370 



ENROLMENT AND DRAFT. 



commissioners have the power, independent of an ex- 

 press provision of the statute conferring such author- 

 ity, to revise and alter their determinations, after they 

 have once made, completed and delivered their de- 

 cision upon the particular questions submitted to their 

 determination. 



If these boards are quasi-judicial tribunals, and are 

 to be likened to the ordinary judicial tribunals, they 

 are to be likened to courts of inferior and limited ju- 

 risdiction, created by statute, with certain specified 

 powers ; and it is a well-settled doctrine, as will be seen 

 hereafter, that no such inferior court has the right to 

 grant a new trial upon the merits, or to revise or va- 

 cate its own decisions, unless such power is specially 

 conferred by statute. It is also well settled that when 

 a special tribunal is created by statute, with specified 

 powers and a limited jurisdiction, for the decision of 

 particular questions of law or fact, or both, that when- 

 ever the power given is once executed, in respect to a 

 particular case oefore it, the power of the tribunal is 

 exhausted and its jurisdiction at an end, so far as such 

 case is concerned; that the persons thus invested with 

 power are then functi officio, so far as relates to that 

 particular case, and that their powers and jurisdiction 

 cannot bte resumed. 



But it is said that the duty performed by the Board of 

 Enrolment in this case was purely a ministerial duty, 

 and that their decision may be revised and corrected 

 in this proceeding. It is undoubtedly true, that most 

 of the duties ftf the officers in the enrolment and draft 

 authorized by the act of Congress under consideration 

 are ministerial, such as the enrolment the prepara- 

 tion of ballots the drawing the giving of notices, 

 Ac. ; but the duties of the board in deciding upon 

 claims of exemption are quasi-judicial, and not minis- 

 terial. If the board should enrol aud draft an alien, 

 who had not declared his intention to become a citizen 

 a citizen under twenty, or one over forty- five years 

 of age, or perhaps enrol a citizen over thirty-five hav- 

 ing a family, in the first class instead of the second, 

 the error might be corrected and the party discharged 

 on habeas corpus, because, as to those parties, their pro- 

 ceedings would be void, for want of jurisdiction of the 

 person and of the subject matter. But in deciding 

 upon the question of the exemption of a person, other- 

 wise liable, on the ground of physical or mental un- 

 fitness for the military service, their acts are most 

 clearly quasi-judicial. The decision of the board, 

 upon this question of fact, declaring the exemption of 

 the person drafted, is, therefore, not one which can be 

 reviewed on mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus. 

 A mandamus to such a tribunal is never granted for 

 the purpose of determining how they shall decide such 

 a question, or to compel them to reverse their decision 

 thereon; and on a common law certiorari to bring 

 their proceedings before the Supreme Court for re- 

 view, that court can only reverse their proceedings for 

 want of jurisdiction or for error in law appearing on 

 their face. 



But if it should be conceded that the duties of the en- 

 rolling board, in determining claims to exemption on 

 the ground of physical unntness for the service are 

 ministerial, that concession would not, in my judg- 

 ment, afford any ground for holding that the relator 

 should be remanded. The decision of the enrolling 

 board certainly discharged him from the draft; he was 

 rejected as physically unfit for the service, and the sec- 

 ond section of the act as before recited, declares all 

 such to be " excepted aud exempt from the provisions 

 of this act, and shall not be liable to military duty un- 

 der the same." By this decision and direction the 

 board therefore lost jurisdiction of the person of the 

 relator, and, by the very terms of the act, he ia no 

 longer liable to do military duty under the draft, any 

 more than a person over the age of forty-five years. 



It was said by the counsel for the Government that 

 tlie Hoard of Enrolment were only to " relieve " the 

 relator from the draft on a proper showing ; and that 

 he was bound to prove that on a "proper showing" 

 they did relieve him from the draft. This proposition, 

 ia reference to the decision of a tribunal which the act 



of Congress creating it has declared shall be final, can- 

 not be maintained. It is substantially saying that 

 when they decide correctly (in the opinion of any 

 other tribunal, before which the question may be rais- 

 ed) their decisions are to be binding and final, but 

 when they decide otherwise their decisions are of no 

 effect. The position is clearly untenable, as the duties 

 of the enrolling board in deciding the question of ex- 

 emption are, as has been before stated, quasi-judi- 

 cial, and not ministerial. The cases relating to the 

 acts of boards of county canvassers, which were cited 

 in support of this position, are not pertinent. 



But it is urged by the counsel for the Government 

 that the decision of the Board of Enrolment, be it ju- 

 dicial or ministerial, may be impeached for fraud ; and 

 he puts this case by way of argument: "Suppose a 

 surgeon, while drunk, should sign a certificate of disa- 

 bility, or should be bribed to do it ; or a certificate 

 should be written over signatures given for another 

 purpose, or be obtained by duress ; might not the pro- 

 vost-marshal contest it, not only in a case like this, but 

 in various cases ? " In the cases thus supposed, no in- 

 jury would be likely to result to the Government in 

 consequence of the doctrines which are held applicable 

 to the present case. It is the decision of the enrolling 

 board, not a certificate of a drunken or. bribed surgeon, 

 which works the exemption ; and it would require at 

 least two intoxicated, corrupt, or very stupid members 

 of the board to lead to the improper discharge of per- 

 sons drafted in the mode suggested. A certificate of 

 exemption written, without authority, over signatures 

 subscribed for another purpose, would be of no validi- 

 ty when it was shown that no such decision had been 

 made by the board ; for (as was urged by the counsel 

 of the Government) it is the decision of the board which 

 exempts, and the certificate having the signatures of 

 the board is not conclusive evidence of their decision. 

 If such a certificate were obtained by duress, or im- 

 properly written over signatures made for another 

 purpose, it would have no effect, for it would not be 

 founded upon a decision of the board. 



But it is insisted that the decision of the enrolling 

 board, if obtained by fraud, can be set aside by the 

 board, or disregarded by the provost-marshal ; who, it 

 is alleged, is no party, in his character of provost-mar- 

 shal, to such proceeding. It is also insisted that it 

 may be disregarded by the Government, and several 

 cases have been cited to show that the decisions and 

 judgments of all courts and special tribunals may be 

 impeached, collaterally, on the ground of fraud. 



It cannot be necessary to enter into a critical exami- 

 nation of the cases and authorities cited on this point. 

 The general rule, undoubtedly, is, that parties to the 

 suit or proceedings in which such judgment or decision 

 is made, cannot impeach such judgment or decision 

 collaterally, but must seek their remedy by writ of er- 

 ror, appeal, or other authorized proceeding for the di- 

 rect setting aside or reversal of such judgment or de- 

 cision ; or, in certain cases, by a suit in equity, for the 

 express purpose of setting it aside. And all persons 

 represented oy the parties to such proceedings, or who 

 claim under them, or in privity with them, or who 

 have succeeded to their rights, are regarded as privies 

 and are equally concluded by such proceedings. But 

 other persons, strangers to such proceedings, may im- 

 peach such proceedings and decisions collaterally, on 

 the ground of fraud, whenever they are set up to (V- 

 prive them of their legal rights. (1 Greenleaf s Evi- 

 dence, sec. 522, 523.) 



It was urged on the argument that this is not the 

 proper tribunal to afford redress to the relator, and 

 that the case is properly, if not exclusively, cognizable 

 by a court martial. If the conclusions already reach- 

 ed are correct, it is unnecessary to waste time in the 

 discussion of this point. If the relator is illegally re- 

 strained of his liberty, he is entitled to be discharged 

 on ftabeas corpus, and to discuss the sacred character 

 of that right would but lead to a repetition of the 

 words of the most distinguished jurists and statesim 1 ", 

 friends of civil liberty and champions of constitution 

 al rights, from the year 1215, when the barousof Eng- 



