PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 



789 



defeats on the invading armies in Louisiana and on the 

 coast of Texas. Detachments of troops and active 

 bodies of partisans kept up so effective a war on the 

 Mississippi river as practically to destroy its value as 

 an avenue of commerce. 



The determined and successful defence of Charleston 

 against the joint land and naval operations of the ene- 

 my afforded an inspiring example of our ability to 

 repel the attacks even of the ironclad fleet, on which 

 they chiefly rely, while on the Northern frontier our 

 success was still more marked. 



The able commander who conducted the campaign 

 in Virginia determined to meet the threatened advance 

 on Richmond for which the enemy had made long 

 and costly preparations by forcing their armies to 

 cross the Potomac and fight in defence of their own 

 capital and homes. Transferring the battle field to 

 their own soil, he succeeded in compelling their rapid 

 retreat from Virginia, and in the hard-fought battle of 

 Gettysburg inflicted such severity of punishment as 

 disabled them from early renewal of the campaign as 

 originally projected. Unfortunately, the communica- 

 tions on "which our general relied for receiving his 

 supplies of munitions were interrupted by extraordi- 

 nary floods, which so swelled the Potomac as to render 

 impassable the fords by which his advance had been 

 made, and he was thus' forced to a withdrawal, which 

 was conducted with deliberation, after securing large 

 trains of captured supplies, and with a constant but 

 unaccepted tender of battle. On more than one occa- 

 sion the enemy has since made demonstrations of a 

 purpose to advance, invariably followed by a precipi- 

 tate retreat to intrenched lines on the approach of our 

 forces. 



The effective check thus opposed to the advance of 

 invaders at all points was such as to afford hope of their 

 early expulsion from portions of the territory previ- 

 ously occupied by them, when the country was pain- 

 fully surprised by the intelligence that the officer in 

 command of Cumberland Gap had surrendered that 

 important and easily defensible pass without firing a 

 shot, upon the summons of a force still believed to 

 have been inadequate to its reduction, and when ree'n- 

 forcements were within supporting distance and had 

 been ordered to his aid. The entire garrison, including 

 the commander, being still held as prisoners by the 

 enemy, I am unable to suggest any explanation of this 

 disaster, which laid open Eastern Tennessee and South- 

 western Virginia to hostile operations, and broke the 

 line of communication between the seat of government 

 and Middle Tennessee. This easy success or the enemy 

 was followed by an advance of Gen. Rosecrans into 

 Georgia, and our army evacuated Chattanooga and 

 availed itself of the opportunity thus afforded of win- 

 ning on the field of Cnickamauga one of the most bril- 

 liant and decisive victories of the war. This signal de- 

 feat of Gen. Rosecrans was followed by his retreat into 

 Chattanooga, where his imperilled position had the im- 

 mediate effect of relieving the pressure of invasion at 

 other points, forcing the concentration, for his relief, 

 of large bodies of troops withdrawn from the armies in 

 the Mississippi Valley and in Northern Virginia. The 

 combined forces thus accumulated against us in Ten- 

 nessee so greatly outnumbered our army as to encourage 

 the enemy to attack. After a long and severe battle, 

 in which great carnage was inflicted on him, some of 

 our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great 

 strength, and by a disorderly retreat compelled the 

 commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere success- 

 ful, and finally to retire with his whole army to a posi- 

 tion some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is 

 believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault 

 had fought with the valor which they had displayed on 

 previous occasions, and which was manifested in this 

 battle on the other part of the lines, the enemy would 

 have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our 

 country would have escaped the misfortune and the 

 army the mortification of the first defeat that has re- 

 sulted from misconduct by the troops. In the mean 

 time the army of General Burnside was driven from all 

 its field positions in Eastern Tennessee, and forced to 



retreat into its intrenchments at Knorville, where for 

 some weeks it was threatened with capture by the 

 forces under General Longstreet. No information has 

 reached me of the final result of the operations of our 

 commander, though intelligence has arrived of his 

 withdrawal from that place. 



While, therefore, our success in driving the enemy 

 from our soil has not equalled the expectations confi- 

 dently entertained at the commencement of the cam- 

 paign, his further progress has been checked. If we 

 are forced to regret losses in Tennessee and Arkansas, 

 we are not without ground for congratulation on suc- 

 cesses in Louisiana and Texas. On the sea coast he is 

 exhausted by vain efforts to capture our ports, while 

 on the Northern frontier he has in turn felt the pressure 

 and dreads the renewal of invasion. The indomitable 

 courage and perseverance of the people in the defence 

 of their homes have been nobly attested by the una- 

 nimity with which the Legislatures of Virginia, North 

 Carolina, and Georgia have recently given expression 

 to the popular sentiment ; and like manifestations may 

 be anticipated from all the States. Whatever obstinacy 

 may be displayed by the enemy in his desperate sacri- 

 fices of money, life, and liberty, in the hope of enslaving 

 us, the experience of mankind has too conclusively 

 shown the superior endurance of those who fight for 

 home, liberty, and independence, to permit any doubt 

 of the result. 



I regret to inform you that there has been no im- 

 provement in the state of our relations with foreign 

 countries since my message in January last. On the 

 contrary, there has been a still greater divergence in 

 the conduct of European nations from that practical 

 impartiality which alone deserves the name of neu- 

 trality, and their action in some cases has assumed a 

 character positively unfriendly. 



You have heretofore been informed that, by common 

 understanding, the initiative in all action touching the 

 contest on this continent had been left by foreign Pow- 

 ers to the two great maritime nations of Western Eu- 

 rope, and that the Governments of these two nations had 

 agreed to take no measures without previous concert. 

 The result of these arrangements has therefore placed it 

 in the power of either France or England to obstruct at 

 pleasure the recognition to which the confederacy is 

 justly entitled, or even to prolong the continuance of 

 hostilities on this side of the Atlantic, if the policy of 

 either could be promoted by the postponement of peace. 

 Each, too, thus became possessed of great influence in 

 so shaping the general exercise of neutral rights in 

 Europe, as to render them subservient to the purpose 

 of aiding one of the belligerents to the detriment of 

 the other. I referred, at your last session, to some of 

 the leading points in the course pursued by professed 

 neutrals, which betrayed a partisan leaning to the side 

 of our enemies; but eVents nave since occurred which 

 induce me to renew the subject in greater detail than 

 was then deemed necessary. In calling to your atten- 

 tion the action of these Governments:, I shall refer to 

 the documents appended to President Lincoln's mes- 

 sages, and to their own correspondence, as disclosing 

 the true nature of their policy and the motives which 

 guided it. To this course no exception can be taken, 

 inasmuch as our attention has been invited to those 

 sources of information by their official publication. 



In May, 1861, the Government of her Britannic Ma- 

 jesty informed our enemies that it had not " allowed 

 any other than an intermediate position on the part of 

 the Southern States," and assured them " that the 

 sympathies of this country (Great Britain) were rather 

 with the North than with the South." 



On the 1st day of June, 1861, the British Govern- 

 ment interdicted the use of its ports " to armed ships 

 and privateers, both of the United States and the so- 

 called Confederate States," with their prizes. The 

 Secretary of State of the United States fully appreci- 

 ated the character and motive of this interdiction, 

 when he observed to Lord Lyons, who communicated 

 it, " that this measure, and that of the same character 

 which had been adopted by France, would probably 

 prove a death blow to Southern privateering." 



