CONGKESS, U. S. 



325 



from a foreign enemy, as to the nature and 

 extent of the powers to be exercised in States 

 or parts of States rescued from the possession 

 of rebels in arms against us. This is a mili- 

 tary occupation of our own territory ; an occu- 

 pation which has become necessary by reason 

 of the fact that the Constitution and laws of 

 the United States cannot otherwise be enforced, 

 and that it is our duty to enforce them, and the 

 right of the loyal citizens of Louisiana to have 

 them enforced, not merely for our benefit, but 

 their protection. 



" Now, Mr. Speaker, what is the object of 

 this vast movement of ours ? For what are we 

 carrying on this war ? For the purpose of en- 

 forcing the laws of the United States. Your 

 war has no other just or legitimate object but 

 the enforcement of your laws. If these laws 

 are obstructed by armed force in the State of 

 Louisiana, you have the right to take and to 

 maintain military occupation of that State to 

 remove such obstruction. You have the right 

 to see that the laws of the United States are 

 executed in the State of Louisiana. 



" Do gentlemen say that because of the exist- 

 ence of armed rebellion in the State of Louis- 

 iana we have no right to enforce the laws of 

 the United States there ? Have we not the 

 right to collect taxes ? Have we not the right 

 to enforce the revenue laws, and the right to 

 conscript soldiers from the citizens of that 

 State ? Have we not the right, by military 

 power, to protect the courts of the United 

 States in the district of Louisiana in the exer- 

 cise of their jurisdiction ? I take this position 

 and I fail to see how it can be controverted 

 that if you are in the military occupation of 

 this, your own territory, you hold it for the 

 purpose for which the war is waged, for the 

 purpose of upholding the jurisdiction and en- 

 forcing obedience to the laws of the United 

 States. 



" The analogies sought to be drawn from 

 Vattel, and other writers on public law, as to 

 the military occupation of a conquered terri- 

 tory from a foreign state have very imperfect 

 application to the case before us: The Con- 

 stitution and laws of the United States are the 

 supreme law of Louisiana, and you are to en- 

 force the execution of those laws. And I see 

 no valid distinction between enforcing those 

 laws which impose duties and burdens upon 

 the people, and the enforcement of those laws 

 which guarantee and protect the rights of the 

 loyal people of the State, rights springing from 

 us, and to be protected by us." 



Mr. Conway: "Was the law under which 

 these men were elected a law of the United 

 States ? " 



Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts : " The law 

 from which the right to elect was derived, and 

 to be elected, was a law of the United States 

 and the supreme law of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, 

 I wish to make matters clear as I go. I want 

 gentlemen who believe that we should enforce 

 the laws of the United States for the collection 



of taxes and the collection of the revenue in 

 Louisiana, to point out the distinction between 

 enforcing the laws of the United States which 

 impose these burdens and duties upon the peo- 

 ple, and the enforcing of the laws which secure 

 to them the enjoyment of their rights and privi- 

 leges under the Constitution, and especially this 

 great and invaluable right of representation, 

 of helping to make the laws which they are 

 bound to obey. Our duty to protect is as clear 

 as their duty to obey. They are reciprocal 

 and interdependent. 



" "We may meet this question of the issue of 

 writs of election in another manner. The 

 question whether these writs were properly 

 issued or not is a technical question, and we 

 can meet it by a technical answer. We may 

 meet the objection that the writs were not is- 

 sued by the executive authority of the State, 

 by saying that they were issued by the only 

 executive authority of that State which the 

 Government of the United States or the people 

 in these districts in any way recognize, and 

 which, in matters of highest concern, they 

 have recognized and obeyed. The writs of 

 election were, in fact, issued upon the earnest 

 request of the loyal citizens of these districts, 

 and were responded to and confirmed by them. 



"But I do not consider the strict legality 

 of these writs vital to the issue before us. I 

 go one step farther. I contend, whether these 

 writs were issued by the executive authority 

 of the State or not, this may be a valid elec- 

 tion. I contend that this provision of the Con- 

 stitution, as other provisions of statute in rela- 

 tion to this subject, is within the well-settled 

 distinction between provisions which are direc- 

 tory and those which are essential. I say, un- 

 der the law of elections, practised upon from 

 the beginning of the Government to this hour, 

 you have gone behind the mere form to get at 

 the substance and truth of the thing ; and that 

 these safeguards provided by the laws to secure 

 to the citizens the orderly exercise of the right 

 of election were never intended to be used as 

 barriers to exclude them from their enjoyment. 



" The point to which I was endeavoring to 

 lead the House is the distinction between those 

 provisions, formal and directory, and those that 

 I deem essential ; and that the House, in the 

 exercise of its power to judge of the elections 

 and the returns of its members, has always felt 

 itself enabled to go behind the ' letter which 

 killeth, to the spirit which* maketh alive,' and 

 to ascertain whether, in point of fact, there has 

 been a fair election by the people of the dis- 

 trict, having full opportunity to vote, and with- 

 out violence or fraud. And therefore if gen- 

 tlemen differ as to the authority of a military 

 governor or, as I would call him, the provis- 

 ional governor of a State, they may still be 

 satisfied that that was a full and fair notice to 

 the people of the election, and that the -loyal 

 people of those districts, having had such full 

 and fair notice, did meet and freely exercise 

 their elective franchise." 



