NAVY, II. S. 



NAVY, U. S., OPERATIONS OF. 667 



eries, he conceives to be " about all that can 

 be done in the way of plating with iron, con- 

 sistently with all the considerations involved." 

 Celerity of turning should be one of the chief 

 elements of efficiency, and " every ironclad, as a 

 matter of course, should be an unexceptionable 

 ram ; or, in other words, susceptible herself of 

 being- used as a projectile." The value of 

 rams at this moment, he thinks, cannot be 

 overestimated, and a few of them in each prom- 

 inent seaport would effectually prevent a 

 blockade. His views on this point are embod- 

 ied in the following paragraph : 



Rams, intended purely for harbor defences, would 

 be better without than with guns. They themselves 

 are to be the projectiles ; or, if you please, they are to 

 be the shot, and the steam is to be the powder ; and 

 the effect of both, properly combined, would be abso- 

 lutely irresistible. Guns, I repeat, would be detri- 

 mental to unity of purpose, and also in other respects; 

 or, in short, be of more harm than good in the long 

 run. Besides, to fit the rams for them, would be to 

 swell the item of cost largely, and thus abridge their 

 multiplication ; and the distinctive plating which their 

 protection would involve, could be used to more advan- 

 tage elsewhere about the hull. The essential points to 

 be secured in these rams, each to a degree as consist- 

 ently with all the rest as practicable, are great strength 

 throughout every part of the hull, not overlooking the 

 bottom by any manner of means ; every protection 

 that supportable plating can afford ; a high velocity ; 

 an ample security of machinery ; the utmost rapidity 

 in turning; a suitable bow. 



Of the respective merits of the Monitor and 

 New Ironsides types of ironclads, he speaks 

 as follows : 



The monitors we have already constructed and used 

 in service, I ani impelled to regard as open to the se- 

 rious objections of a marked deficiency in ability for 

 general naval purposes, and in strength of bottom, sea- 

 worthiness, speed, turning qualities, height of deck 

 above the water, and habitability ; yet for mere smooth- 

 water harbor operations, the object, I suppose, for 

 which they were intended, they undoubtedly do possess 

 formidable offensive and defensive properties, viewed 

 in a relative sense. 



Their absolute worth, however, in these particulars, 

 I cannot regard as entitled to the extravagant merit 

 claimed for it, induced, I apprehend, in a great meas- 

 ure, by conclusions drawn from the encounters of the 

 first monitor and the Weehawken, with the Merrimac 

 and Atalanta, without a sufficient knowledge of the facts 

 attending them, and without any (or more than an un- 

 willing) reference to the cases of opposite results, as 

 for instance the Ogeechee, and the repeated displays 

 before Charleston. 

 ***#* 



The New Ironsides I regard as a much more efficient 

 type of ironclad than the monitors just discussed, be- 

 cause of her possessing decided advantages over them 

 in the particulars of fitness for general purposes, sea- 

 worthiness, relative strength of bottom, or absolute 

 capacity to endure vibration thereat ; security against 

 antagonist vessel getting astride of her; speed, and 

 habitability. Had she been planned for turrets, in- 

 stead of the use of guns at broadside ports, she would 

 have been, I think, still more formidable; nor is she 

 unexceptionable in other respects; and among them 

 speed and turning qualities. It is necessary to try her 

 more at sea, and more at closer quarters with an en- 

 emy, than she has yet been tried, in order to determine 

 positively her relative merits in some highly important 

 particulars. 



Capt. John Kodgers, who participated in all 

 the important actions of the monitors against 



the forts at Charleston, and also commanded 

 the "Weehawken in her contest with the At- 

 lanta, thus sums up his conclusions after a care- 

 ful comparison of the New Ironsides and the 

 monitors : 



I think that the Monitor class and the Ironsides class 

 are different weapons, each having its peculiar advant- 

 ages both needed to an iron-clad navy both needed 

 in war; but that, when the Monitor class measures 

 its strength against the Ironsides class, then with ves- 

 sels of equal size, the Monitor class will overpower the 

 Ironsides class; indeed, a single monitor will capture 

 many casemated vessels of no greater individual size or 

 speed ; and as vessels find their natural antagonists in 

 forts, it must be considered that upon the whole the 

 Monitor principle contains the most successful ele- 

 ments for plating vessels for war purposes. 



Of the sea-going qualities of the monitors, 

 nearly every prominent naval officer speaks 

 with distrust or with positive disfavor. See ac- 

 counts of loss of Monitor and "Weehawken, un- 

 der OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVY. 



NAVY, U. S., OPERATIONS OF. During 1863 

 six squadrons were maintained by the United 

 States Government along the Atlantic seaboard, 

 and in the "Western waters, viz.: 1, the North 

 Atlantic Squadron, Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. 

 Lee ; 2, the South Atlantic Squadron, Rear- 

 Admiral S. F. Dupont, who was relieved, July 

 6th, by Rear-Admiral J. A. Dahlgren ; 3, the 

 Eastern Gulf Squadron, Acting Rear-Admiral 

 T. Bailey; 4, the Western Gulf Squadron, Rear- 

 Admiral D. G. Farragut, who was temporarily 

 relieved in July by his second in command, 

 Commodore II. H. Bell ; 5, the Mississippi Flo- 

 tilla, Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter ; 6, the Poto- 

 mac Flotilla, Commodore A. A. Harwood. There 

 Avere also small squadrons on the Pacific and East 

 India stations, and a number of vessels were 

 employed in searching for rebel privateers and 

 on other special service. 



I. North Atlantic Squadron. The opera- 

 tions of this squadron have comprised chiefly 

 blockade duties along the coasts of Virginia 

 and North Carolina, where, according to the 

 Secretary of the Navy, the officers in command 

 "have been sleepless sentinels, and have ex- 

 hibited examples of heroic bravery and daring, 

 in repelling the rbels and protecting and 

 succoring the army when in difficulty, which 

 reflect honor on themselves and the service." 

 So effective were their services that along the 

 entire station all intercourse with the enemy 

 was cut off, with the single exception of the 

 port of "Wilmington, the closing of which was 

 difficult on account of its two inlets, thirty 

 miles apart, flanked by extensive batteries. A 

 few steamers from the Clyde and elsewhere, 

 of light draught, succeeded, under cover of the 

 darkness, in eluding capture, but most even of 

 that description of vessels fell into the hands 

 of the blockaders, or were run on shore and 

 destroyed. Many of the operations of the 

 blockading fleet were performed in connection 

 with the land forces, and will be found de- 

 scribed under that head. Those only will be 

 mentioned here in which the navy performed 

 the sole or the chief part. 



