch of to-day is received. You remem- 

 ber that I gave you, as a necessary condition of suc- 

 cess, an adequate cavalry force. Since that time I 

 have not lost a moment in mounting our dismounted 

 cavalry as fast as we could get horses. Not more than 

 three hundred remain to be mounted. The 5th Iowa, 

 ordered up from Donelson, arrived to-day. The 

 1st Wisconsin will be here by Saturday. My pre- 

 liminary infantry movements have nearly all been 

 completed, and I am preparing to strike a blow that 

 will tell. But to show you how differently things are 

 viewed here, I called on my corps and division com- 

 manders and generals of cavalry, for answers in writ- 

 ing to the questions: 



First From your best information, do you think 

 the enemy materially weakened in our front? Second 

 Do you think this army can advance at this time 

 with reasonable prospect of fighting a great and suc- 

 cessful battle? Third Do you think an advance ad- 

 visable at this time? To the first, eleven answered 

 no ; six, yes, to the extent of ten thousand. To the 

 second, four, yes, with doubts ; thirteen, no. To the 

 third, not one yes ; seventeen, no. 



Not one thinks an advance advisable until Yicks- 

 burg's fate is determined. Admitting these officers to 

 have a reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, 

 and patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and 

 stronger reasons than probably appear at Washington, 

 for the attitude of this army. I therefore counsel cau- 

 tion and patience at headquarters. Better wait a little 

 to get all we can ready to insure the best result. If, 

 by so doing, we, perforce of Providence, observe a 

 groat military maxim not to risk two great and deci- 

 sive battles at the same time we might have cause to 

 be thankful for it. At all events you see that, to ex- 

 pect success, I must have such thorough grounds that 

 when I say " Forward," my word will inspire convic- 

 tion and confidence where both are now wanting. I 

 should like to have your suggestion. 



W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General. 



To Maj.-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 



WASHINGTON, June 12l, 1868. 



GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday is just re- 

 ceived. I do not understand your application of the 

 military maxim not to fight two great battles at the 

 same time. It will apply to a single army, but not to 

 two armies acting independently of each other. John- 

 ston and Bragg are acting on interior lines between 

 you and Grant, and it is for their interest, not ours, 

 that they should fight at different times, so as to use 

 the same force against both of you. It is for our in- 

 terest to fight them, if possible, while divided. If you 

 are not strong enough to fight Bragg with a part of his 

 force absent, y<m will not be able to fight him after 

 the affair at Yicksburg is over, and his troops return 

 to your front. 



There is another military maxim, that " councils of 

 war never fight." If you say that you are not pre- 

 pared to fight Bragg, I shall not order you to do so, 

 for the responsibility of fighting or refusing to fight at 

 a particular time or place, must rest upon the general 

 in immediate command. It cannot be shared by a 

 council of war, nor will the authorities here make you 

 fight against your will. You ask me to counsel them 

 to caution and patience. I have done so very often, 



but after five or six months of inactivity, with your 

 force all the time diminishing and no hope of any im- 

 mediate increase, you must not be surprised that their 

 patience is pretty well exhausted. If you do not deem 

 it prudent to risk a general battle with Bragg, why 

 can you not harass him, or make such demonstrations 

 as to prevent his sending more reinforcements to 

 Johnston? I do not write this in a spirit of fault 

 finding, but to assure you that the prolonged inac- 

 tivity of so large an army in the field is causing much 

 complaint and dissatisfaction, not only in Washington, 

 but throughout the country. 



Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 



H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 



Maj.-Gen. ROSBCBANS, Murfreesboro, Tenn. 



HBADQUABTEBS DEPARTMENT or THE CUMBERLAND, > 



MCBFREESBORO, i/Wttfi Zlst, 1863. ) 



GENERAL : In your favor of the 12th inst., you say you 

 do not see how the maxim of not fighting two great bat- 

 tles at the same time, applies to the case of this army 

 and to Grant's. Looking at the matter practically, we 

 and our opposing forces are so widely separated, that 

 for Bragg to materially aid Johnston, he must aban- 

 don our front substantially, and then we can move to 

 our ultimate work with more rapidity, and less waste 

 of material on natural obstacles. If Grant is defeated, 

 both forces will come here, and then we ought to be 

 near pur base. The same maxim that forbids, as you 

 take it, a single army fighting two great battles at the 

 same time by the way, a very awkward thing to do 

 would forbid this nation's engaging all its forces in 

 the great West at the same time, so as to leave it with- 

 out a single reserve to stem the current of possible 

 disaster. This is, I think, sustained by high military 

 and political considerations. We ought to fight here, 

 if we have a strong prospect of winning a decisive 

 battle over the opposing force, and upon this ground I 

 shall act. I shall be careful not to risk our last re- 

 serve without strong grounds to expect success. 



W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General. 



Maj.-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 



On the 24th of June, Gen. Rosecrans com- 

 menced a series of movements for the purpose 

 of bringing on a conflict between his forces 

 and those under the command of Gen. Bragg, 

 or to cause the latter to retire. His plan was 

 to create the impression of a main advance 

 from Murfreesboro upon Gen. Bragg's centre 

 and left, by feint movements and demonstra- 

 tions with the smaller portion of the army in 

 the direction of Shelbyville, while the decisive 

 blow should be struck by marching rapidly 

 with the main body upon Gen. Bragg's right, 

 and, after turning or defeating it, to move upon 

 Tullahoma, by way of Manchester. Thus he 

 would seize the enemy's base and lines of com- 

 munication from that point. 



The twentieth corps, under Gen. McCook, 

 was selected to make the advance on the right. 

 About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, 

 the division of Gen. Sheridan advanced on the 

 Shelbyville road, preceded by five companies 

 of the 30th Indiana mounted infantry, under 

 Lieut-Col. Jones. As it came in sight of the 

 enemy's outposts, it halted and bivouacked on 

 each side of the road in the wood. The divis- 

 ions of Gens. Johnson and Davis advanced six 

 miles on the same road, and then turned to the 

 left on the road to Liberty Gap. 



The morning was stormy, but, before day- 

 break, the mounted infantry, under Col. "Wilder, 

 marched along the road leading to Manchester, 



