CONGKESS, U. 8. 



263 



rights, privileges, and immunities ; and the per- 

 formance of that duty alone justifies this war. 



" Now, sir, look at the theory that is at- 

 tempted to be defended by my learned friend 

 from Pennsylvania. That he is learned in the 

 law, his high reputation and his long and la- 

 borious life in that profession entitle him to be 

 considered. Look at his theory. No member 

 of this House pretends to deny that any act or 

 ordinance of secession is void in law ; and yet 

 the gentleman from Pennsylvania finds that 

 somehow or other the ordinance of secession, 

 though void and of no effect, did somehow take 

 the State out of the Union, and has relieved 

 the General Government from all obligation 

 even to protect, or to attempt to protect, the 

 loyal citizens of that State in the enjoyment of 

 their rights. Now, can there be a plainer prop- 

 osition than this, that if there be one loyal cit- 

 izen remaining in a rebel State, no man, no 

 body of men, by any act, illegal and unconsti- 

 tutional, can deprive such a citizen of his 

 rights ? 



" The duties of obedience and protection are 

 reciprocal; and no just and humane Govern- 

 ment, where it cannot give such protection, 

 will punish disloyalty. The first duty of the 

 Government is to protect its citizens ; and the 

 next duty of the Government is to punish those 

 who violate its laws. Sir, I have no patience 

 with the doctrine announced by the gentleman 

 from Pennsylvania; I hold it in utter abhor- 

 rence. I think it equally unsound and mischiev- 

 ous as that of the so-called right of secession. 



" The gentleman speaks of the appointment 

 of these military governors over the conquered 

 States, as he calls them. Did anybody ever 

 pretend that we had the authority of the Con- 

 stitution for that ? It is only to be justified as 

 a military necessity. It is only to be justified 

 by the usage of war. It is the exercise of 

 authority by the commanding general. If a 

 judge or a police magistrate be appointed, it is 

 only in pursuance of the power of the com- 

 mander-in-chief of the' army. Constitutional 

 questions have nothing more to do with the 

 appointment of those judicial officers than they 

 have with the appointment of his aids. He 

 had undoubtedly a right, where military and 

 where judicial authority was to be exercised, 

 to delegate a judge, or to delegate a major-gen- 

 eral for the exercise of that power. That del- 

 egation of authority is to be justified alone by 

 the usage of war. The power to appoint a 

 military governor over one of the States of the 

 Union, or a person to discharge temporarily 

 the functions of a magistrate, or a police offi- 

 cer, by the President, has its origin in necessi- 

 ty, and is alone justified by it. Of that neces- 

 sity the President is alone the judge, as the 

 commander-in-chief of the army. Congress 

 can neither exercise the power nor judge of 

 the necessity of its exercise." 



Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts: "Mr. Chair- 

 man, I beg to call the attention of the House 

 back to the precise matter before us. It is a 



provision for the appropriation of money for a 

 definite and specific purpose ; and that purpose 

 is to enforce the collection of a direct tax as- 

 sessed by this House in conformity to a pro- 

 vision of the Constitution of the United States 

 (article one, section two, clause four); a tax 

 which could only have been assessed in exact 

 conformity to that provision. The object of 

 tliis provision in the appropriation bill, and of 

 the law of the last session, was to enforce, in 

 the disaffected States, the collection of that tax. 

 Upon what ground, Mr. Chairman ? Upon this 

 ground, that the authority of this Government 

 at this time is as valid over those States as it 

 was before the acts of secession were passed ; 

 upon the ground that every act of secession 

 passed by those States is utterly null and void ; 

 upon the ground that an act legally null and 

 void cannot acquire force because armed rebel- 

 lion is behind it seeking to uphold it ; npon the 

 ground that the Constitution makes us not a 

 mere confederacy, but a nation; upon the 

 ground that the provisions of that Constitution 

 strike through the State Government and reach 

 directly, not intermediately, the subjects. Sub- 

 jects of whom ? Of the nation ; of the United 

 States. If this be so, Mr. Chairman, if these 

 acts of secession be void, what is our position 

 to-day ? Gentlemen say that there is a belli- 

 gerent power exercising authority against us. 

 That is, you say that rebellion is . attempting 

 revolution. Very well. Who ever heard, as 

 a matter of public law, that the authority of a 

 Government over its rebellious subjects was 

 lost until that revolution was successful was 

 a fact accomplished ? 



" My position, then, Mr. Chairman, is that 

 we may appropriate this money, that we may 

 enforce the collection of this tax, because to*- 

 day, as always heretofore, the authority of the 

 National Government binds and covers every 

 inch of the territory of the national domain ; 

 because that law which we call the Constitution 

 is, to-day, the supreme law of the land. If the 

 position taken by the learned gentleman from 

 Pennsylvania be true, that we are every day 

 passing unconstitutional acts, we are every day 

 violating our oaths recorded in heaven to sup- 

 port the Constitution of the United States. I 

 hold, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that it is our 

 duty to compel the collection of this tax just as 

 if the ordinance of secession had not been passed. 

 But I beg leave to say that however we may 

 differ as to the extent of powers which the 

 Constitution gives us (and they are ample for 

 all good ends), when we deliberately pass from 

 fidelity to this Constitution to enact law in vio- 

 lation of its sacred provisions, we are ourselves 

 inaugurating revolution. It is fire against fire, 

 and God have mercy on the country. 



"I have only a word or two more to say, Mr. 

 Chairman. In all events, at whatever cost or 

 peril of treasure or of life, we must cling to the 

 national unity ; and for this end we must cling 

 to the only possible bond of unity the Consti- 

 tution. Mr. Chairman, I have listened quietly, 



