666 



NAVY, U. S. 



sels so armored must be of considerable tonnage. I 

 presume the department only intended to build such 

 vessels as were best adapted to the service at the scene 

 of war. 



Keeping in view the peculiar exigencies of the case, 

 which required light draft and great ordnance power, 

 it appears that the selection of the department could 

 not nave been more judicious in preferring a number 

 of monitors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base ; 

 and if the intent of the department could have been 

 carried out in regard to numbers, we should now have 

 been in entire possession of the coast from the Capes 

 of Virginia to New Orleans, including Wilmington, 

 Charleston, Mobile, Ac. 



Many defects of both classes are easily remediable, 

 but some of those in the monitors could only be deter- 

 mined by the test of battle; before that, approximation 

 only was possible. 



In response to a resolution of Congress, Sec- 

 retary Welles transmitted to that body in 

 April, 1864, a voluminous report on the effi- 

 ciency of the ironclads, embodying the opin- 

 ions of some of the first naval authorities in 

 the country, including Rear-Admirals Dupont, 

 Porter and Goldsborough, and Captain John 

 Rodgers. Admiral Dupont adheres to the 

 views previously expressed by him. 



I am well aware, he says, that the results at Charles- 

 ton were not all that were wished for, and I quite 

 agree with the department that there was, neverthe- 

 less, much in them that was gratifying, particularly 

 that the loss of life was so small, ana that the capacity 

 of the ironclads for enduring the hot and heavy fire 

 brought to bear upon them, which would have de- 

 stroyed any vessels of wood heretofore used in war- 

 fare, was made so evident. But I must take leave to 

 remind the department that ability to endure is not a 

 sufficient element wherewith to gain victories, that en- 

 durance must be accompanied with a corresponding 

 power to inflict injury on the enemy; and I will im- 

 prove the_ present occasion to repeat the expression of 

 a conviction which I have already conveyed to the de- 

 partment in former letters, that the weakness of the 

 Monitor class of vessels, in this important particular, is 

 fatal to their attempts against fortifications having out- 

 lying obstructions, as at the Ogeechee and at Charles- 

 ton, or against other fortifications upon elevations, as 

 at Fort Darling, or against any modern fortifications 

 before which they must anchor or lie at rest, and re- 

 ceive much more than they can return. With even 

 their diminished surface they are not invulnerable, and 

 their various mechanical contrivances for working 

 their turrets and guns are so liable to immediate de- 

 rangement that, in the brief though fierce engagement 

 at Charleston, five out of eight were disabled, and, as 

 I mentioned in my detailed report to the department, 

 half an hour more fighting would, in my judgment, 

 have placed them all horn combat. 



Rear-Admiral Porter, on the other hand, 

 finds little to disapprove of, and much to praise, 

 in the monitors. " I remember," he says, " pro- 

 nouncing the first Ericsson Monitor a perfect 

 success, and capable of defeating anything that 

 thru floated. I was looked upon at that time 

 as something of an enthusiast, as ray opinions 

 were widely at variance with those of some 

 scientific gentlemen. The results have justified 

 me in forming a high estimate of the Monitor 

 principle." Hi- lia< u hi^'h opinion of the iron- 

 clads building on the Ohio at the commence- 

 ment of 1864, and thinks one of them capable, 

 when completed, of destroying every vessel on 

 the Mississippi between Cairo and the Golf, 

 lie adds: 



I think too much has been expected of monitors 

 heretofore, and the fact that two or three of them were 

 not able to overcome obstacles formidable enough to 

 keep out a large fleet of three-deckers, has, in a meas- 

 ure, weakened the confidence of the public (who gener- 

 ally know little or nothing about such matters) in them. 

 But the monitors for harbor defence are just as valuable 

 as they were on the day when the first one drove the levia- 

 than Merrimac back to her hole, and saved the honor of 

 the nation. I am sure that monitors would have done 

 much better on this river than the old poop gunboats 

 did, which were built for temporary purposes only, or 

 until monitors could take their places. Earthwork's on 

 elevated positions are difficult to silence, it is true, ex- 

 cept by a concentrated fire of many guns, and moni- 

 tors are not well provided in numbers. No vessels 

 have been more successful than the Mississippi gun- 

 boats, whenever they have been called upon to attack 

 such works. Still they were very deficient in one re- 

 spect, as they were very vulnerable, suffered a good 

 deal, and proved that in the end the monitor principle, 

 from its invulnerability, was the only thing that could 

 be safely depended on. For this reason I often wished 

 that I had been provided with one good monitor, with 

 which at certain times I could have accomplished more 

 than with a fleet of such boats as we have here. 



The resistance of iron, he finds from person- 

 al observation, depends more on the woodt n 

 backing than on the thickness of the iron, ai d 

 that two inches of iron on thirty-six inches of 

 oak will resist more than three inches of iron 

 on fifteen inches of oak. " I have, moreover, 

 noticed," he observes, " that where there is a 

 backing of wood covered with three-inch iron, 

 and that iron with wood again, the resist- 

 ance of the latter will prevent balls of heavy 

 size from entering the iron. In fact it is hardly 

 indented." He closes a warm tribute to the 

 efficiency of the monitors in the following 

 words : 



Any professional man who will lay aside his preju- 

 dices, caused by the discomforts incident to the moni- 

 tors, must admit that, as a harbor defence, they are the 

 best and only vessels to be built, and I hope we shall 

 see every harbor in the United States where there is a 

 chance of an enemy penetrating, supplied with two or 

 three of these floating batteries. If they have not been 

 able to penetrate the harbor of Charleston, where fifty 

 guns to one were opposed to them, and where they had 

 to contend with obstructions placed in their way, im- 

 possible to be removed, it in no way detracts from th>3ir 

 well-earned reputation for efficiency. They have done 

 at Charleston what no other vessels ever built could 

 possibly have accomplished, and though the army, as 

 usual (when combined operations are carried on), has 

 monopolized all the honors, it is a very certain fact 

 that the monitors held their own as no other vessels 

 could have done, and under their shelter the army vas 

 enabled to perform its work successfully. 



Admiral Goldsborough thinks that, as ex- 

 periments have shown that a seagoing vessel 

 of war cannot be covered with iron throughout 

 her vulnerable parts, so as to render her proof 

 against large round-shot and rifle projectiles, 

 the use of plating should be restricted to the 

 most vitally exposed parts, and should be "of 

 such practicable thickness as to secure im- 

 munity in those places against the explosive ef- 

 fect of shells generally, and against the damag- 

 ing effect of other projectiles striking obliquely, 

 or otherwise unfavorably to the material dam- 

 age of the iron." A hull thus arranged, w ith 

 water-tight bulkheads and turrets for the bat- 



