ARMY OPERATIONS. 



77 



At 6 A. M., on the appointed day, Gen. Blair's 

 (17th) corps, holding the extreme left of Gen. 

 McPherson's line, moved toward the eastern 

 point of the mountain to threaten the enemy's 

 rL'ht, while Gen. Dodge's (16th) corps and Gen. 

 :i's (loth) corps assaulted the northern slope 

 adjoining. The brunt of the attack was home 

 by three brigades of the 15th corps, which im- 

 mediately scattered the enemy's skirmishers, 

 and pushing on up the hill with impetuosity, 

 carried part of the rebel rifle-pits. Some of the 

 retreating enemy were captured while endeav- 

 oring to escape to a gorge which intervenes be- 

 tween the right and left halves of Kenesaw. 

 Still pressing forward our troops arrived at the 

 foot of a perpendicular cliff thirty feet high, 

 from the crest of which the enemy formed in 

 line of battle, poured a destructive plunging 

 fire, and rolled down huge stones. Seeing it 

 impossible to scale these cliffs our line halted, 

 retired a short distance, and fortified on the 

 extreme right. For the second and more im- 

 portant attack portions of Gen. Newton's divi- 

 sion of the 4th corps, and of Gen. Davis's of the 

 14th corps, were selected. At a given signal 

 the troops rushed forward with buoyant cour- 

 age, charged up the face of the mountain amidst 

 a murderous fire from a powerful battery on 

 the summit and through two lines of abatis, 

 carried a line of rifle-pits beyond, and reached 

 the works. The colors of several regiments 

 were planted before the latter, and some of the 

 men succeeded in mounting the ramparts, but 

 the deaths of Gens. Wagner and Harker, and 

 the wounding of Gen. McCook, the destructive 

 fire of both musketry and artillery, and the dif- 

 ficulty of deploying the long columns under such 

 fire, rendered it necessary to recall the men. 

 Gen. Newton's troops returned to their original 

 line, while Gen. Davis's 2d brigade threw up 

 works between those they had carried and the 

 main line of the enemy, and there remained. The 

 whole contest lasted little more than an hour, 

 but cost Gen. Sherman nearly three thousand in 

 killed and wounded, while the enemy, lying be- 

 hind well-formed breastworks, suffered com- 

 paratively slight loss. During the day Gen. 

 Schofield had sharp skirmishing with the ene- 

 my's left wing, and Gen. Cox's division of the 

 23d corps pushed forward to a point nine 

 miles south of Marietta and three from the 

 Chattahoochee ; but the important fighting was 

 in the centre. The failure of the attack is to 

 be attributed to the fact that Gen. Johnston 

 did not allow himself to be deceived by the 

 lengthened line which Gen. Sherman opposed to 

 him. From his elevated position on the sum- 

 mit of Kenesaw he could see plainly that the 

 main posts still confronted him, and that the 

 flanking movement to his left was not in earnest. 

 Contenting himself, therefore, with sending a 

 single corps to watch the right wing, he held 

 his main body to repel the assault on his centre. 



It was not, however, the intention of Gen. 

 Sherman to rest long under the imputation of 

 defeat, and he almost immediately commenced 



preparations to turn the enemy's left, amusing 

 Gen. Johnston, meanwhile, by a show of ap- 

 proaching his centre by saps. On July 1st, 

 Gens. Hooker and Schofield advanced to the 

 right some two miles, and on the 2d Gen. 

 McPherson received orders to rapidly shift 

 his whole force from the extreme left to the 

 extreme right of the Federal lines, and push 

 on to Xickajack Creek, which flows into the 

 Chattahoochee, four miles below the railroad 

 bridge. His place on the left, in front of Ken- 

 esaw, was occupied by Gen. Garrard's cavalry, 

 while Gen. Stoneman's cavalry moved on his 

 flanks to strike the river near Turners Ferry, 

 two miles and a half below the railroad bridge. 

 The object of the movement was speedily de- 

 tected by Gen. Johnston, who at once prepared 

 to evacuate Kenesaw and fall back to the Chat- 

 tahoochee. On the night of the 2d his rear 

 guard abandoned the works which for upward 

 of three weeks had been so resolutely assailed 

 and defended, and before dawn of the 3d the 

 Federal pickets occupied the crest of the moun- 

 tain. Orders were immediately given for Gen. 

 Thomas to move forward along the railroad to 

 Marietta, and thence southward to the Chatta- 

 hoochee, the rest of the army pressing rapidly 

 toward Xickajack Creek to harass the enemy in 

 flank and rear, and if possible to assail him iu 

 the confusion of crossing the river. Gen. Sher- 

 man himself, accompanying the Army of the 

 Cumberland, entered Marietta at 9 o'clock on 

 the morning of the 3d. During the retreat about 

 two thousand prisoners, principally stragglers, 

 fell into the hands of the Federal troops. 



Gen. Johnston was too good a general to 

 leave his movement uncovered, and Gen. 

 Thomas pushing forward in pursuit, found 

 him intrenched behind a fortified line at Smyr- 

 na, half way between the river and Marietta, 

 having his flanks protected by Xickajack and 

 Rottenwood Creeks. This, however, was but 

 an advance line, his intention being to make 

 his real stand in a series of works on the left 

 Lank of the river, and at the railroad bridge, 

 where he had constructed, a strong tete de 

 pont. Again a flanking movement to the 

 right was attempted, and with such success 

 that on the night of the 4th Gen. Johnston 

 fell back to the river, across which the main 

 body of his army passed, Gen. Hardee's corps 

 remaining on the right bank. Gen. Sherman 

 then moved up to the Chattahoochee, and on 

 the evening of the 5th Gens. Thomas's and Mc- 

 Pherson's troops occupied a line extending from 

 a short distance above the railroad bridge to the 

 mouth of Xickajack Creek, while Gen. Schofield 

 was posted in the rear near Smyrna as a re- 

 serve. Cavalry demonstrations were extended 

 as far south as Carnpbelltown, fifteen miles be- 

 low the railroad bridge. By these several man- 

 oeuvres, and particularly by the shifting of Gen. 

 McPherson's troops to the right, Gen. Sherman 

 aimed to convey to Gen. Johnston the impression 

 that it was his h-r't flank that was to be turned; 

 and in pursuance of the same strategy the Fed- 



